Pub Date : 2021-03-25DOI: 10.1093/he/9780198853503.003.0004
P. Davies
This chapter analyses the formation of unilateral contracts. A unilateral contract arises where O promises A something if A does a particular act which is not the making of a promise to O. A unilateral contract only imposes obligations on O. A is not obliged to do anything. A unilateral offer can be accepted by A regardless of A’s motive for doing the required act. However, A must know of the offer in order for a contract to be formed. O may not be able to revoke the offer if A has embarked upon performance. This will depend upon whether or not O has made an implied promise not to revoke the offer.
{"title":"4. Offer and acceptance: unilateral contracts","authors":"P. Davies","doi":"10.1093/he/9780198853503.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198853503.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyses the formation of unilateral contracts. A unilateral contract arises where O promises A something if A does a particular act which is not the making of a promise to O. A unilateral contract only imposes obligations on O. A is not obliged to do anything. A unilateral offer can be accepted by A regardless of A’s motive for doing the required act. However, A must know of the offer in order for a contract to be formed. O may not be able to revoke the offer if A has embarked upon performance. This will depend upon whether or not O has made an implied promise not to revoke the offer.","PeriodicalId":159199,"journal":{"name":"JC Smith's The Law of Contract","volume":"373 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123407508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-25DOI: 10.1093/he/9780198853503.003.0015
P. Davies
This chapter analyses the law on exclusion clauses and unfair terms. Exclusion clauses are terms which exclude or limit a defendant’s liability. The enactment of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 has reduced the importance of common law techniques for avoiding the worst effects of exclusion clauses. Both statutes enable the courts to control the substance of the contract. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 only applies to non-consumer contracts. It empowers a court not to enforce exclusion clauses where they are unreasonable. Unlike the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 is not limited to exclusion clauses. A term will be unfair if, ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer’.
{"title":"15. Exclusion clauses and unfair terms","authors":"P. Davies","doi":"10.1093/he/9780198853503.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198853503.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyses the law on exclusion clauses and unfair terms. Exclusion clauses are terms which exclude or limit a defendant’s liability. The enactment of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 has reduced the importance of common law techniques for avoiding the worst effects of exclusion clauses. Both statutes enable the courts to control the substance of the contract. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 only applies to non-consumer contracts. It empowers a court not to enforce exclusion clauses where they are unreasonable. Unlike the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 is not limited to exclusion clauses. A term will be unfair if, ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer’.","PeriodicalId":159199,"journal":{"name":"JC Smith's The Law of Contract","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132527848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-25DOI: 10.1093/he/9780198853503.003.0003
P. Davies
This chapter analyses the key elements traditionally required for the formation of a bilateral contract. Contracts are bargains. The natural way to make a bargain is for one side to propose the terms and the other to agree to them. So contracts are almost invariably made by a process of offer and acceptance. However, the lack of offer and acceptance does not necessarily preclude the existence of a contract, if a bargain can be discerned from the facts in some other way. The chapter begins by explaining what constitutes an offer, and discusses various common scenarios. It then examines the requirements of acceptance, since this is what is required for a contract to be concluded. It considers the possibilities that an offer might be revoked by the offeror; or rejected by the offeree; or the offeree might ask for further information; or the offer might lapse.
