Pub Date : 2019-05-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0008
C. C. Fair
This chapter maps the historic foundations of Indian grand strategy and the obstacles that have precluded the realization of a new one. First, it describes the elements of Nehru’s grand strategy, and the ways and means that India adopted to pursue them. Second, it examines the factors that have galvanized debates about discarding these Nehruvian commitments. Third, it describes the various contemporary, contending schools of thought about what India’s grand strategy should be. Fourth, it explores the various bureaucratic and political obstacles to transitioning away from this Nehruvian past. The fifth section argues that what has resulted is a form of incrementalism that has nonetheless precipitated important changes in India’s political, diplomatic, and military behavior away from these past Nehruvian commitments. The chapter concludes on a skeptical note by questioning whether the contemporary Indian administration will be able to craft a coherent grand strategy, given the vociferous nature of India’s democracy and decentralized political structure.
{"title":"India","authors":"C. C. Fair","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter maps the historic foundations of Indian grand strategy and the obstacles that have precluded the realization of a new one. First, it describes the elements of Nehru’s grand strategy, and the ways and means that India adopted to pursue them. Second, it examines the factors that have galvanized debates about discarding these Nehruvian commitments. Third, it describes the various contemporary, contending schools of thought about what India’s grand strategy should be. Fourth, it explores the various bureaucratic and political obstacles to transitioning away from this Nehruvian past. The fifth section argues that what has resulted is a form of incrementalism that has nonetheless precipitated important changes in India’s political, diplomatic, and military behavior away from these past Nehruvian commitments. The chapter concludes on a skeptical note by questioning whether the contemporary Indian administration will be able to craft a coherent grand strategy, given the vociferous nature of India’s democracy and decentralized political structure.","PeriodicalId":160356,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Grand Strategy","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129255192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0007
C. Milani, Tiago Nery
After the civil-military dictatorship (1964–1985), the Brazilian re-democratization process coincided with a “double divorce.” The first was between foreign policy and defense policy, the second between military and civilian authorities. It was only in the aftermath of the inauguration of the 1988 Constitution that the Brazilian federal government began constructing a bridge between these two public policies, their respective administrations, and attendant constituencies under the aegis of a democratic regime. Cardoso’s government began implementing a strategy aimed at placing the armed forces under civilian control. But it was during Lula’s and Rousseff’s subsequent administration’s that they laid out a “sketch of Brazil’s grand strategy,” interrupted by Rousseff’s 2016 controversial impeachment.Â?In this context, we analyze the main challenges concerning the conception and the implementation of Brazil’s grand strategy between 2003 and 2014, thus demonstrating how Brazil’s domestic politics and its development model together played key roles in this process.
{"title":"Brazil","authors":"C. Milani, Tiago Nery","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"After the civil-military dictatorship (1964–1985), the Brazilian re-democratization process coincided with a “double divorce.” The first was between foreign policy and defense policy, the second between military and civilian authorities. It was only in the aftermath of the inauguration of the 1988 Constitution that the Brazilian federal government began constructing a bridge between these two public policies, their respective administrations, and attendant constituencies under the aegis of a democratic regime. Cardoso’s government began implementing a strategy aimed at placing the armed forces under civilian control. But it was during Lula’s and Rousseff’s subsequent administration’s that they laid out a “sketch of Brazil’s grand strategy,” interrupted by Rousseff’s 2016 controversial impeachment.Â?In this context, we analyze the main challenges concerning the conception and the implementation of Brazil’s grand strategy between 2003 and 2014, thus demonstrating how Brazil’s domestic politics and its development model together played key roles in this process.","PeriodicalId":160356,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Grand Strategy","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122775183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0003
Céline Marangé
This chapter argues that Russia’s current leadership has consistently promoted a grand strategy that is fundamentally defensive in nature and offensive in practice. It has prioritized security and the quest for recognition in assuming that Russia’s status has been purposely diminished, and that the strategic environment poses a tangible threat to both Russian national interests and the regime’s survival. The institutional setting and strategic culture play a crucial role in the formulation of a strategic security agenda. Although defensive in character and reactive in nature, Russian strategies have embraced bold, proactive, and transformational agendas that have extended beyond military activity. New ways and means have been developed to heighten Russia’s security, assert regional dominance, and attain global recognition. Russia’s leadership not only resorts to military interventions and hybrid warfare and to strategic deterrence and intimidation, but also to comprehensive influence and political destabilization, while using military rhetoric and victories to conceal its domestic shortcomings.
