Abstract Eliciting actual donations toward a public good has been proposed as a means of estimating a lower bound to individuals compensating surplus, and can be accomplished using mail/phone surveys or field experiments. This study shows that when warm-glow is present, the elicitation instrument decreases the transaction costs of donating. This presents an obstacle to using the donation mechanism. As a remedy, we propose the use of a multi-donation mechanism where subjects can direct their donation to alternative public goods. Results from a field experiment confirm this instrument-induced bias can be large, suggesting field experiment practitioners should seriously consider how their experimental procedures may alter economic behavior.
{"title":"Instrument-Induced Bias in Donation Mechanisms: Evidence from the Field","authors":"B. Norwood, J. Lusk","doi":"10.2202/1538-0645.1413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1413","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Eliciting actual donations toward a public good has been proposed as a means of estimating a lower bound to individuals compensating surplus, and can be accomplished using mail/phone surveys or field experiments. This study shows that when warm-glow is present, the elicitation instrument decreases the transaction costs of donating. This presents an obstacle to using the donation mechanism. As a remedy, we propose the use of a multi-donation mechanism where subjects can direct their donation to alternative public goods. Results from a field experiment confirm this instrument-induced bias can be large, suggesting field experiment practitioners should seriously consider how their experimental procedures may alter economic behavior.","PeriodicalId":112351,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124899365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David F. Bradford, Rebecca A Fender, Stephen H. Shore, Martin Wagner
Abstract The objective of this paper is primarily methodological. Using a new specification, we reanalyze the data on worldwide environmental quality investigated by Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger in their well-known paper on the environmental Kuznets curve (which postulates an inverse U-shaped relationship between income level and pollution). This new specification avoids using nonlinear transformations of potentially nonstationary regressors in panel estimation, which is a major unresolved econometric problem plaguing much of the existing literature. We furthermore draw conclusions from fixed effects estimation, which had eluded Grossman and Krueger. Our estimation results indicate the presence of an EKC for only six of the fourteen pollutants, whereas Grossman and Krueger find support for all but one pollutant.
{"title":"The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Exploring a Fresh Specification","authors":"David F. Bradford, Rebecca A Fender, Stephen H. Shore, Martin Wagner","doi":"10.2202/1538-0645.1073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1073","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The objective of this paper is primarily methodological. Using a new specification, we reanalyze the data on worldwide environmental quality investigated by Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger in their well-known paper on the environmental Kuznets curve (which postulates an inverse U-shaped relationship between income level and pollution). This new specification avoids using nonlinear transformations of potentially nonstationary regressors in panel estimation, which is a major unresolved econometric problem plaguing much of the existing literature. We furthermore draw conclusions from fixed effects estimation, which had eluded Grossman and Krueger. Our estimation results indicate the presence of an EKC for only six of the fourteen pollutants, whereas Grossman and Krueger find support for all but one pollutant.","PeriodicalId":112351,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116639590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We analyze the behavior of foreign banks who sequentially provide credit to finance projects in an emerging market. The foreign banks are exposed to both project-risks and the macro-economic risk of a currency crisis, and there are no bailout guarantees. Nevertheless, we show that it is often the case that banks provide too much credit too easily and that this behavior may precipitate the onset of a currency crisis. We demonstrate how the imposition of capital controls in the form of taxes and subsidies on foreign investment may improve the situation. Whereas most of the literature on currency crises focuses its analysis on debtor countries and thus on the borrowers' side, our paper illustrates that the lenders' side also deserves attention.
{"title":"Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis","authors":"Z. Neeman, G. Orosel","doi":"10.2202/1538-0645.1050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1050","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We analyze the behavior of foreign banks who sequentially provide credit to finance projects in an emerging market. The foreign banks are exposed to both project-risks and the macro-economic risk of a currency crisis, and there are no bailout guarantees. Nevertheless, we show that it is often the case that banks provide too much credit too easily and that this behavior may precipitate the onset of a currency crisis. We demonstrate how the imposition of capital controls in the form of taxes and subsidies on foreign investment may improve the situation. Whereas most of the literature on currency crises focuses its analysis on debtor countries and thus on the borrowers' side, our paper illustrates that the lenders' side also deserves attention.","PeriodicalId":112351,"journal":{"name":"Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127200655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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