考虑动力电池梯级利用的新能源汽车闭环供应链决策

Shengzhong Zhang, Z. Zheng, Wuqiang Li
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摘要

梯队利用是提高退役动力电池利用效率的有效途径。然而,在回收市场的不同发展阶段,废旧电池数量与储能需求之间存在不同的错配,影响了新能源汽车供应链的决策和优化。为解决这一问题,构建了由电池制造商、乘用车制造商和第三方回收商组成的闭环供应链模型。利用Stackelberg博弈论对回收市场发展初期(回收量大于储能需求)和成熟阶段(回收量小于储能需求)进行研究,发现:在分散决策下,储能市场规模的扩大可以有效促进电池回收和二次利用,而在集中决策下无法实现这一效果。二次电池的销售价格在回收市场发展初期不受动力电池损耗的影响,与回收市场成熟期动力电池的损失率成正比。在回收市场发展初期,成本分担契约可以实现闭环供应链协调,而收益共享契约不能实现供应链协调。在回收市场的成熟期,两种契约可以实现协调。
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Closed-loop supply chain decision of new energy vehicles considering the cascade utilization of power batteries
Echelon utilization is an effective way to improve the utilization efficiency of retired power batteries. However, in different development periods of the recycling market, there is different mismatch between the number of used batteries and the demand for energy storage, which affects the decision-making and optimization of new energy vehicles supply chain. To solve this problem, a closed-loop supply chain model composed of battery manufacturer, passenger car manufacturer and third-party recycler was constructed. Stackelberg game theory was used to study the recycling market in the early stage of development (the recycling quantity is greater than the energy storage demand) and the mature stage (the recycling quantity is less than the energy storage demand), and it was found that: Under decentralized decision-making, the expansion of the energy storage market scale can effectively promote battery recycling and secondary utilization, but this effect cannot be achieved under centralized decision-making. The selling price of secondary batteries is not affected by the loss of power batteries in the early stage of the development of the recycling market, and is proportional to the loss rate of power batteries in the mature period of the recycling market. In the early stage of the development of the recycling market, the cost-sharing contract can achieve closed-loop supply chain coordination, but the revenue-sharing contract cannot achieve supply chain coordination. In the mature period of the recycling market, both contracts can achieve coordination.
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