{"title":"\"On Desolation Row\": The Blurring of the Borders between Civil and Criminal Mental Disability Law, and What It Means to All of Us","authors":"M. Perlin, D. Dorfman, Naomi Weinstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3110985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3110985","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":114888,"journal":{"name":"Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123650093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Focusing solely on whether a hotel owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a guest registry is akin to asking whether Verizon Wireless has a reasonable expectation of privacy in its customer lists. The answer to those questions should be yes, but the sixty-four thousand dollar question — and the proverbial elephant in the room — is whether hotel occupants and cell phone users forfeit their privacy rights simply because they check into the Beverly Hills Hotel or call their significant others from a Smart Phone on the Santa Monica Freeway. Put differently, a hotel owner’s expectation of privacy in a guest registry is the tip of the iceberg. The hotel guests’ privacy rights — just like the cell phone user’s and the internet subscriber’s — is where the rubber meets the constitutional road.The issue lurking in the background of City of Los Angeles v. Patel — and in the back of most citizens’ minds — transcends hotel owners, highly regulated industries, and Holiday Inns. It is about whether the third-party doctrine, which was created during the disco era when rotary telephones were in vogue, adequately protects privacy rights in the digital era. The answer to this question should be no. If the answer to this question is yes, and the third-party doctrine remains intact in its current form, then law enforcement officers from the Los Angeles Police Department will be able to march into the lobby of the Beverly Hills Hotel without a warrant — or any suspicion whatsoever — and know if a Supreme Court Justice is staying in the Sunset Suite. There’s more. Law enforcement will also be able to know the make, model, and license plate number of the Justice’s vehicle, the length of time the Justice has been staying there (including the Justice’s departure date), the Justice’s room number, and how many people are in the Justice’s room. Incredibly, the hotel owner must provide all of this information to law enforcement officers regardless of whether the officers have probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or even a hunch that criminal activity is afoot. All of this happens without any judicial oversight whatsoever.It gets worse.If the hotel operator at the Beverly Hills Hotel refuses law enforcement’s demand, he or she may spend the night in the Los Angeles County Jail awaiting a trial on charges that can result in six months’ imprisonment and a stiff fine. Something is very wrong — and unreasonable — with this picture. And reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.
{"title":"City of Los Angeles v. Patel: The Upcoming Supreme Court Case No One is Talking About","authors":"Adam Lamparello","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2543157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2543157","url":null,"abstract":"Focusing solely on whether a hotel owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a guest registry is akin to asking whether Verizon Wireless has a reasonable expectation of privacy in its customer lists. The answer to those questions should be yes, but the sixty-four thousand dollar question — and the proverbial elephant in the room — is whether hotel occupants and cell phone users forfeit their privacy rights simply because they check into the Beverly Hills Hotel or call their significant others from a Smart Phone on the Santa Monica Freeway. Put differently, a hotel owner’s expectation of privacy in a guest registry is the tip of the iceberg. The hotel guests’ privacy rights — just like the cell phone user’s and the internet subscriber’s — is where the rubber meets the constitutional road.The issue lurking in the background of City of Los Angeles v. Patel — and in the back of most citizens’ minds — transcends hotel owners, highly regulated industries, and Holiday Inns. It is about whether the third-party doctrine, which was created during the disco era when rotary telephones were in vogue, adequately protects privacy rights in the digital era. The answer to this question should be no. If the answer to this question is yes, and the third-party doctrine remains intact in its current form, then law enforcement officers from the Los Angeles Police Department will be able to march into the lobby of the Beverly Hills Hotel without a warrant — or any suspicion whatsoever — and know if a Supreme Court Justice is staying in the Sunset Suite. There’s more. Law enforcement will also be able to know the make, model, and license plate number of the Justice’s vehicle, the length of time the Justice has been staying there (including the Justice’s departure date), the Justice’s room number, and how many people are in the Justice’s room. Incredibly, the hotel owner must provide all of this information to law enforcement officers regardless of whether the officers have probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or even a hunch that criminal activity is afoot. All of this happens without any judicial oversight whatsoever.It gets worse.If the hotel operator at the Beverly Hills Hotel refuses law enforcement’s demand, he or she may spend the night in the Los Angeles County Jail awaiting a trial on charges that can result in six months’ imprisonment and a stiff fine. Something is very wrong — and unreasonable — with this picture. And reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.","PeriodicalId":114888,"journal":{"name":"Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123747717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Writing with prescience, Professor Jacobus tenBroek eloquently argued mid-century on behalf of participatory justice for individuals with disabilities. Nothing “could be more essential to personality, social existence, [and] economic opportunity” he determined, “than the physical capacity, the public approval, and the legal right to be abroad in the land.” Some fifty years later, Professor tenBroek’s “right to live in the world” -- the ability of persons with disabilities to have equally meaningful contact with the population at large -- became a central feature of the values underlying the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter CRPD, or Convention), the first human rights treaty of the twenty-first century. Accordingly, this Article explores the extent and manner that participatory justice animates the CRPD, first as a general matter and then specifically in reference to Article 30, the provision governing the o! bligations of States Parties to “[p]articipation in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport.” Part I sets forth Professor tenBroek’s jurisprudence in regard to participatory justice. Next, Part II highlights aspects of the Convention that are especially notable for their substantive and procedural inclusion of persons with disabilities and reflective of a deeply participatory model of justice that is consistent with Professor tenBroek’s vision. Part III illustrates these assertions by focusing on CRPD Article 30 and its mandate for inclusive cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport, and explains that provision’s practical significance for the worldwide community of persons with disabilities. We conclude with a few reflections on the Convention’s future impact as a vehicle for social change.
