{"title":"基于混合云定价的最优容量分割","authors":"Wei Wang, Baochun Li, B. Liang","doi":"10.1109/ICDCS.2012.52","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cloud resources are usually priced in multiple markets with different service guarantees. For example, Amazon EC2 prices virtual instances under three pricing schemes -- the subscription option (a.k.a., Reserved Instances), the pay-as-you-go offer (a.k.a., On-Demand Instances), and an auction-like spot market (a.k.a., Spot Instances) -- simultaneously. There arises a new problem of capacity segmentation: how can a provider allocate resources to different categories of pricing schemes, so that the total revenue is maximized? In this paper, we consider an EC2-like pricing scheme with traditional pay-as-you-go pricing augmented by an auction market, where bidders periodically bid for resources and can use the instances for as long as they wish, until the clearing price exceeds their bids. We show that optimal periodic auctions must follow the design of m+1-price auction with seller's reservation price. Theoretical analysis also suggests the connections between periodic auctions and EC2 spot market. Furthermore, we formulate the optimal capacity segmentation strategy as a Markov decision process over some demand prediction window. To mitigate the high computational complexity of the conventional dynamic programming solution, we develop a near-optimal solution that has significantly lower complexity and is shown to asymptotically approach the optimal revenue.","PeriodicalId":6300,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE 32nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems","volume":"16 1","pages":"425-434"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"84","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Towards Optimal Capacity Segmentation with Hybrid Cloud Pricing\",\"authors\":\"Wei Wang, Baochun Li, B. Liang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICDCS.2012.52\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Cloud resources are usually priced in multiple markets with different service guarantees. For example, Amazon EC2 prices virtual instances under three pricing schemes -- the subscription option (a.k.a., Reserved Instances), the pay-as-you-go offer (a.k.a., On-Demand Instances), and an auction-like spot market (a.k.a., Spot Instances) -- simultaneously. There arises a new problem of capacity segmentation: how can a provider allocate resources to different categories of pricing schemes, so that the total revenue is maximized? In this paper, we consider an EC2-like pricing scheme with traditional pay-as-you-go pricing augmented by an auction market, where bidders periodically bid for resources and can use the instances for as long as they wish, until the clearing price exceeds their bids. We show that optimal periodic auctions must follow the design of m+1-price auction with seller's reservation price. Theoretical analysis also suggests the connections between periodic auctions and EC2 spot market. Furthermore, we formulate the optimal capacity segmentation strategy as a Markov decision process over some demand prediction window. To mitigate the high computational complexity of the conventional dynamic programming solution, we develop a near-optimal solution that has significantly lower complexity and is shown to asymptotically approach the optimal revenue.\",\"PeriodicalId\":6300,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2012 IEEE 32nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"425-434\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-06-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"84\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2012 IEEE 32nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2012.52\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2012 IEEE 32nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2012.52","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Towards Optimal Capacity Segmentation with Hybrid Cloud Pricing
Cloud resources are usually priced in multiple markets with different service guarantees. For example, Amazon EC2 prices virtual instances under three pricing schemes -- the subscription option (a.k.a., Reserved Instances), the pay-as-you-go offer (a.k.a., On-Demand Instances), and an auction-like spot market (a.k.a., Spot Instances) -- simultaneously. There arises a new problem of capacity segmentation: how can a provider allocate resources to different categories of pricing schemes, so that the total revenue is maximized? In this paper, we consider an EC2-like pricing scheme with traditional pay-as-you-go pricing augmented by an auction market, where bidders periodically bid for resources and can use the instances for as long as they wish, until the clearing price exceeds their bids. We show that optimal periodic auctions must follow the design of m+1-price auction with seller's reservation price. Theoretical analysis also suggests the connections between periodic auctions and EC2 spot market. Furthermore, we formulate the optimal capacity segmentation strategy as a Markov decision process over some demand prediction window. To mitigate the high computational complexity of the conventional dynamic programming solution, we develop a near-optimal solution that has significantly lower complexity and is shown to asymptotically approach the optimal revenue.