Lawsuits have a deterrent effect, but this is mitigated if settlements are routine. Regulators and judges should consider that a firm contemplating predatory activity directed at financially unsophisticated individuals might have built an estimate of settlement costs into their analysis of the net present value of the “project.” This suggests that choosing not to settle to establish a precedent would be an appropriate regulatory policy, especially in cases involving egregious behavior. Hence, while private settlements may be Pareto optimal, this notion does not apply to public consumer protection class action settlements. Asymmetric information is a major factor in consumer protection litigation, but the consumer protection regulator has an information advantage; this can allow regulators to represent the class effectively. We develop these issues by considering theories of the settlement process in the context of a pivotal case. We provide suggestions for theoretical research on consumer protection class actions, an underdeveloped area of the literature.
{"title":"Consumer Protection Settlements: Theory and Policy","authors":"J. Mcnulty","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3896139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3896139","url":null,"abstract":"Lawsuits have a deterrent effect, but this is mitigated if settlements are routine. Regulators and judges should consider that a firm contemplating predatory activity directed at financially unsophisticated individuals might have built an estimate of settlement costs into their analysis of the net present value of the “project.” This suggests that choosing not to settle to establish a precedent would be an appropriate regulatory policy, especially in cases involving egregious behavior. Hence, while private settlements may be Pareto optimal, this notion does not apply to public consumer protection class action settlements. Asymmetric information is a major factor in consumer protection litigation, but the consumer protection regulator has an information advantage; this can allow regulators to represent the class effectively. We develop these issues by considering theories of the settlement process in the context of a pivotal case. We provide suggestions for theoretical research on consumer protection class actions, an underdeveloped area of the literature.","PeriodicalId":141301,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Business Law (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123815539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On 14th January 2020, His Excellency the president Uhuru Kenyatta directed the Kenya National Trading Corporation to purchase excess rice from Kano plains and Mwea. The rice was to be sold to the disciplined forces, prison services and public schools. Ten months down the road, the Ministry of Education released a circular on 8th October 2020 which listed the prices of the rice. Heads from public primary and secondary schools caused an uproar claiming that the prices in the circular were expensive. Further, they claimed that they supported the local suppliers by procuring goods from them. The ministry officials claim that the presidential directive has to be complied with and that schools have no other option other than to negotiate with the Kenya National Trading Corporation with regard to the prices.
The government is doing a commendable job promoting the Kenyan products through its BUY KENYA BUILD KENYA initiative. However, the manner in which it is promoting the initiative is ineffective. I seek to address this issue in this article, and give reasons that show that the approach taken by the government in ordering public schools to procure rice from Kenya National Trading Corporation is ineffective. To begin with, I will address the justification for the famous BUY KENYA BUILD KENYA initiative. Secondly, I will explain why the move by the government in ordering public schools to buy rice from Kenya National Trading Corporation is ineffective. Finally, I will offer my concluding remarks.
{"title":"A Commentary on the President’s Directive to Public Schools to Procure Rice From Kenya National Trading Corporation","authors":"Kenneth Njiri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3712814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3712814","url":null,"abstract":"On 14th January 2020, His Excellency the president Uhuru Kenyatta directed the Kenya National Trading Corporation to purchase excess rice from Kano plains and Mwea. The rice was to be sold to the disciplined forces, prison services and public schools. Ten months down the road, the Ministry of Education released a circular on 8th October 2020 which listed the prices of the rice. Heads from public primary and secondary schools caused an uproar claiming that the prices in the circular were expensive. Further, they claimed that they supported the local suppliers by procuring goods from them. The ministry officials claim that the presidential directive has to be complied with and that schools have no other option other than to negotiate with the Kenya National Trading Corporation with regard to the prices.<br><br>The government is doing a commendable job promoting the Kenyan products through its BUY KENYA BUILD KENYA initiative. However, the manner in which it is promoting the initiative is ineffective. I seek to address this issue in this article, and give reasons that show that the approach taken by the government in ordering public schools to procure rice from Kenya National Trading Corporation is ineffective. To begin with, I will address the justification for the famous BUY KENYA BUILD KENYA initiative. Secondly, I will explain why the move by the government in ordering public schools to buy rice from Kenya National Trading Corporation is ineffective. Finally, I will offer my concluding remarks.","PeriodicalId":141301,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Business Law (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125343987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wallace Stettinius, George W. Logan, John L. Colley
This case provides for a discussion of the legal obligations of directors and their role in our corporate/capitalist system of corporate governance. Excerpt UVA-OM-1084 Rev. May 10, 2011 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: The Jack Wright Series (2) Legal Obligations of Directors Introduction As Jack Wright weighed the invitation to join the Mega Corporation board, he reflected on how his personal career had flourished and the ways in which his stature in the community had risen steadily over the years. As a result, he had been asked several years previously to become an organizer/director of a de novo community bank, the shares of which would be listed on NASDAQ after its charter was granted by the Federal Reserve. This was Wright's first opportunity to become a director of a publicly held company, and he had readily agreed to join the organizers, a prestigious group of successful, civic-minded people. Wright knew most of the organizers, though not all of them. He was currently facing an unexpected and difficult problem in connection with that attachment. . . .
