Q4 Arts and Humanities Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI:10.24917/20841043.10.2.6
Adriana Warmbier
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摘要

反思的权威。根据科斯加德的构成论点,道德能人:在本文中,我要讨论的问题是,克里斯汀·科斯加德对道德能人与其行为目的之间的规范关系的描述,构成了她的实践身份,是否会避免陷入道德哲学中另一个抽象理论的陷阱。行为理由的规范性权威的构成论点的支持者提出了一个有希望的方法来解决这个元伦理问题,他们认为理由的规范性权威是在推理本身的实践中发现的(在代理本身中)。在关于理性要求的规范性的两个构成论点中,科斯加德首先试图论证“规范性问题”并不仅仅在于寻找道德实践的解释,而是在于问“什么证明道德对我们的要求是正当的?”第二,确立道德标准之所以对我们提出要求,是因为它们代表了构成自我的命令(违反道德标准的代价是失去实际身份)。Korsgaard用她自己修改过的反思背书法来处理这两个论点。她声称,人类意识的反思结构建立了我们与自己的规范性关系,这是一种权威关系(这是义务的来源)。我认为,科斯加德将行动描述为自我构成(一种实践认同感的构成),未能建立反思的权威。我引用了讨论过的说法,即我们行为的理性权威来自反思的审查(反思的检验)。通过观察作为科斯加德方法基础的康德的实践理性模型,我提出了将亚里士多德的实践理性模型作为反思性认可策略的有用框架的可能性。
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Refleksja jako źródło autorytetu. Podmiotowość moralna w świetle argumentu konstytutywizmu Korsgaard
The authority of reflection. Moral agency in the light of Korsgaard’s constitutive arguments: In this paper I address the question as to whether Christine Korsgaard’s account of normative relations between the moral agent and the ends of her actions which constitutes her practical identity avoids falling into the trap of being just another abstract theory in moral philosophy. Proponents of constitutive arguments for the normative authority of reasons for action offer a promising approach to this meta‐ethical question by arguing that the normative authority of reasons is found within the practice of reasoning itself (in agency itself). In two constitutive arguments for the normativity of rational requirements, Korsgaard attempts first to argue that “the normative question” does not consist in looking merely for an explanation of moral practices but in asking “What justifies the claims that morality makes on us?”, and secondly to establish that the reason why ethical standards make claims on us is that they represent commands which are constitutive of having a self (the cost of violating ethical standards is the loss of practical identity). Korsgaard deals with these two arguments using her own modified version of the reflective endorsement method. She claims that the reflective structure of human consciousness establishes the normative relation we have to ourselves and that this is a relation of authority (that is the source of obligation). I argue that Korsgaard’s account of action as self‐constitution (the constitution of a practical sense of identity) fails to arrive at establishing the authority of reflection. I draw on the discussed claim that reasoned authority for our actions comes from reflective scrutiny (the test of reflection). Viewing the Kantian model of practical reason which lies at the basis of Korsgaard’s approach, I suggest the possibility of applying the Aristotelian model of practical reason as an useful framework for the reflective endorsement strategy.
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来源期刊
Argument  Biannual Philosophical Journal
Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Arts and Humanities-Religious Studies
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期刊最新文献
Anil Seth, Being you. A new science of consciousness A revitalisation of virtue ethics in contemporary education Synkretyczne pouczenie jogiczne w Ćarakasanhicie (Śarirasthana 1.137–155) Geistlosigkeit. Reflexionen zur Aktualität von Søren Kierkegaards Konstruktion des Selbst im Spannungsfeld von Immanenz und Transzendenz Dharmarāja and Dhammarāja (II)
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