Bilateral aid projects continue to proliferate in an uncoordinated fashion, leading to fragmented aid delivery, despite high-level political promises to reign in the practice. Frequently absent in the academic and policy debates is an exploration of which policy venues can be effective in changing donor behavior. In this paper, we explore the role of the World Bank in promulgating best practices and enhancing sectoral coordination among bilateral donors. The World Bank's size, policy clout, and its own publicly stated commitments should make it a prime candidate for enacting measures that can help reduce bilateral aid proliferation and fragmentation. We concentrate on sectoral aid allocations and identify possible venues through which the World Bank can affect bilateral donor behavior and increase allocative efficiency, including as Lead Partner, Balancer, and by leading by example through Best Practices. Based on project-level data from 1998 to 2013, we find that bilateral donors and the World Bank allocate projects in a complementary fashion into the same sectors. Furthermore, World Bank and bilateral project numbers move together, and there is some evidence that bilateral donors emulate World Bank behavior. There is no evidence that World Bank activities help to reduce bilateral aid fragmentation.
{"title":"Multilateral Aid to the Rescue? Sectoral Fragmentation of Bilateral Development Aid and the Role of the World Bank","authors":"M. Steinwand, B. Reinsberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3575822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3575822","url":null,"abstract":"Bilateral aid projects continue to proliferate in an uncoordinated fashion, leading to fragmented aid delivery, despite high-level political promises to reign in the practice. Frequently absent in the academic and policy debates is an exploration of which policy venues can be effective in changing donor behavior. In this paper, we explore the role of the World Bank in promulgating best practices and enhancing sectoral coordination among bilateral donors. The World Bank's size, policy clout, and its own publicly stated commitments should make it a prime candidate for enacting measures that can help reduce bilateral aid proliferation and fragmentation. We concentrate on sectoral aid allocations and identify possible venues through which the World Bank can affect bilateral donor behavior and increase allocative efficiency, including as Lead Partner, Balancer, and by leading by example through Best Practices. Based on project-level data from 1998 to 2013, we find that bilateral donors and the World Bank allocate projects in a complementary fashion into the same sectors. Furthermore, World Bank and bilateral project numbers move together, and there is some evidence that bilateral donors emulate World Bank behavior. There is no evidence that World Bank activities help to reduce bilateral aid fragmentation.","PeriodicalId":114338,"journal":{"name":"PSN: World Bank & International Monetary Fund (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129593119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cash department is an important department of any bank. It is the main source of all banking activities for the reason every day bank has to remain certain amount in cash in accordance with the rules and regulations. This department is a very sensitive organ of a bank. The procedures of receiving cash are maintained properly with the help of Cashier. Documents relevant to this section including cash deposit and cash withdrawal are preserved as record very carefully. At present, cash department of a bank provide services to the clients by using modern technology. Various debit and credit vouchers are used in cash department. Different kinds of cheques are used for cash withdrawal whereas various registrars are maintained to keep record of each transaction. Clearing helps in cash collection from other banks and debit card or credit card makes easier cash withdrawal from the ATM booth. However, customers’ satisfaction highly depends on cash department of a bank.
{"title":"A Practical Approach to Cash Department of a Bank","authors":"Md. Ashabur Rahman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3468617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3468617","url":null,"abstract":"Cash department is an important department of any bank. It is the main source of all banking activities for the reason every day bank has to remain certain amount in cash in accordance with the rules and regulations. This department is a very sensitive organ of a bank. The procedures of receiving cash are maintained properly with the help of Cashier. Documents relevant to this section including cash deposit and cash withdrawal are preserved as record very carefully. At present, cash department of a bank provide services to the clients by using modern technology. Various debit and credit vouchers are used in cash department. Different kinds of cheques are used for cash withdrawal whereas various registrars are maintained to keep record of each transaction. Clearing helps in cash collection from other banks and debit card or credit card makes easier cash withdrawal from the ATM booth. However, customers’ satisfaction highly depends on cash department of a bank.","PeriodicalId":114338,"journal":{"name":"PSN: World Bank & International Monetary Fund (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129743460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To measure the global spillovers of a Chinese slowdown on the long-term nominal interest rates in the US/Germany, I model the US/German nominal term structure jointly in the post financial crisis (FC) sample, including the Chinese leading indicator as a new factor. I use an affine term structure model and decompose changes in the 5-year nominal interest rates into (1) changes in the expected future nominal short rate, “the signaling channel,” and (2) the 5-year term premium, “the portfolio balance channel.” A drop in the Chinese leading indicator results in a significant drop in the US/German growth over the first year. In the US, this leads to clear signaling effects but no portfolio balancing effects. In Germany, I find both signaling and portfolio balancing effects, but the direction of these effects is opposite to what one might expect. To deal with the different monetary regimes since the Sovereign debt crisis (SDC) I also model the German term structure independently from the US in the post SDC sample. Like in the US, I now find that in Germany, a lower Chinese leading indicator has important signaling effects in the expected direction. However, (opposite) portfolio balancing effects neutralize these signaling effects on the estimated 5-year Bund yield.
