We examine the impact of collocation on local within-firm performance, or intra-firm spillovers, by decomposing spillovers into one-time stock and recurring flow effects. Stock effects include one-time learning effects. Flow effects include ongoing resource sharing as well as cannibalization. Using data on the population of U.S. hotels and restaurants from 1977-2007, we exploit changes in the number of collocated establishments owned by the same firm to estimate the relative importance of stock and flow benefits. We find that collocation improves the productivity of new and existing establishments by 1-2%, even when correcting for endogenous sorting into collocation. The results, in conjunction with our field work, suggest that collocation generally facilitates the transfer of knowledge within the firm, but that flow effects of collocation are more sensitive to the broader economic environment.
{"title":"Intra-Firm Spillovers? The Stock and Flow Effects of Collocation","authors":"E. Rawley, Robert C. Seamans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2544518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2544518","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of collocation on local within-firm performance, or intra-firm spillovers, by decomposing spillovers into one-time stock and recurring flow effects. Stock effects include one-time learning effects. Flow effects include ongoing resource sharing as well as cannibalization. Using data on the population of U.S. hotels and restaurants from 1977-2007, we exploit changes in the number of collocated establishments owned by the same firm to estimate the relative importance of stock and flow benefits. We find that collocation improves the productivity of new and existing establishments by 1-2%, even when correcting for endogenous sorting into collocation. The results, in conjunction with our field work, suggest that collocation generally facilitates the transfer of knowledge within the firm, but that flow effects of collocation are more sensitive to the broader economic environment.","PeriodicalId":165654,"journal":{"name":"Columbia: Management (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126493508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses a formal model to study how firms evaluate and compete to acquire resources in strategic factor markets. It finds that, unlike in a typical market for goods and services, competition among resource investors to acquire strategic resources may not always benefi t resource sellers. Rather, when the level of competition passes a certain threshold, miscoordination among investors increases to the point that sellers expected pro ts decline. In fact, it may sometimes benefi t sellers for competition among investors to be muted to the point that investors earn a positive return. The paper extends the model to consider how investors organize to overcome managerial agency in resource evaluation. Two organizational designs are considered: (a) incentivization, wherein a lower-level manager is motivated by an incentive contract to make good resource acquisition decisions for an investor, and (b) supervision, wherein the acquisition decision is either handled directly or closely monitored by headquarters. The model suggests that competition among investors will be associated with a greater use of supervision, and that investors using supervision will tend to make lower offers. The paper also fi nds that supervision will be more common when valuable resources are rare.
{"title":"Resource Evaluation, the Business Environment, and Managerial Agency","authors":"David Gaddis Ross","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1916136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1916136","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a formal model to study how firms evaluate and compete to acquire resources in strategic factor markets. It finds that, unlike in a typical market for goods and services, competition among resource investors to acquire strategic resources may not always benefi t resource sellers. Rather, when the level of competition passes a certain threshold, miscoordination among investors increases to the point that sellers expected pro ts decline. In fact, it may sometimes benefi t sellers for competition among investors to be muted to the point that investors earn a positive return. The paper extends the model to consider how investors organize to overcome managerial agency in resource evaluation. Two organizational designs are considered: (a) incentivization, wherein a lower-level manager is motivated by an incentive contract to make good resource acquisition decisions for an investor, and (b) supervision, wherein the acquisition decision is either handled directly or closely monitored by headquarters. The model suggests that competition among investors will be associated with a greater use of supervision, and that investors using supervision will tend to make lower offers. The paper also fi nds that supervision will be more common when valuable resources are rare.","PeriodicalId":165654,"journal":{"name":"Columbia: Management (Topic)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116452813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a parsimonious principal-agent model, this paper builds a theory of how responsibility for entrepreneurial and managerial services should be allocated among managers within a firm. The paper offers an alternative explanation for the Penrose effect, whereby firm growth is said to be retarded by the time required to assimilate new managers. The paper shows a combination of moral hazard and causal ambiguity can similarly retard firm growth.
{"title":"A Theory of Entrepreneurial and Managerial Services: Revisiting Penrose from an Agency Perspective","authors":"David Gaddis Ross","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1916137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1916137","url":null,"abstract":"Using a parsimonious principal-agent model, this paper builds a theory of how responsibility for entrepreneurial and managerial services should be allocated among managers within a firm. The paper offers an alternative explanation for the Penrose effect, whereby firm growth is said to be retarded by the time required to assimilate new managers. The paper shows a combination of moral hazard and causal ambiguity can similarly retard firm growth.","PeriodicalId":165654,"journal":{"name":"Columbia: Management (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124708958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Individuals frequently face intertemporal decisions. For the purposes of economic analysis, the preference parameters assumed to govern these decisions are generally considered to be stable economic primitives. However, evidence on the stability of time preferences is notably lacking. In a large field study conducted over two years with about 1,400 individuals, time preferences are elicited using incentivized choice experiments. The aggregate distributions of discount factors and the proportion of present-biased individuals are found to be unchanged over the two years. At the individual level, the one year correlations in measured time preference parameters are found to be high by existing standards, though some individuals change their intertemporal choices potentially indicating unstable preferences. By linking time preference measures to tax return data, we show that identified instability is uncorrelated with socio-demographics and changes to income, future liquidity, employment and family composition.
