Communication between departments within a firm may include deception. Theory suggests that telling lies in these environments may be strategically optimal if there exists a small difference in monetary incentives (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Galeotti et al, 2012). We design a laboratory experiment to investigate whether agents with different monetary incentives in a network environment behave according to theoretical predictions. We found that players’ choices are consistent with the theory. That is, most communication within an incentive group is truthful and deception often occurs between subjects from different groups. These results have important implications for intra-organizational conflict management, demonstrating that in order to minimize deceptive communication between departments the firm may need to reduce incentive differences between these groups. Length: 19
公司内部各部门之间的沟通可能包括欺骗。理论表明，在这些环境中，如果存在金钱激励的微小差异，说谎可能是战略上最优的(Crawford and Sobel, 1982;Galeotti et al, 2012)。我们设计了一个实验室实验来研究网络环境中具有不同货币激励的代理人是否会根据理论预测行事。我们发现玩家的选择与理论是一致的。也就是说，激励组内的大多数交流都是真实的，而欺骗经常发生在来自不同组的受试者之间。这些结果对组织内部冲突管理具有重要意义，表明为了尽量减少部门之间的欺骗性沟通，公司可能需要减少这些群体之间的激励差异。长度:19
{"title":"Deception in Networks: A Laboratory Study","authors":"Rong Rong, Daniel Houser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2514037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2514037","url":null,"abstract":"Communication between departments within a firm may include deception. Theory suggests that telling lies in these environments may be strategically optimal if there exists a small difference in monetary incentives (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Galeotti et al, 2012). We design a laboratory experiment to investigate whether agents with different monetary incentives in a network environment behave according to theoretical predictions. We found that players’ choices are consistent with the theory. That is, most communication within an incentive group is truthful and deception often occurs between subjects from different groups. These results have important implications for intra-organizational conflict management, demonstrating that in order to minimize deceptive communication between departments the firm may need to reduce incentive differences between these groups. Length: 19","PeriodicalId":131415,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Interest-Based Negotiations (Topic)","volume":"97 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122559978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：