{"title":"A Chinese Slowdown and the Nominal Term Structures of the US and German Interest Rates","authors":"M. Maletič","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3222271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3222271","url":null,"abstract":"To measure the global spillovers of a Chinese slowdown on the long-term nominal interest rates in the US/Germany, I model the US/German nominal term structure jointly in the post financial crisis (FC) sample, including the Chinese leading indicator as a new factor. I use an affine term structure model and decompose changes in the 5-year nominal interest rates into (1) changes in the expected future nominal short rate, “the signaling channel,” and (2) the 5-year term premium, “the portfolio balance channel.” A drop in the Chinese leading indicator results in a significant drop in the US/German growth over the first year. In the US, this leads to clear signaling effects but no portfolio balancing effects. In Germany, I find both signaling and portfolio balancing effects, but the direction of these effects is opposite to what one might expect. To deal with the different monetary regimes since the Sovereign debt crisis (SDC) I also model the German term structure independently from the US in the post SDC sample. Like in the US, I now find that in Germany, a lower Chinese leading indicator has important signaling effects in the expected direction. However, (opposite) portfolio balancing effects neutralize these signaling effects on the estimated 5-year Bund yield.","PeriodicalId":114338,"journal":{"name":"PSN: World Bank & International Monetary Fund (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114247148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While many international organisations have independent evaluations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Health organization (WHO), uniquely the World Bank in its 2015 World Development Report sought to ascertain the potential biases that influence how its staff interpret evidence and influence policy. Here, we describe the World Bank's study design, including experiments to ascertain the impact on Bank staff's judgements of complexity, confirmation bias, sunk cost bias, and an understanding of the wishes of those whom they seek to help. We then review the Bank's proposed mechanisms to minimise the impact of the biases they identified. We argue that this approach, that we refer to as 'reflective practice,' deserves to be adopted more widely among institutions that seek to use evidence from research to inform policy and practice.
{"title":"Reflective Practice: How the World Bank Explored its Own Biases?","authors":"M. Mckee, D. Stuckler","doi":"10.15171/ijhpm.2015.216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15171/ijhpm.2015.216","url":null,"abstract":"While many international organisations have independent evaluations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Health organization (WHO), uniquely the World Bank in its 2015 World Development Report sought to ascertain the potential biases that influence how its staff interpret evidence and influence policy. Here, we describe the World Bank's study design, including experiments to ascertain the impact on Bank staff's judgements of complexity, confirmation bias, sunk cost bias, and an understanding of the wishes of those whom they seek to help. We then review the Bank's proposed mechanisms to minimise the impact of the biases they identified. We argue that this approach, that we refer to as 'reflective practice,' deserves to be adopted more widely among institutions that seek to use evidence from research to inform policy and practice.","PeriodicalId":114338,"journal":{"name":"PSN: World Bank & International Monetary Fund (Topic)","volume":"220 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115652501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The second document prepared by The Group of Lecce.Our ambitious step moved from our belief that the global economy needs today a system of governance that is both effective and legitimate. Only a governance system that is perceived as legitimate by the world nations and their citizens—we stressed in our document— can ultimately make choices that are accepted and effective: legitimacy and effectiveness, while trading each other off in the short term, are mutually complementary in the long haul.In such a spirit, our proposal aimed to transform the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF and the Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF into “the” universal forums where state ministers and governors carry out global financial and development policy cooperation. Unlike any “G” and their derivative country groupings, the two committees truly originated within the framework of the Bretton Woods system to oversee international finance and economic development policies, and were endowed with an internal governance structure that, while requiring major improvements today, was intended all along to give voice to all member countries in a way that has remained unequalled by any of the “G’s” so far mobilized. Our proposal, also, included many elements to reform the corporate governance system of the IMF and the World Bank, with a view to enhancing their legitimacy and the effectiveness of their operation at the core of the global economy.As you prepare to meet in Pittsburgh, we wish to solicit your attention to aspects of a fundamentalcomponent of global policy in our times: the effectiveness and legitimacy of “soft law”. Soft law isessential to achieve economic and financial stability in a world of nations without a global government. Although inherently flexible and voluntary, very often many new soft-law provisions in finance generate obligations to which governments and peoples become subject. But the making of soft law at a time when it is increasingly accepted that all nations and individuals possess the right to a voice and for their voice to be heard requires that the processes leading to the formation and implementation of soft law reflect criteria of procedural openness and transparency, participation of nations and peoples, and accountability vis-a-vis the global community of those involved in handling the processes. The soft-law making practices currently adopted by the international financial community do not reflect these criteria (far from it, in fact).