{"title":"3. Offer and acceptance: bilateral contracts","authors":"P. Davies","doi":"10.1093/he/9780198853503.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198853503.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyses the key elements traditionally required for the formation of a bilateral contract. Contracts are bargains. The natural way to make a bargain is for one side to propose the terms and the other to agree to them. So contracts are almost invariably made by a process of offer and acceptance. However, the lack of offer and acceptance does not necessarily preclude the existence of a contract, if a bargain can be discerned from the facts in some other way. The chapter begins by explaining what constitutes an offer, and discusses various common scenarios. It then examines the requirements of acceptance, since this is what is required for a contract to be concluded. It considers the possibilities that an offer might be revoked by the offeror; or rejected by the offeree; or the offeree might ask for further information; or the offer might lapse.","PeriodicalId":159199,"journal":{"name":"JC Smith's The Law of Contract","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122413251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-05DOI: 10.1093/he/9780198807810.003.0029
P. Davies
This chapter considers gain-based and equitable remedies for breach of contract, which can be awarded in situations where restricting the claimant to damages would be inadequate. Damages may be awarded to strip a defendant of gains made from a breach of contract. Such ‘restitutionary damages’ are only awarded very rarely in ‘exceptional circumstances’ where the usual remedies for breach of contract are ‘inadequate’, and the claimant has a legitimate interest in preventing the defendant’s profit-making activity and depriving them of their profit. Where damages are inadequate to achieve justice, the court may grant equitable relief. The most important equitable orders are for specific performance and injunctions. Specific performance compels a person to perform their contract. Injunctions can either prevent a person from breaching their contract (prohibitory injunctions) or force a person to comply with their contract (mandatory injunctions).
{"title":"29. Remedies beyond compensatory damages","authors":"P. Davies","doi":"10.1093/he/9780198807810.003.0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198807810.003.0029","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers gain-based and equitable remedies for breach of contract, which can be awarded in situations where restricting the claimant to damages would be inadequate. Damages may be awarded to strip a defendant of gains made from a breach of contract. Such ‘restitutionary damages’ are only awarded very rarely in ‘exceptional circumstances’ where the usual remedies for breach of contract are ‘inadequate’, and the claimant has a legitimate interest in preventing the defendant’s profit-making activity and depriving them of their profit. Where damages are inadequate to achieve justice, the court may grant equitable relief. The most important equitable orders are for specific performance and injunctions. Specific performance compels a person to perform their contract. Injunctions can either prevent a person from breaching their contract (prohibitory injunctions) or force a person to comply with their contract (mandatory injunctions).","PeriodicalId":159199,"journal":{"name":"JC Smith's The Law of Contract","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114383698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-05DOI: 10.1093/HE/9780198807810.003.0022
P. Davies
This chapter analyses the law on illegality and restraint of trade. The law on illegality is very complicated. Illegal acts vary greatly in range and severity. The Supreme Court has recently held that a ‘range of factors’ need to be considered when deciding whether the claimant’s illegality should defeat a claim, and it is likely that the law will become increasingly flexible in this area. Restraint of trade is concerned with balancing the competing rights of private parties, notably the employer’s right to expect a certain degree of loyalty as regards their business against the employee’s freedom to leave their employment and to undertake new business activities. The key consideration tends to be whether restraint of trade clauses are reasonable.
{"title":"22. Illegality and restraint of trade","authors":"P. Davies","doi":"10.1093/HE/9780198807810.003.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HE/9780198807810.003.0022","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyses the law on illegality and restraint of trade. The law on illegality is very complicated. Illegal acts vary greatly in range and severity. The Supreme Court has recently held that a ‘range of factors’ need to be considered when deciding whether the claimant’s illegality should defeat a claim, and it is likely that the law will become increasingly flexible in this area. Restraint of trade is concerned with balancing the competing rights of private parties, notably the employer’s right to expect a certain degree of loyalty as regards their business against the employee’s freedom to leave their employment and to undertake new business activities. The key consideration tends to be whether restraint of trade clauses are reasonable.","PeriodicalId":159199,"journal":{"name":"JC Smith's The Law of Contract","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126375181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-04-01DOI: 10.1093/HE/9780198733539.003.0005
P. Davies
This chapter discusses the key elements of a contract as an agreement. No contract exists unless the parties have agreed on everything which they consider requires agreement. However, a failure explicitly to set out all the terms of the agreement is not necessarily fatal to there being a contract, since a court might be able to imply terms to fill in any gaps. But a court will be unable to do this if it would contradict the intentions of the parties. Parties may agree not to negotiate with anyone else for a specified period of time. But an agreement to negotiate with one another is not binding because it is insufficiently certain. An agreement may be made ‘subject’ to something or other. If so, the contract is not binding until that particular event occurs.
