We hypothesize that suppliers use customers’ financial statement information when making capital investment decisions but are misled into overinvesting when a major customer misstates their financial statements. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that suppliers make higher investments in PP&E and inventory when a major customer misstates their financial statements than otherwise, compared to matched suppliers that do not experience customer misstatements over similar periods. The overinvestment is confined to suppliers that depend heavily on their misstating customer. We verify that suppliers are misled into overinvesting by showing that while customer earnings do not predict future customer orders when they are misstated, suppliers continue to weight customer earnings when making capital investments. To support the overinvestment claim, we show that suppliers with misstating customers impair a disproportionately higher share of their assets in the future.
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