{"title":"Russia","authors":"Céline Marangé","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that Russia’s current leadership has consistently promoted a grand strategy that is fundamentally defensive in nature and offensive in practice. It has prioritized security and the quest for recognition in assuming that Russia’s status has been purposely diminished, and that the strategic environment poses a tangible threat to both Russian national interests and the regime’s survival. The institutional setting and strategic culture play a crucial role in the formulation of a strategic security agenda. Although defensive in character and reactive in nature, Russian strategies have embraced bold, proactive, and transformational agendas that have extended beyond military activity. New ways and means have been developed to heighten Russia’s security, assert regional dominance, and attain global recognition. Russia’s leadership not only resorts to military interventions and hybrid warfare and to strategic deterrence and intimidation, but also to comprehensive influence and political destabilization, while using military rhetoric and victories to conceal its domestic shortcomings.","PeriodicalId":160356,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Grand Strategy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130379505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many theorists and policymakers may be surprised to learn that an international organization, such as the European Union, has the capacity to form and articulate its own grand strategy. However, identifying “who” makes EU grand strategy is challenging. A range of institutions and actors play a role in the formulation, consolidation, and execution of the EU’s grand strategy. These institutions, together with EU member states, define “grand strategy” in differing ways. Furthermore, some actors are more conscious than others that they are actually engaged in “grand strategy”–making rather than simply debating policies. This chapter identifies the leading actors in EU grand strategy; why and how these actors pursue grand strategy goals using a variety of instruments; discusses what those goals have been; and the prospects for their attainment.
{"title":"The European Union","authors":"Daniel Fiott, Luis Simón","doi":"10.1787/d974f297-en","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/d974f297-en","url":null,"abstract":"Many theorists and policymakers may be surprised to learn that an international organization, such as the European Union, has the capacity to form and articulate its own grand strategy. However, identifying “who” makes EU grand strategy is challenging. A range of institutions and actors play a role in the formulation, consolidation, and execution of the EU’s grand strategy. These institutions, together with EU member states, define “grand strategy” in differing ways. Furthermore, some actors are more conscious than others that they are actually engaged in “grand strategy”–making rather than simply debating policies. This chapter identifies the leading actors in EU grand strategy; why and how these actors pursue grand strategy goals using a variety of instruments; discusses what those goals have been; and the prospects for their attainment.","PeriodicalId":160356,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Grand Strategy","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130548596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0004
Andrew S. Erickson
Scholars still debate the very notion of a Chinese grand strategy. Nonetheless, recent leadership and policy statements, and their explicit linkage to historical patterns of Chinese behavior, suggest that China may well have the most forthright example of a grand strategy of any major power today. This chapter is composed of five parts in substantiating that claim. First, it survey’s Xi’s contemporary grand strategy. Second, it discusses the historical foundations of Xi’s initiatives. Third, it lists the modern factors that shape and complicate China’s grand strategic efforts. Fourth, it examines the two major contemporary prongs that link the global to the national strategy: the external Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aimed at binding Eurasia to China through infrastructure and commercial development; and the internal efforts to consolidate societal stability with a stronger surveillance state. Together, the chapter argues, these initiatives are designed to mitigate the impact of demographic decline and an S-curved slowdown in the growth of China’s economy, with the goal of buttressing other elements of national power to facilitate China’s re-emergence.