{"title":"Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory Justice, and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities","authors":"M. Stein","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1549673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1549673","url":null,"abstract":"Writing with prescience, Professor Jacobus tenBroek eloquently argued mid-century on behalf of participatory justice for individuals with disabilities. Nothing “could be more essential to personality, social existence, [and] economic opportunity” he determined, “than the physical capacity, the public approval, and the legal right to be abroad in the land.” Some fifty years later, Professor tenBroek’s “right to live in the world” -- the ability of persons with disabilities to have equally meaningful contact with the population at large -- became a central feature of the values underlying the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter CRPD, or Convention), the first human rights treaty of the twenty-first century. Accordingly, this Article explores the extent and manner that participatory justice animates the CRPD, first as a general matter and then specifically in reference to Article 30, the provision governing the o! bligations of States Parties to “[p]articipation in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport.” Part I sets forth Professor tenBroek’s jurisprudence in regard to participatory justice. Next, Part II highlights aspects of the Convention that are especially notable for their substantive and procedural inclusion of persons with disabilities and reflective of a deeply participatory model of justice that is consistent with Professor tenBroek’s vision. Part III illustrates these assertions by focusing on CRPD Article 30 and its mandate for inclusive cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport, and explains that provision’s practical significance for the worldwide community of persons with disabilities. We conclude with a few reflections on the Convention’s future impact as a vehicle for social change.","PeriodicalId":114888,"journal":{"name":"Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights","volume":"PAMI-2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126655936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The goal of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was to create a civil rights law protecting people with disabilities from discrimination on the basis of their disabilities. Disability rights advocates in 1990 were victorious in their efforts to open doors for people with disabilities and to change the country's outlook and acceptance of people with disabilities. These advocates believed that the terms of the ADA, based as they were on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, combined with the legislative history of the ADA, would provide clear instructions to the courts that the ADA was intended to provide broad coverage prohibiting discrimination against people with a wide range of physical and mental impairments.Unfortunately, the Supreme Court -- with lower courts following in its lead, barricaded the door that the ADA had opened by interpreting the definition of "disability" in the ADA to create an overly demanding standard for coverage under the law. This article provides an overview of the advocacy effort that has resulted in restoring the original intent of the ADA and destroying the barriers of discrimination that prevent people with disabilities from fully participating in society.
{"title":"The ADA Amendments Act of 2008","authors":"C. Feldblum, K. Barry, E. Benfer","doi":"10.1201/b11513-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1201/b11513-18","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was to create a civil rights law protecting people with disabilities from discrimination on the basis of their disabilities. Disability rights advocates in 1990 were victorious in their efforts to open doors for people with disabilities and to change the country's outlook and acceptance of people with disabilities. These advocates believed that the terms of the ADA, based as they were on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, combined with the legislative history of the ADA, would provide clear instructions to the courts that the ADA was intended to provide broad coverage prohibiting discrimination against people with a wide range of physical and mental impairments.Unfortunately, the Supreme Court -- with lower courts following in its lead, barricaded the door that the ADA had opened by interpreting the definition of \"disability\" in the ADA to create an overly demanding standard for coverage under the law. This article provides an overview of the advocacy effort that has resulted in restoring the original intent of the ADA and destroying the barriers of discrimination that prevent people with disabilities from fully participating in society.","PeriodicalId":114888,"journal":{"name":"Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights","volume":"509 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123198753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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