B. Hayo, Israel García, Pierre‐Guillaume Méon, Florian Neumeier, D. Roth
This paper provides background information and basic descriptive statistics for a representative survey of the German population conducted on our behalf by GfK in the first quarter of 2018. The survey covers various topics, including: 1) attitudes towards asylum seekers; 2) migrating workers in the workplace; 3) inflation and monetary policy; and 4) the role played by local budgets in local voting decisions. We also collect a broad range of socio-demographic and psychological indicators.
{"title":"Public Attitudes Towards Asylum Seekers, Immigrants in the Workplace, Inflation, and Local Budgets: Evidence from a Representative Survey of the German Population","authors":"B. Hayo, Israel García, Pierre‐Guillaume Méon, Florian Neumeier, D. Roth","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3199720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3199720","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides background information and basic descriptive statistics for a representative survey of the German population conducted on our behalf by GfK in the first quarter of 2018. The survey covers various topics, including: 1) attitudes towards asylum seekers; 2) migrating workers in the workplace; 3) inflation and monetary policy; and 4) the role played by local budgets in local voting decisions. We also collect a broad range of socio-demographic and psychological indicators.","PeriodicalId":119240,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Domestic Politics & Conflict (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121063751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent theorizing has emphasized that military mobilizations both sink costs and tie hands, unlike signaling strategies that rely solely on punishments for bluffing, like audience costs. I argue that public reactions to bluffs, and inconsistency more generally, have been misunderstood in this regard, and that a reconceptualization of audience costs as prospect-theory-driven "expectation costs" suggests that threats from leaders who are more accountable to some opinionated audience function as costly signals very much like military mobilizations. This dynamic can help explain, without contradiction, four major phenomena: why all but the most unaccountable leaders consistently act as if bluffing is costly even though traditional audience costs may be trivial; why more accountable leaders' threats are more successful regardless of how and to whom the leader is accountable; why democracies rarely engage in militarized disputes, much less war, with each other; and why the overall relationship between war and democracy is parabolic.
{"title":"Expectation Costs in International Disputes: How Words Work Like Tanks for Accountable Leaders","authors":"David Walsh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3034718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3034718","url":null,"abstract":"Recent theorizing has emphasized that military mobilizations both sink costs and tie hands, unlike signaling strategies that rely solely on punishments for bluffing, like audience costs. I argue that public reactions to bluffs, and inconsistency more generally, have been misunderstood in this regard, and that a reconceptualization of audience costs as prospect-theory-driven \"expectation costs\" suggests that threats from leaders who are more accountable to some opinionated audience function as costly signals very much like military mobilizations. This dynamic can help explain, without contradiction, four major phenomena: why all but the most unaccountable leaders consistently act as if bluffing is costly even though traditional audience costs may be trivial; why more accountable leaders' threats are more successful regardless of how and to whom the leader is accountable; why democracies rarely engage in militarized disputes, much less war, with each other; and why the overall relationship between war and democracy is parabolic.","PeriodicalId":119240,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Domestic Politics & Conflict (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123358713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Control of armies, police and parties delivers hard power in the ‘state of exception’ illustrated by civil war in Nepal. The history of Nepal nevertheless shows how in revolutionary conditions, the crowd can be decisive to advance equality. Soft people power is mostly superior for advancing egalitarian agendas than hard power. Yet momentary people power must grapple with ancient, entrenched, material power. While ethnic or religious groups sometimes create armies, political parties, states within a federation, women do not create such institutions of hard power. Deft vernacularisation of women’s rights, LGBT rights and the rights of Untouchables into the discourses of both Maoist and western hard power delivered some egalitarian shifts. This case reveals how windows of soft power that advance gender and class equality can be widened in the face of resurgence of the hard power of parties, militaries, crony capitalism and foreign capital. Together, window-widening, disciplined nonviolence and vernacularisation to enroll hard power can deliver transformations that favour the marginalised.
{"title":"Gender, Class, Resilient Power: Nepal Lessons in Transformation","authors":"J. Braithwaite","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2685495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2685495","url":null,"abstract":"Control of armies, police and parties delivers hard power in the ‘state of exception’ illustrated by civil war in Nepal. The history of Nepal nevertheless shows how in revolutionary conditions, the crowd can be decisive to advance equality. Soft people power is mostly superior for advancing egalitarian agendas than hard power. Yet momentary people power must grapple with ancient, entrenched, material power. While ethnic or religious groups sometimes create armies, political parties, states within a federation, women do not create such institutions of hard power. Deft vernacularisation of women’s rights, LGBT rights and the rights of Untouchables into the discourses of both Maoist and western hard power delivered some egalitarian shifts. This case reveals how windows of soft power that advance gender and class equality can be widened in the face of resurgence of the hard power of parties, militaries, crony capitalism and foreign capital. Together, window-widening, disciplined nonviolence and vernacularisation to enroll hard power can deliver transformations that favour the marginalised.","PeriodicalId":119240,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Domestic Politics & Conflict (Topic)","volume":"224 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114428051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：