{"title":"货币在随机匹配的贸易驿站经济中的重要性","authors":"Alessandro Marchesiani","doi":"10.1093/oep/gpad038","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article studies how the structure of centralized markets can affect efficient allocation in anonymous decentralized trades. In line with previous studies, we show that efficiency in decentralized markets can be sustained in a moneyless finite-number-of-agents setting if agents are patient enough and the price is observed with noise. We additionally show that, if there are no gains from trade, then the price associated with an inactive centralized market is zero irrespective of the noise. Thus, the non-essentiality-of-money result is a more robust phenomenon when the centralized market acts only as a coordination device.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The essentiality of money in a trading post economy with random matching\",\"authors\":\"Alessandro Marchesiani\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oep/gpad038\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This article studies how the structure of centralized markets can affect efficient allocation in anonymous decentralized trades. In line with previous studies, we show that efficiency in decentralized markets can be sustained in a moneyless finite-number-of-agents setting if agents are patient enough and the price is observed with noise. We additionally show that, if there are no gains from trade, then the price associated with an inactive centralized market is zero irrespective of the noise. Thus, the non-essentiality-of-money result is a more robust phenomenon when the centralized market acts only as a coordination device.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48092,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad038\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad038","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The essentiality of money in a trading post economy with random matching
Abstract This article studies how the structure of centralized markets can affect efficient allocation in anonymous decentralized trades. In line with previous studies, we show that efficiency in decentralized markets can be sustained in a moneyless finite-number-of-agents setting if agents are patient enough and the price is observed with noise. We additionally show that, if there are no gains from trade, then the price associated with an inactive centralized market is zero irrespective of the noise. Thus, the non-essentiality-of-money result is a more robust phenomenon when the centralized market acts only as a coordination device.
期刊介绍：
Oxford Economic Papers is a general economics journal, publishing refereed papers in economic theory, applied economics, econometrics, economic development, economic history, and the history of economic thought. It occasionally publishes survey articles in addition to original papers. Books are not reviewed, but substantial review articles are considered. The journal occasionally publishes survey articles in addition to original papers, and occasionally publishes special issues or symposia.
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