{"title":"A neuroscience perspective on pleasure and pain","authors":"Dan-Mikael Ellingsen, M. Kringelbach, S. Leknes","doi":"10.4324/9781351115865-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351115865-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158326,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Pain","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125358770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-11DOI: 10.4324/9781351115865-10
F. Vignemont
{"title":"The first-person in pain","authors":"F. Vignemont","doi":"10.4324/9781351115865-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351115865-10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158326,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Pain","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131171989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is the affective component of pain?","authors":"J. Prinz","doi":"10.4324/9781351115865-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351115865-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158326,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Pain","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125347809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When is a pain not a pain?","authors":"V. Hardcastle","doi":"10.4324/9781351115865-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351115865-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158326,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Pain","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124385688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The rationality of emotional and physical suffering","authors":"M. Brady","doi":"10.4324/9781351115865-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351115865-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158326,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Pain","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125518795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The unpleasantness of pain for humans and other animals","authors":"Adam Shriver","doi":"10.4324/9781351115865-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351115865-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":158326,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Pain","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114893701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are many philosophical theories on offer that give different accounts of the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, and then critically compare and contrast them. In particular, we want to examine how they handle the reason-giving power of affective states. We will look into two representationalist proposals and a functionalist proposal, and argue that, contrary to their own advertisements, the representationalist proposals don’t adequately account for why and how sensory affect can motivate, rationalize, and justify subsequent behavior and intentional mental activity. We will show that our own functionalist proposal does a much better job in this regard, and that when the representationalist proposals are modified to do a better job, they may fare better not because of their representationalist credentials but due to their functionalist ones.
{"title":"Reasons and theories of sensory affect","authors":"M. Aydede, M. Fulkerson","doi":"10.4324/9781351115865-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351115865-3","url":null,"abstract":"Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are many philosophical theories on offer that give different accounts of the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, and then critically compare and contrast them. In particular, we want to examine how they handle the reason-giving power of affective states. We will look into two representationalist proposals and a functionalist proposal, and argue that, contrary to their own advertisements, the representationalist proposals don’t adequately account for why and how sensory affect can motivate, rationalize, and justify subsequent behavior and intentional mental activity. We will show that our own functionalist proposal does a much better job in this regard, and that when the representationalist proposals are modified to do a better job, they may fare better not because of their representationalist credentials but due to their functionalist ones.","PeriodicalId":158326,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Pain","volume":"72 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114012874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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