{"title":"Strenghtening the Rule of Law in Global Finance","authors":"L. Maggio","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1701045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1701045","url":null,"abstract":"The second document prepared by The Group of Lecce.Our ambitious step moved from our belief that the global economy needs today a system of governance that is both effective and legitimate. Only a governance system that is perceived as legitimate by the world nations and their citizens—we stressed in our document— can ultimately make choices that are accepted and effective: legitimacy and effectiveness, while trading each other off in the short term, are mutually complementary in the long haul.In such a spirit, our proposal aimed to transform the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF and the Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF into “the” universal forums where state ministers and governors carry out global financial and development policy cooperation. Unlike any “G” and their derivative country groupings, the two committees truly originated within the framework of the Bretton Woods system to oversee international finance and economic development policies, and were endowed with an internal governance structure that, while requiring major improvements today, was intended all along to give voice to all member countries in a way that has remained unequalled by any of the “G’s” so far mobilized. Our proposal, also, included many elements to reform the corporate governance system of the IMF and the World Bank, with a view to enhancing their legitimacy and the effectiveness of their operation at the core of the global economy.As you prepare to meet in Pittsburgh, we wish to solicit your attention to aspects of a fundamentalcomponent of global policy in our times: the effectiveness and legitimacy of “soft law”. Soft law isessential to achieve economic and financial stability in a world of nations without a global government. Although inherently flexible and voluntary, very often many new soft-law provisions in finance generate obligations to which governments and peoples become subject. But the making of soft law at a time when it is increasingly accepted that all nations and individuals possess the right to a voice and for their voice to be heard requires that the processes leading to the formation and implementation of soft law reflect criteria of procedural openness and transparency, participation of nations and peoples, and accountability vis-a-vis the global community of those involved in handling the processes. The soft-law making practices currently adopted by the international financial community do not reflect these criteria (far from it, in fact).","PeriodicalId":114338,"journal":{"name":"PSN: World Bank & International Monetary Fund (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126813666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Banerjee, A. Deaton, N. Lustig, Kenneth Rogoff, Edward Hsu
This evaluation of World Bank research between 1998 and 2005 was carried out by a panel consisting of Abhijit Banerjee (MIT), Angus Deaton (Princeton, chair), Nora Lustig (UNDP), and Kenneth Rogoff (Harvard.) The panel selected a large random sample of research projects, which were read and assessed by a team of 25 evaluators. Panel members also solicited views from current and past Bank staff, as well as from policy makers and academics in developing countries. Based on the evidence the authors assembled, the interviews the authors conducted, and their own consideration, the panel concluded that the World Bank needs a research department, and that its research needs cannot be fully met by hiring in from the outside. Research is a central part of quality control in the Bank, and is crucial to its claim to be 'Knowledge Bank.' Without a research-based ability to learn from its projects and policies, the Bank could not maintain its role as the world's leading development agency. The 2.5 percent of its administrative budget that the Bank spends on research is surely too low given the multiplicity of tasks that research is expected to fulfill, including the generation of new knowledge about development, the collection and dissemination of data, the generation of knowledge to support guide Bank strategy, operational support, and capacity building in client countries. As the world becomes richer, and already today among middle income countries, the need for high-quality, research-based advice will only become stronger as the need for Bank lending diminishes.
{"title":"An Evaluation of World Bank Research, 1998 - 2005","authors":"A. Banerjee, A. Deaton, N. Lustig, Kenneth Rogoff, Edward Hsu","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2950327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2950327","url":null,"abstract":"This evaluation of World Bank research between 1998 and 2005 was carried out by a panel consisting of Abhijit Banerjee (MIT), Angus Deaton (Princeton, chair), Nora Lustig (UNDP), and Kenneth Rogoff (Harvard.) The panel selected a large random sample of research projects, which were read and assessed by a team of 25 evaluators. Panel members also solicited views from current and past Bank staff, as well as from policy makers and academics in developing countries. Based on the evidence the authors assembled, the interviews the authors conducted, and their own consideration, the panel concluded that the World Bank needs a research department, and that its research needs cannot be fully met by hiring in from the outside. Research is a central part of quality control in the Bank, and is crucial to its claim to be 'Knowledge Bank.' Without a research-based ability to learn from its projects and policies, the Bank could not maintain its role as the world's leading development agency. The 2.5 percent of its administrative budget that the Bank spends on research is surely too low given the multiplicity of tasks that research is expected to fulfill, including the generation of new knowledge about development, the collection and dissemination of data, the generation of knowledge to support guide Bank strategy, operational support, and capacity building in client countries. As the world becomes richer, and already today among middle income countries, the need for high-quality, research-based advice will only become stronger as the need for Bank lending diminishes.","PeriodicalId":114338,"journal":{"name":"PSN: World Bank & International Monetary Fund (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129018488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：