Pub Date : 2008-03-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00331.x
Donghun Kim, R. Cotterill
In this paper, we estimate a mixed logit model for demand in the U.S. processed cheese market. The estimates are used to determine pass-through rates of cost changes under different behavioral regimes. We find that, under collusion, the pass-through rates for all brands fall between 21% and 31% while, under Nash-Bertrand price competition, the range of pass-through rates is between 73% and 103%. The mixed logit model provides a more flexible framework for studying pass-through rates than the logit model since the curvature of the demand functions depends upon the empirical distribution of consumer types.
{"title":"Cost Pass-Through in Differentiated Product Markets: The Case of U.S. Processed Cheese","authors":"Donghun Kim, R. Cotterill","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00331.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00331.x","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we estimate a mixed logit model for demand in the U.S. processed cheese market. The estimates are used to determine pass-through rates of cost changes under different behavioral regimes. We find that, under collusion, the pass-through rates for all brands fall between 21% and 31% while, under Nash-Bertrand price competition, the range of pass-through rates is between 73% and 103%. The mixed logit model provides a more flexible framework for studying pass-through rates than the logit model since the curvature of the demand functions depends upon the empirical distribution of consumer types.","PeriodicalId":126056,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120158080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-09-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00291.x
S. Greenstein, Michael J. Mazzeo
We examine the role of differentiation among competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in nearly 1,200 U.S. cities in 1999 and 2002, before and after a valuation crash affecting communications firms. We test and reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous competitors. We also find strong evidence that differentiated CLECs account for both potential market demand and the business strategies of competitors when making their entry decisions. Finally, product heterogeneity in markets in 1999 helps predict how the structure of markets evolved through 2002. We conclude that the policy debate for local telecommunications regulation should account for differentiated behavior.
{"title":"The Role of Differentiation Strategy in Local Telecommunication Entry and Market Evolution: 1999-2002","authors":"S. Greenstein, Michael J. Mazzeo","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00291.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00291.x","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the role of differentiation among competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in nearly 1,200 U.S. cities in 1999 and 2002, before and after a valuation crash affecting communications firms. We test and reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous competitors. We also find strong evidence that differentiated CLECs account for both potential market demand and the business strategies of competitors when making their entry decisions. Finally, product heterogeneity in markets in 1999 helps predict how the structure of markets evolved through 2002. We conclude that the policy debate for local telecommunications regulation should account for differentiated behavior.","PeriodicalId":126056,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119604981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-02-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00316.x
J. Waldfogel, R. Rob
New information technology has reduced marginal production and distribution costs of information goods to negligible levels and promises to revolutionize many industries. Unpaid copies of digital products can be as good as paid first-generation copies, and their availability can undermine the ability of sellers to cover first-copy costs. As a result, unpaid distribution has emerged as a major issue facing the music and movie industries in the past few years. Using survey data on movie consumption by about 500 University of Pennsylvania college students, we ask whether unpaid consumption of movies displaces paid consumption. Employing a variety of cross-sectional and longitudinal empirical approaches, we find large and statistically significant evidence of displacement. In what we view as the most appropriate empirical specifications, we find that unpaid first consumption reduces paid consumption by about 1 unit. Unpaid second consumption has a smaller effect, about 0.20 units. These estimates indicate that unpaid consumption, which makes up 5.2 percent of movie viewing in our sample, reduced paid consumption in our sample by 3.5 percent.
{"title":"Piracy on the Silver Screen","authors":"J. Waldfogel, R. Rob","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00316.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00316.x","url":null,"abstract":"New information technology has reduced marginal production and distribution costs of information goods to negligible levels and promises to revolutionize many industries. Unpaid copies of digital products can be as good as paid first-generation copies, and their availability can undermine the ability of sellers to cover first-copy costs. As a result, unpaid distribution has emerged as a major issue facing the music and movie industries in the past few years. Using survey data on movie consumption by about 500 University of Pennsylvania college students, we ask whether unpaid consumption of movies displaces paid consumption. Employing a variety of cross-sectional and longitudinal empirical approaches, we find large and statistically significant evidence of displacement. In what we view as the most appropriate empirical specifications, we find that unpaid first consumption reduces paid consumption by about 1 unit. Unpaid second consumption has a smaller effect, about 0.20 units. These estimates indicate that unpaid consumption, which makes up 5.2 percent of movie viewing in our sample, reduced paid consumption in our sample by 3.5 percent.","PeriodicalId":126056,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119900080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I develop and test a model of strategic R&D investments where innovating and non-innovating firms compete on the basis of their ability to reduce costs and imitate rivals. I find that a larger proportion of non-innovating rivals stimulates cost-reducing investments and attenuates the disincentive effect of imitation by innovators on firm level R&D. Key model properties are verified by estimating the first order condition for the optimal choice of R&D, using the 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey of U.S. industrial R&D. Results also suggest that R&D and size are simultaneously determined, with R&D being proportional to size, as predicted by the theoretical model.