{"title":"5. Contract as an agreement","authors":"P. Davies","doi":"10.1093/HE/9780198733539.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HE/9780198733539.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the key elements of a contract as an agreement. No contract exists unless the parties have agreed on everything which they consider requires agreement. However, a failure explicitly to set out all the terms of the agreement is not necessarily fatal to there being a contract, since a court might be able to imply terms to fill in any gaps. But a court will be unable to do this if it would contradict the intentions of the parties. Parties may agree not to negotiate with anyone else for a specified period of time. But an agreement to negotiate with one another is not binding because it is insufficiently certain. An agreement may be made ‘subject’ to something or other. If so, the contract is not binding until that particular event occurs.","PeriodicalId":159199,"journal":{"name":"JC Smith's The Law of Contract","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115195147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-04-01DOI: 10.1093/HE/9780198733539.003.0006
P. Davies
This chapter considers situations where one party (A) makes an offer to another party (B) but a third party (C) purports to accept the offer made by A. If A makes an offer to B and B alone, that offer cannot be accepted by C. Whether an offer is restricted to B alone is a question of interpretation. If A makes a mistake as to the other party’s identity, no contract will be formed (or, as it is sometimes said, the contract will be void). If A makes a mistake as to the other party’s attributes (such as their creditworthiness) then a contract will be formed. However, that contract may be voidable as a result of a misrepresentation. Whether a contract is void or voidable is particularly important where third parties have acquired rights in the subject matter of a contract.
{"title":"6. Identity of offeror and offeree","authors":"P. Davies","doi":"10.1093/HE/9780198733539.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HE/9780198733539.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers situations where one party (A) makes an offer to another party (B) but a third party (C) purports to accept the offer made by A. If A makes an offer to B and B alone, that offer cannot be accepted by C. Whether an offer is restricted to B alone is a question of interpretation. If A makes a mistake as to the other party’s identity, no contract will be formed (or, as it is sometimes said, the contract will be void). If A makes a mistake as to the other party’s attributes (such as their creditworthiness) then a contract will be formed. However, that contract may be voidable as a result of a misrepresentation. Whether a contract is void or voidable is particularly important where third parties have acquired rights in the subject matter of a contract.","PeriodicalId":159199,"journal":{"name":"JC Smith's The Law of Contract","volume":"180 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116322439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-04-01DOI: 10.1093/HE/9780198733539.003.0007
P. Davies
This chapter analyses the issue of consideration in contract law. Contracts are generally binding only if supported by consideration. Consideration can be viewed as ‘the price tag on the promise’: a party must provide something in exchange for the promise in order to be able to enforce that promise. That ‘something’ is called ‘consideration’, and might itself be a promise. The requirement of consideration is demanded by the common law. But, in some situations, equity will allow a promisee to enforce a promise, despite a lack of consideration, through the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Where the promisor makes a clear promise, intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon, and in fact acted upon, the courts will not allow the promisor to act inconsistently with that promise if to do so would be unconscionable.
{"title":"7. Consideration and promissory estoppel","authors":"P. Davies","doi":"10.1093/HE/9780198733539.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HE/9780198733539.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyses the issue of consideration in contract law. Contracts are generally binding only if supported by consideration. Consideration can be viewed as ‘the price tag on the promise’: a party must provide something in exchange for the promise in order to be able to enforce that promise. That ‘something’ is called ‘consideration’, and might itself be a promise. The requirement of consideration is demanded by the common law. But, in some situations, equity will allow a promisee to enforce a promise, despite a lack of consideration, through the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Where the promisor makes a clear promise, intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon, and in fact acted upon, the courts will not allow the promisor to act inconsistently with that promise if to do so would be unconscionable.","PeriodicalId":159199,"journal":{"name":"JC Smith's The Law of Contract","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133794265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}