Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1163/9789401203913_006
Timm Triplett, Willem A. deVries
In order to provide an alternative to the Cartesian myth that knowledge of our thoughts and sensations is “given,” Sellars posits a community of “Rylean ancestors” – humans at an early stage of conceptual development who possess a language containing sophisticated concepts about the physical world and about their own language and behavior, but who lack any concepts of thoughts or sensations. Sellars’s presentation of this thought experiment leaves many important details sketchy. In the following dialogue, we offer our differing assessments of how well those details could be filled out. TT questions how the Rylean hypothesis could provide a plausible account of human thought and sensory experience at any stage of human conceptual development. WdeV responds to TT’s challenge by filling out the picture of what the Ryleans’ conceptual world would look like. TT and WdeV debate the merits and the plausibility of the resulting picture.
{"title":"Is Sellars's Rylean hypothesis plausible? A dialogue","authors":"Timm Triplett, Willem A. deVries","doi":"10.1163/9789401203913_006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789401203913_006","url":null,"abstract":"In order to provide an alternative to the Cartesian myth that knowledge of our thoughts and sensations is “given,” Sellars posits a community of “Rylean ancestors” – humans at an early stage of conceptual development who possess a language containing sophisticated concepts about the physical world and about their own language and behavior, but who lack any concepts of thoughts or sensations. Sellars’s presentation of this thought experiment leaves many important details sketchy. In the following dialogue, we offer our differing assessments of how well those details could be filled out. TT questions how the Rylean hypothesis could provide a plausible account of human thought and sensory experience at any stage of human conceptual development. WdeV responds to TT’s challenge by filling out the picture of what the Ryleans’ conceptual world would look like. TT and WdeV debate the merits and the plausibility of the resulting picture.","PeriodicalId":117860,"journal":{"name":"Poznán studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities","volume":"142 10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129254645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1163/9789401201285_003
T. Kuipers
Surprisingly enough, modified versions of the confirmation theory of Carnap and Hempel and the truth approximation theory of Popper turn out to be smoothly synthesizable. The glue between confirmation and truth approximation appears to be the instrumentalist methodology, rather than the falsificationist one. By evaluating theories separately and comparatively in terms of their successes and problems (hence even if they are already falsified), the instrumentalist methodology provides - both in theory and in practice - the straight route for short-term empirical progress in science in the spirit of Laudan. However, it is argued that such progress is also functional for all kinds of truth approximation: observational, referential, and theoretical. This sheds new light on the long-term dynamic of science and hence on the relation between the main epistemological positions, viz., instrumentalism (Toulmin, Laudan), constructive empiricism (van Fraassen), referential realism (Hacking and Cartwright), and theory realism of a nonessentialist nature (Popper), here called constructive realism. In From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (2000) the above story is presented in great detail. The present synopsis highlights the main ways of theory evaluation presented in that book, viz. evaluation in terms of confirmation (or falsification), empirical progress and truth approximation.
{"title":"The threefold evaluation of theories: a synopsis of from instrumentalism to constructive realism. On some relations between confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation (2000)","authors":"T. Kuipers","doi":"10.1163/9789401201285_003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789401201285_003","url":null,"abstract":"Surprisingly enough, modified versions of the confirmation theory of Carnap and Hempel and the truth approximation theory of Popper turn out to be smoothly synthesizable. The glue between confirmation and truth approximation appears to be the instrumentalist methodology, rather than the falsificationist one. By evaluating theories separately and comparatively in terms of their successes and problems (hence even if they are already falsified), the instrumentalist methodology provides - both in theory and in practice - the straight route for short-term empirical progress in science in the spirit of Laudan. However, it is argued that such progress is also functional for all kinds of truth approximation: observational, referential, and theoretical. This sheds new light on the long-term dynamic of science and hence on the relation between the main epistemological positions, viz., instrumentalism (Toulmin, Laudan), constructive empiricism (van Fraassen), referential realism (Hacking and Cartwright), and theory realism of a nonessentialist nature (Popper), here called constructive realism. In From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (2000) the above story is presented in great detail. The present synopsis highlights the main ways of theory evaluation presented in that book, viz. evaluation in terms of confirmation (or falsification), empirical progress and truth approximation.","PeriodicalId":117860,"journal":{"name":"Poznán studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities","volume":"132 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133694084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1163/9789401203371_019
A. Betti