{"title":"Firm Heterogeneity, Imitation, and the Incentives for Cost Reducing R&D Effort","authors":"M. Ceccagnoli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.183548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.183548","url":null,"abstract":"I develop and test a model of strategic R&D investments where innovating and non-innovating firms compete on the basis of their ability to reduce costs and imitate rivals. I find that a larger proportion of non-innovating rivals stimulates cost-reducing investments and attenuates the disincentive effect of imitation by innovators on firm level R&D. Key model properties are verified by estimating the first order condition for the optimal choice of R&D, using the 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey of U.S. industrial R&D. Results also suggest that R&D and size are simultaneously determined, with R&D being proportional to size, as predicted by the theoretical model.","PeriodicalId":126056,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131873108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant-level scale economies are small and market power is not an issue. At issue is the question: what makes industries necessarily fragmented? The theoretical model distinguishes between the structure of brands and firms in an industry by examining trade-offs associated with affiliation and integration, and how they are affected by the contracting environment. I show how contractual incompleteness can lead industries to be necessarily fragmented. I also show that improvements in the contracting environment will tend to lead to a greater concentration of brands, but whether they lead industries to be more or less concentrated depends on what becomes contractible. I then discuss the propositions generated by the model through a series of case study examples.
{"title":"Affiliation, Integration, and Information: Ownership Incentives and Industry Structure","authors":"T. Hubbard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.269245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.269245","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant-level scale economies are small and market power is not an issue. At issue is the question: what makes industries necessarily fragmented? The theoretical model distinguishes between the structure of brands and firms in an industry by examining trade-offs associated with affiliation and integration, and how they are affected by the contracting environment. I show how contractual incompleteness can lead industries to be necessarily fragmented. I also show that improvements in the contracting environment will tend to lead to a greater concentration of brands, but whether they lead industries to be more or less concentrated depends on what becomes contractible. I then discuss the propositions generated by the model through a series of case study examples.","PeriodicalId":126056,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129012594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vertical integration can reduce integrating firms' trading opportunities and, contrary to predictions of two-firm models, this loss of trade can make integration unprofitable. If downstream units must commit to suppliers before contracting on the final terms of trade, then suppliers will have ex-post monopoly power. This monopoly power reduces the quality that an integrated supplier will provide to its competitors. Expectations of this quality reduction can prevent firms from purchasing from an integrated supplier even though the supplier would be better off if it could commit to provide its downstream competitors with sufficient quality to retain their business.
{"title":"Vertical Enclosure: Vertical Integration and the Reluctance to Purchase from a Competitor","authors":"D. Heavner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.201888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.201888","url":null,"abstract":"Vertical integration can reduce integrating firms' trading opportunities and, contrary to predictions of two-firm models, this loss of trade can make integration unprofitable. If downstream units must commit to suppliers before contracting on the final terms of trade, then suppliers will have ex-post monopoly power. This monopoly power reduces the quality that an integrated supplier will provide to its competitors. Expectations of this quality reduction can prevent firms from purchasing from an integrated supplier even though the supplier would be better off if it could commit to provide its downstream competitors with sufficient quality to retain their business.","PeriodicalId":126056,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130001169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research sharing is an important objective of many research joint ventures. When partners share R&D but do not maximize joint profits, large consortia are more profitable than small ones, and joint ventures prefer dispersed rivals. For much of the spillover space, a coalition formation game that permits limited membership predicts that at most, three joint ventures form. Research-sharing joint ventures improve welfare when spillovers are low, and banning research sharing joint ventures is beneficial for high spillovers. With imperfect research sharing and low spillovers, allowing only research sharing is the best industry-wide joint venture alternative for consumer surplus.
{"title":"Endogenous Formation of Competitive Research Sharing Joint Ventures","authors":"P. Greenlee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.204549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.204549","url":null,"abstract":"Research sharing is an important objective of many research joint ventures. When partners share R&D but do not maximize joint profits, large consortia are more profitable than small ones, and joint ventures prefer dispersed rivals. For much of the spillover space, a coalition formation game that permits limited membership predicts that at most, three joint ventures form. Research-sharing joint ventures improve welfare when spillovers are low, and banning research sharing joint ventures is beneficial for high spillovers. With imperfect research sharing and low spillovers, allowing only research sharing is the best industry-wide joint venture alternative for consumer surplus.","PeriodicalId":126056,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132980347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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