{"title":"China","authors":"Andrew S. Erickson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars still debate the very notion of a Chinese grand strategy. Nonetheless, recent leadership and policy statements, and their explicit linkage to historical patterns of Chinese behavior, suggest that China may well have the most forthright example of a grand strategy of any major power today. This chapter is composed of five parts in substantiating that claim. First, it survey’s Xi’s contemporary grand strategy. Second, it discusses the historical foundations of Xi’s initiatives. Third, it lists the modern factors that shape and complicate China’s grand strategic efforts. Fourth, it examines the two major contemporary prongs that link the global to the national strategy: the external Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aimed at binding Eurasia to China through infrastructure and commercial development; and the internal efforts to consolidate societal stability with a stronger surveillance state. Together, the chapter argues, these initiatives are designed to mitigate the impact of demographic decline and an S-curved slowdown in the growth of China’s economy, with the goal of buttressing other elements of national power to facilitate China’s re-emergence.","PeriodicalId":160356,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Grand Strategy","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122028127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0010
Eitan Shamir
A traditional approach views grand strategy as primarily concerned with a state’s external affairs: consolidating national security by employing a combination of state capabilities that utilize economic, diplomatic, and military power instruments. Israel’s founders, in contrast, stressed the importance of internal factors such as legitimacy, social cohesion, and economic disparity as essential conditions for national survival. Bearing these benchmark features in mind, Israel’s varied, enduring challenges continue to raise the dilemma of what constitutes both the theoretical and practical boundaries of the country’s grand strategy. Indeed, an examination of the country’s strategic blueprint reveals a constant ambivalence—between focusing on domestic issues and the urgent need to respond to security and diplomatic challenges. The continuous definition and redefinition of what comprises grand strategy reflect the various forces in play in shaping the country’s strategic choices, in the context of an environment where these three founding considerations are continually challenged.
{"title":"Israel","authors":"Eitan Shamir","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"A traditional approach views grand strategy as primarily concerned with a state’s external affairs: consolidating national security by employing a combination of state capabilities that utilize economic, diplomatic, and military power instruments. Israel’s founders, in contrast, stressed the importance of internal factors such as legitimacy, social cohesion, and economic disparity as essential conditions for national survival. Bearing these benchmark features in mind, Israel’s varied, enduring challenges continue to raise the dilemma of what constitutes both the theoretical and practical boundaries of the country’s grand strategy. Indeed, an examination of the country’s strategic blueprint reveals a constant ambivalence—between focusing on domestic issues and the urgent need to respond to security and diplomatic challenges. The continuous definition and redefinition of what comprises grand strategy reflect the various forces in play in shaping the country’s strategic choices, in the context of an environment where these three founding considerations are continually challenged.","PeriodicalId":160356,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Grand Strategy","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124816312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0011
Ghaidaa Hetou
This chapter evaluates the formulation, implementation, and consistency of Saudi Arabia’s grand strategy since 1979. It examines how internal and regional factors influenced that strategy through the optic of a series of critical regional turning points, often overlain by shifting US debates on the Kingdom’s regional role. The chapter delineates why Saudi elites prioritize certain long-term objectives, how they perceive threats, and why they respond in specific ways. Its guiding conceptual framework is informed by four elements: the Kingdom’s dominant strategic culture, its political system, perception of national security, and regional alliance formations. The chapter demonstrates how the current Saudi establishment’s ability to sustain a grand strategy—primarily a regional role—is closely linked to its economic power, financial solvency, and internal stability.
{"title":"Saudi Arabia","authors":"Ghaidaa Hetou","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter evaluates the formulation, implementation, and consistency of Saudi Arabia’s grand strategy since 1979. It examines how internal and regional factors influenced that strategy through the optic of a series of critical regional turning points, often overlain by shifting US debates on the Kingdom’s regional role. The chapter delineates why Saudi elites prioritize certain long-term objectives, how they perceive threats, and why they respond in specific ways. Its guiding conceptual framework is informed by four elements: the Kingdom’s dominant strategic culture, its political system, perception of national security, and regional alliance formations. The chapter demonstrates how the current Saudi establishment’s ability to sustain a grand strategy—primarily a regional role—is closely linked to its economic power, financial solvency, and internal stability.","PeriodicalId":160356,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Grand Strategy","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124878749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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