In 1913 Stanisław Leśniewski published his article on the sempiternity of truth, ‘Is Truth only Eternal or is it both Eternal and Sempiternal?’ (1913). The paper, directed against Kotarbiński’s ‘The Problem of the Existence of the Future’ (1913), made an important contribution to the debate on the excluded middle current in the Lvov circle in those years. The discussion involved at the same time absoluteness, eternity and sempiternity of truth, i. e. truth for ever and truth since ever, and had as ideal reference point Twardowski’s ‘On the So-called Relative Truths’ (1900), where the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School had attacked the relativity of truth. Contrasting Kotarbiński’s positions, Leśniewski defended ‘absolutism’, consequently taking sides with Twardowski. Twardowski had revived Bernard Bolzano’s ideas on the subject, and, mainly thanks to him, these became known in the Lvov-Warsaw School. There is no doubt that Leśniewski knew Twardowski’s ideas and it seems evident that the latter influenced him: Leśniewski’s results are mostly compatible with the ‘absolutistic’ content of Twardowski’s 1900 article. And, similarly, no doubts can be raised about the Bolzanian origin of the aspects of eternity and sempiternity of truth defended by Twardowski in Relative Truths: though his name is not quoted, traces of Bolzano’s legacy can be found even in the examples given by Twardowski, some of which are the same as used by Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre. Yet, since
{"title":"Sempiternal Truth. The Bolzano-Twardowski-Leśniewski Axis","authors":"A. Betti","doi":"10.1163/9789401203371_019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789401203371_019","url":null,"abstract":"In 1913 Stanisław Leśniewski published his article on the sempiternity of truth, ‘Is Truth only Eternal or is it both Eternal and Sempiternal?’ (1913). The paper, directed against Kotarbiński’s ‘The Problem of the Existence of the Future’ (1913), made an important contribution to the debate on the excluded middle current in the Lvov circle in those years. The discussion involved at the same time absoluteness, eternity and sempiternity of truth, i. e. truth for ever and truth since ever, and had as ideal reference point Twardowski’s ‘On the So-called Relative Truths’ (1900), where the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School had attacked the relativity of truth. Contrasting Kotarbiński’s positions, Leśniewski defended ‘absolutism’, consequently taking sides with Twardowski. Twardowski had revived Bernard Bolzano’s ideas on the subject, and, mainly thanks to him, these became known in the Lvov-Warsaw School. There is no doubt that Leśniewski knew Twardowski’s ideas and it seems evident that the latter influenced him: Leśniewski’s results are mostly compatible with the ‘absolutistic’ content of Twardowski’s 1900 article. And, similarly, no doubts can be raised about the Bolzanian origin of the aspects of eternity and sempiternity of truth defended by Twardowski in Relative Truths: though his name is not quoted, traces of Bolzano’s legacy can be found even in the examples given by Twardowski, some of which are the same as used by Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre. Yet, since","PeriodicalId":117860,"journal":{"name":"Poznán studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133582650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9781315800608-12
Gérard Jorland
Evaluation critique de l'application par Nowak du modele de la concretisation au modele marxiste du developpement de la theorie. La conception nowakienne de la transformation et les methodes de Marx sont mises en exergue
对诺瓦克将具体模型应用于马克思主义理论发展模型的批判性评价。强调了诺瓦克的转型观和马克思的方法
{"title":"Idealization and transformation","authors":"Gérard Jorland","doi":"10.4324/9781315800608-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315800608-12","url":null,"abstract":"Evaluation critique de l'application par Nowak du modele de la concretisation au modele marxiste du developpement de la theorie. La conception nowakienne de la transformation et les methodes de Marx sont mises en exergue","PeriodicalId":117860,"journal":{"name":"Poznán studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123062510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1163/9789004356900_006
C. Lorenz
{"title":"Philosophy of history and analytical philosophy in Germany: A special relationship?","authors":"C. Lorenz","doi":"10.1163/9789004356900_006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004356900_006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":117860,"journal":{"name":"Poznán studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116069918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1163/9789401201339_014
J. Kamps
Scientific discourse leaves implicit a vast amount of knowledge, assumes that this background knowledge is taken into account – even taken for granted – and treated as undisputed. In particular, the terminology in the empirical sciences is treated as antecedently understood. The background knowledge surrounding a theory is usually assumed to be true or approximately true. This is in sharp contrast with logic, which explicitly ignores underlying presuppositions and assumes uninterpreted languages. We discuss the problems that background knowledge may cause for the formalization of scientific theories. In particular, we will show how some of these problems can be addressed in the context of the computational representation of scientific theories.
{"title":"The ubiquity of background knowledge","authors":"J. Kamps","doi":"10.1163/9789401201339_014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789401201339_014","url":null,"abstract":"Scientific discourse leaves implicit a vast amount of knowledge, assumes that this background knowledge is taken into account – even taken for granted – and treated as undisputed. In particular, the terminology in the empirical sciences is treated as antecedently understood. The background knowledge surrounding a theory is usually assumed to be true or approximately true. This is in sharp contrast with logic, which explicitly ignores underlying presuppositions and assumes uninterpreted languages. We discuss the problems that background knowledge may cause for the formalization of scientific theories. In particular, we will show how some of these problems can be addressed in the context of the computational representation of scientific theories.","PeriodicalId":117860,"journal":{"name":"Poznán studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133942361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Variable-Binders as Functors","authors":"Achille C. Varzi","doi":"10.7916/D8DR2T6Q","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8DR2T6Q","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":117860,"journal":{"name":"Poznán studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities","volume":"2007 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134615140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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