{"title":"Stability of Time Preferences","authors":"Stephan Meier, Charles D. Sprenger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1556544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1556544","url":null,"abstract":"Individuals frequently face intertemporal decisions. For the purposes of economic analysis, the preference parameters assumed to govern these decisions are generally considered to be stable economic primitives. However, evidence on the stability of time preferences is notably lacking. In a large field study conducted over two years with about 1,400 individuals, time preferences are elicited using incentivized choice experiments. The aggregate distributions of discount factors and the proportion of present-biased individuals are found to be unchanged over the two years. At the individual level, the one year correlations in measured time preference parameters are found to be high by existing standards, though some individuals change their intertemporal choices potentially indicating unstable preferences. By linking time preference measures to tax return data, we show that identified instability is uncorrelated with socio-demographics and changes to income, future liquidity, employment and family composition.","PeriodicalId":165654,"journal":{"name":"Columbia: Management (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116263880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not allowed all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, contributions increase and differ distinctly across groups and individuals with different induced characteristics. We show econometrically that these differences are not accidentally but enforced by punishment. The enforced contribution norms are related to fairness ideas of equity regarding the contributions but not regarding the earnings. Individuals with different characteristics tacitly agree on the norm to be enforced, even if this leads to large payoff differences. Our results also emphasize the role of details of the environment that may alter focal contribution norms in an important way.
{"title":"Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations","authors":"Ernesto Reuben, A. Riedl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1915464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1915464","url":null,"abstract":"Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not allowed all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, contributions increase and differ distinctly across groups and individuals with different induced characteristics. We show econometrically that these differences are not accidentally but enforced by punishment. The enforced contribution norms are related to fairness ideas of equity regarding the contributions but not regarding the earnings. Individuals with different characteristics tacitly agree on the norm to be enforced, even if this leads to large payoff differences. Our results also emphasize the role of details of the environment that may alter focal contribution norms in an important way.","PeriodicalId":165654,"journal":{"name":"Columbia: Management (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129272901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Elizabeth W. Dunn, D. Carney, M. Norton, D. Ariely
Stigmatized minorities may have an advantage in persuading majority group members during some face-to-face interactions due to the greater self-presentational demands such interactions elicit. In contrast to models which predict greater persuasive impact of members of ingroups, White participants were more convinced by persuasive appeals delivered by a Black interaction partner than by a White interaction partner. When interacting with a Black partner, Whites engaged in greater self-presentation, which in turn made them more susceptible to their partner's persuasive appeal (Studies 1 and 2). This persuasive benefit of stigma was eliminated when participants were exposed to the same partners making the same arguments on video, decreasing self-presentational demands (Study 2). We conclude by discussing when stigma is likely to facilitate versus impair persuasion.
{"title":"The Persuasive Appeal of Stigma","authors":"Elizabeth W. Dunn, D. Carney, M. Norton, D. Ariely","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.996424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.996424","url":null,"abstract":"Stigmatized minorities may have an advantage in persuading majority group members during some face-to-face interactions due to the greater self-presentational demands such interactions elicit. In contrast to models which predict greater persuasive impact of members of ingroups, White participants were more convinced by persuasive appeals delivered by a Black interaction partner than by a White interaction partner. When interacting with a Black partner, Whites engaged in greater self-presentation, which in turn made them more susceptible to their partner's persuasive appeal (Studies 1 and 2). This persuasive benefit of stigma was eliminated when participants were exposed to the same partners making the same arguments on video, decreasing self-presentational demands (Study 2). We conclude by discussing when stigma is likely to facilitate versus impair persuasion.","PeriodicalId":165654,"journal":{"name":"Columbia: Management (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126669265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-07-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500000334
Ann-Renée Blais, Elke U Weber
This paper proposes a revised version of the original Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale developed by Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) that is shorter and applicable to a {broader range of ages, cultures, and educational levels}. It also provides a French translation of the revised scale. Using multilevel modeling, we investigated the risk-return relationship between apparent risk taking and risk perception in 5 risk domains. The results replicate previously noted differences in reported degree of risk taking and risk perception at the mean level of analysis. The multilevel modeling shows, more interestingly, that within-participants variation in risk taking across the 5 content domains of the scale was about 7 times as large as between-participants variation. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of the person-situation debate related to risk attitude as a stable trait.
{"title":"A Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale for Adult Populations","authors":"Ann-Renée Blais, Elke U Weber","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500000334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500000334","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a revised version of the original Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale developed by Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) that is shorter and applicable to a {broader range of ages, cultures, and educational levels}. It also provides a French translation of the revised scale. Using multilevel modeling, we investigated the risk-return relationship between apparent risk taking and risk perception in 5 risk domains. The results replicate previously noted differences in reported degree of risk taking and risk perception at the mean level of analysis. The multilevel modeling shows, more interestingly, that within-participants variation in risk taking across the 5 content domains of the scale was about 7 times as large as between-participants variation. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of the person-situation debate related to risk attitude as a stable trait.","PeriodicalId":165654,"journal":{"name":"Columbia: Management (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131389615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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