Pub Date : 2021-02-18DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198862932.003.0007
T. Schapiro
In this chapter, I address the last constraint, asymmetric pressure. How is it that your inclination can put asymmetric pressure on your will? I argue that this is a deep and general problem, one that familiar theories of strength and weakness of will tend to elide. What, in principle, could pressure a free will? My Kantian claim is that the only thing that can pressure a free will is the burden of freedom itself. Inclinations, as such, cannot pressure the will. But if their nature is as I have described, they provide us with the opportunity to flee our freedom, by providing us with an animal mind to flee into. Instead of humanizing our incentive, we dehumanize ourselves. Similarly, I argue, we can be weak in relation to our social environment. Social scripts do not pressure us directly, but they give us the opportunity to flee into automaticity.
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Pub Date : 2021-02-18DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198862932.003.0006
Tamar Schapiro
In this chapter, I begin to show how the inner animal view meets the constraints I laid out. What is the relation between your instinctive part and your deciding part? It cannot be that of rider to horse, because that would be an internalized brute force view. I argue further that it cannot be that of ruler to citizenry, as in Korsgaard’s constitution model of the soul, because that makes the difference between inclination and will too shallow. Instead of looking for familiar analogies, I claim, we should accept that this relation is sui generis, while still articulating a conception that meets the three constraints. Here I focus on non-voluntariness and deliberative role. I explain why it is challenging to meet these constraints jointly. I then show how the inner animal view can be developed so as to meet both. Your inclinations are non-voluntary because they are guided by your instinctive mind, which is different from your deciding mind. They can nevertheless play a deliberative role, because you can take your inner animal’s thinking as raw material and “incorporate” it into a maxim that you can regard as worthy of your choice.
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Pub Date : 2021-02-18DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198862932.003.0002
Tamar Schapiro
In this chapter, I frame my question. My explicandum is the moment in which you are inclined, but not thereby determined, to φ. I call this “the moment of drama.” I want to know what challenges and opportunities we are faced with, in this moment. My question arises out of a distinctive philosophical method, one that differs from the standard method in philosophy of mind and action. The standard method asks, “what happens when someone acts?” My method, which is inspired by Kant, asks, “what am I doing, insofar as I am acting?” I explain how this method leads me to take the moment of drama as my explicandum. Finally, I preview three features of the relation between inclination and will that characterize this moment: being inclined to φ is a non-voluntary condition that exerts asymmetric pressure on the will, while also playing a deliberative role.
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