Pub Date : 2020-10-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866213.003.0001
Gus van Harten
In this chapter, foreign investor protections are introduced as a symbol and guarantor of global inequality. Backed by the most powerful adjudicative mechanism in international law, these protections benefit 255,000 people whose combined wealth exceeds that of 80 per cent of the world’s adult population, about four billion people. They lead one to ask if the one hundred companies responsible for most industrial greenhouse gas emissions, for example, are so vulnerable or helpful to others as to deserve extraordinary international protection. Commonplace arguments in favour of investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) are surveyed and criticized. The promotional role of the ISDS industry of arbitrators, lawyers, and experts, for which ISDS has generated to billions in fees, is also highlighted, focusing on arbitrators whose pro-investor interpretations laid a foundation for the explosion of ISDS.
{"title":"Fortifying Inequality","authors":"Gus van Harten","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198866213.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866213.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, foreign investor protections are introduced as a symbol and guarantor of global inequality. Backed by the most powerful adjudicative mechanism in international law, these protections benefit 255,000 people whose combined wealth exceeds that of 80 per cent of the world’s adult population, about four billion people. They lead one to ask if the one hundred companies responsible for most industrial greenhouse gas emissions, for example, are so vulnerable or helpful to others as to deserve extraordinary international protection. Commonplace arguments in favour of investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) are surveyed and criticized. The promotional role of the ISDS industry of arbitrators, lawyers, and experts, for which ISDS has generated to billions in fees, is also highlighted, focusing on arbitrators whose pro-investor interpretations laid a foundation for the explosion of ISDS.","PeriodicalId":114722,"journal":{"name":"The Trouble with Foreign Investor Protection","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116149655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866213.003.0006
Gus van Harten
In this chapter, the impact of investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) on countries is examined more closely. Examples are given of how governments have changed their decisions to favour investors under ISDS pressure. As knowledge of ISDS continues to grow, state institutions face more pressure to avoid offending those most able to finance claims. Predictably, governments have responded to ISDS by institutionalizing ‘regulatory chill’; that is, by reconfiguring the state apparatus to privilege the ultra-wealthy, creating immeasurable potential losses for those who do not own wealth abroad. It is now reasonable to expect that such chill happens in all countries exposed to ISDS claims by wealthy investors and having at least some institutional capacity to identify and manage the risks.
{"title":"Intimidating Sovereigns","authors":"Gus van Harten","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198866213.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866213.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, the impact of investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) on countries is examined more closely. Examples are given of how governments have changed their decisions to favour investors under ISDS pressure. As knowledge of ISDS continues to grow, state institutions face more pressure to avoid offending those most able to finance claims. Predictably, governments have responded to ISDS by institutionalizing ‘regulatory chill’; that is, by reconfiguring the state apparatus to privilege the ultra-wealthy, creating immeasurable potential losses for those who do not own wealth abroad. It is now reasonable to expect that such chill happens in all countries exposed to ISDS claims by wealthy investors and having at least some institutional capacity to identify and manage the risks.","PeriodicalId":114722,"journal":{"name":"The Trouble with Foreign Investor Protection","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116191602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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