{"title":"Corporate Governance: The Jack Wright Series (2) Legal Obligations of Directors","authors":"Wallace Stettinius, George W. Logan, John L. Colley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2974879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2974879","url":null,"abstract":"This case provides for a discussion of the legal obligations of directors and their role in our corporate/capitalist system of corporate governance. \u0000Excerpt \u0000UVA-OM-1084 \u0000Rev. May 10, 2011 \u0000CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: The Jack Wright Series (2) \u0000Legal Obligations of Directors \u0000Introduction \u0000As Jack Wright weighed the invitation to join the Mega Corporation board, he reflected on how his personal career had flourished and the ways in which his stature in the community had risen steadily over the years. As a result, he had been asked several years previously to become an organizer/director of a de novo community bank, the shares of which would be listed on NASDAQ after its charter was granted by the Federal Reserve. This was Wright's first opportunity to become a director of a publicly held company, and he had readily agreed to join the organizers, a prestigious group of successful, civic-minded people. Wright knew most of the organizers, though not all of them. He was currently facing an unexpected and difficult problem in connection with that attachment. \u0000. . .","PeriodicalId":141301,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Business Law (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127653341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This thesis will consider the question of whether Australian law has kept pace with CEO incentive pay developments in a way that is consistent with the economic rationale behind them. This thesis will be divided into four sections: One – The thesis will survey CEO incentive pay and explain how it has developed over the last thirty years to where it is today. Two - The thesis will analyze the economic rationale behind the development of incentive pay with particular attention on the “agency-principal problem”. The incentives have not only been used to protect the principal from the self-interest of the agent, but have also been used to link pay with desirable performance outcomes. Three- The thesis will discuss black letter law and soft law (such as ASX corporate governance guidelines) that have been introduced to govern and protect shareholders from the risks incentive pay may expose them to. Four – The thesis will consider whether the law has kept pace with incentive developments in a way that is consistent with the economic rationale behind them.
{"title":"Agency Theory and CEO Incentives","authors":"J. Dunning","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2034618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2034618","url":null,"abstract":"This thesis will consider the question of whether Australian law has kept pace with CEO incentive pay developments in a way that is consistent with the economic rationale behind them. This thesis will be divided into four sections: One – The thesis will survey CEO incentive pay and explain how it has developed over the last thirty years to where it is today. Two - The thesis will analyze the economic rationale behind the development of incentive pay with particular attention on the “agency-principal problem”. The incentives have not only been used to protect the principal from the self-interest of the agent, but have also been used to link pay with desirable performance outcomes. Three- The thesis will discuss black letter law and soft law (such as ASX corporate governance guidelines) that have been introduced to govern and protect shareholders from the risks incentive pay may expose them to. Four – The thesis will consider whether the law has kept pace with incentive developments in a way that is consistent with the economic rationale behind them.","PeriodicalId":141301,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Business Law (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126499962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757221.003.0015
M. Cheong, Yin Harn Lee
This chapter considers the role of specific remedies and money awards in protecting the performance interest of creditors under Malaysian law. It analyses the law under the Contracts Act 1950 and the Specific Relief Act 1950. The chapter concludes that although these two legislation are modeled after the equivalent Indian statutes, established principles of English common law and principles of equity continue to have a strong influence over the Malaysian courts interpretation of these statutes.
{"title":"Specific Remedies and Money Awards in the Protection of the Performance Interest under Malaysian Contract Law","authors":"M. Cheong, Yin Harn Lee","doi":"10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757221.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757221.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers the role of specific remedies and money awards in protecting the performance interest of creditors under Malaysian law. It analyses the law under the Contracts Act 1950 and the Specific Relief Act 1950. The chapter concludes that although these two legislation are modeled after the equivalent Indian statutes, established principles of English common law and principles of equity continue to have a strong influence over the Malaysian courts interpretation of these statutes.","PeriodicalId":141301,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Business Law (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127276078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alexander Hoffarth, M. M. Frank, Samuel A. Lewis Sr.
