Do beliefs in the credibility of institutions designed to constrain the state from violating rights affect the behavior of all individuals equally? We argue that the effect depends on how insulated an individual is from rights violations. We test this argument against individual-level data on democratic regime support, confidence in legal institutions and a socioeconomic factor that protects a person from physical integrity violations. Consistent with our substitution argument, the effect of institutional confidence on democratic support decreases as insulation increases; and, the effect of insulation decreases as institutional confidence increases. This analysis suggests that commitment models overestimate and underestimate institutional effects when they fail to account for insulation.
{"title":"Substitutable Protections: Socioeconomic Insulation and Credible Commitment Devices","authors":"Jeffrey K. Staton, Christopher Reenock","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.913428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.913428","url":null,"abstract":"Do beliefs in the credibility of institutions designed to constrain the state from violating rights affect the behavior of all individuals equally? We argue that the effect depends on how insulated an individual is from rights violations. We test this argument against individual-level data on democratic regime support, confidence in legal institutions and a socioeconomic factor that protects a person from physical integrity violations. Consistent with our substitution argument, the effect of institutional confidence on democratic support decreases as insulation increases; and, the effect of insulation decreases as institutional confidence increases. This analysis suggests that commitment models overestimate and underestimate institutional effects when they fail to account for insulation.","PeriodicalId":129571,"journal":{"name":"CELS 2006 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114551378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine recent confrontational activism campaigns by hedge funds and other private investors. The main parallels between the groups are a significantly positive market reaction for the target firm around the initial Schedule 13D filing date, significantly positive returns over the subsequent year, and the activist's high success rate in achieving its original objective. Further, both activists frequently gain board representation through real or threatened proxy solicitations. Two major differences are that hedge funds target more profitable firms than other activists, and hedge funds address cash flow agency costs whereas other private investors change the target's investment strategies. Copyright (c) 2009 The American Finance Association.
{"title":"Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors","authors":"April Klein, Emanuel Zur","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.913362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.913362","url":null,"abstract":"We examine recent confrontational activism campaigns by hedge funds and other private investors. The main parallels between the groups are a significantly positive market reaction for the target firm around the initial Schedule 13D filing date, significantly positive returns over the subsequent year, and the activist's high success rate in achieving its original objective. Further, both activists frequently gain board representation through real or threatened proxy solicitations. Two major differences are that hedge funds target more profitable firms than other activists, and hedge funds address cash flow agency costs whereas other private investors change the target's investment strategies. Copyright (c) 2009 The American Finance Association.","PeriodicalId":129571,"journal":{"name":"CELS 2006 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123526959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Staggered boards offer incumbent management considerable protection from hostile takeovers and proxy fights. However, in the last few years, managers of an increasing number of firms have voluntarily destaggered their boards, exposing themselves to the risk of being removed from office. This paper investigates why managers decide to destagger their boards. I find statistically significant evidence that the likelihood of destaggering increases with shareholder pressure (in the form of precatory shareholder resolutions seeking destaggered boards) and with the amount of the CEO's unvested (including out-of-the-money) options. I do not find evidence of a strong connection between the decision to destagger and firm performance, or other CEO characteristics, including other forms of compensation such as unrestricted equity. The study provides insight into the informal power and influence of shareholders over the board, and the role of equity and monetary compensation in aligning management's interests with those of the shareholders.
{"title":"Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?","authors":"Mira Ganor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.908668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.908668","url":null,"abstract":"Staggered boards offer incumbent management considerable protection from hostile takeovers and proxy fights. However, in the last few years, managers of an increasing number of firms have voluntarily destaggered their boards, exposing themselves to the risk of being removed from office. This paper investigates why managers decide to destagger their boards. I find statistically significant evidence that the likelihood of destaggering increases with shareholder pressure (in the form of precatory shareholder resolutions seeking destaggered boards) and with the amount of the CEO's unvested (including out-of-the-money) options. I do not find evidence of a strong connection between the decision to destagger and firm performance, or other CEO characteristics, including other forms of compensation such as unrestricted equity. The study provides insight into the informal power and influence of shareholders over the board, and the role of equity and monetary compensation in aligning management's interests with those of the shareholders.","PeriodicalId":129571,"journal":{"name":"CELS 2006 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Archive)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132986664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：