One of the fastest-growing areas in business is socially responsible investment (SRI), which incorporates environmental, social, and governance concerns. From 2007 to 2017, SRI increased from $2.71 trillion to over $21 trillion, and in 2017, 84% of all millennials were interested in SRI. Given these trends, how should an entrepreneur with a social mission proceed? One of the first decisions is choosing an appropriate legal entity. This technical note presents an array of legal entities that a business with a social mission could consider, with special emphasis on a relatively recent option: the benefit corporation. Excerpt UVA-C-2407 Jan. 9, 2019 Entity Choices for a Socially Responsible Business Introduction Social enterprises. Hybrid social ventures. Triple bottom line corporations. All these entities make “use of market-based strategies to promote the public good,” which characterize “one of the…fastest growing areas of small business today.” Part of the growth in this area might be attributed to the fact that stakeholders are demanding that businesses identify with a social mission. While the data show a general preference by consumers and labor for companies that are pursuing a social impact, this preference is particularly striking when one focuses specifically on the so-called millennial generation. For example, “seventy percent of millennials indicate a willingness to spend more with brands that support causes or operate using business models that align and resonate with their own values.” As employees, millennials show a similar desire for their work to serve a greater purpose. Indeed, more than 50% of millennials say they would take a pay cut to find work that matches their values, and 90% want to use their skills for good. As of 2015, the millennial generation was the largest share of the workforce (at 53.5 million) and set to assume only more influence going forward. One could therefore expect these trends to continue. Investors are showing an interest in channeling their capital to support social enterprises as well. Socially responsible investment (SRI)—investment that incorporates environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns—has grown tremendously in the past decade. For example, in 2007, SRI accounted for 11% ($ 2.71trillion) of assets under management; only seven years later, that value had increased to over $ 21trillion. In 2017, private equity and venture capital firms allocated $ 4billion. Most notably in 2017, well-known private equity firms TPG and Bain Capital closed the Rise Fund ($ 2billion) and the Double Impact Fund ($ 390million), respectively, to “focus on ‘double bottom line' investment.” And there is speculation that in the future, millennials will prefer to prioritize these types of investments. The limited data about existing high-net-worth millennials supports this point. According to a report by the Spectrum Group, 49% of millennials with more than $ 1million net worth said that social responsibility is
{"title":"Entity Choices for a Socially Responsible Business","authors":"Alexander Hoffarth, M. M. Frank, Samuel A. Lewis Sr.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3320828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3320828","url":null,"abstract":"One of the fastest-growing areas in business is socially responsible investment (SRI), which incorporates environmental, social, and governance concerns. From 2007 to 2017, SRI increased from $2.71 trillion to over $21 trillion, and in 2017, 84% of all millennials were interested in SRI. Given these trends, how should an entrepreneur with a social mission proceed? One of the first decisions is choosing an appropriate legal entity. This technical note presents an array of legal entities that a business with a social mission could consider, with special emphasis on a relatively recent option: the benefit corporation. Excerpt UVA-C-2407 Jan. 9, 2019 Entity Choices for a Socially Responsible Business Introduction Social enterprises. Hybrid social ventures. Triple bottom line corporations. All these entities make “use of market-based strategies to promote the public good,” which characterize “one of the…fastest growing areas of small business today.” Part of the growth in this area might be attributed to the fact that stakeholders are demanding that businesses identify with a social mission. While the data show a general preference by consumers and labor for companies that are pursuing a social impact, this preference is particularly striking when one focuses specifically on the so-called millennial generation. For example, “seventy percent of millennials indicate a willingness to spend more with brands that support causes or operate using business models that align and resonate with their own values.” As employees, millennials show a similar desire for their work to serve a greater purpose. Indeed, more than 50% of millennials say they would take a pay cut to find work that matches their values, and 90% want to use their skills for good. As of 2015, the millennial generation was the largest share of the workforce (at 53.5 million) and set to assume only more influence going forward. One could therefore expect these trends to continue. Investors are showing an interest in channeling their capital to support social enterprises as well. Socially responsible investment (SRI)—investment that incorporates environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns—has grown tremendously in the past decade. For example, in 2007, SRI accounted for 11% ($ 2.71trillion) of assets under management; only seven years later, that value had increased to over $ 21trillion. In 2017, private equity and venture capital firms allocated $ 4billion. Most notably in 2017, well-known private equity firms TPG and Bain Capital closed the Rise Fund ($ 2billion) and the Double Impact Fund ($ 390million), respectively, to “focus on ‘double bottom line' investment.” And there is speculation that in the future, millennials will prefer to prioritize these types of investments. The limited data about existing high-net-worth millennials supports this point. According to a report by the Spectrum Group, 49% of millennials with more than $ 1million net worth said that social responsibility is ","PeriodicalId":141301,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Business Law (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124371604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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