Pub Date : 2019-06-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0008
M. Rowlands
The idea of pre-intentional self-awareness is extended to incorporate awareness of one’s mental states or acts and of the “lived” body. The temporal parameters of pre-intentional self-awareness are also extended by way of a detailed consideration of episodic memory in animals. Whether animals are capable of such memory is controversial, due to our inability to determine whether they represent past episodes in the right way. Even if animals cannot episodically remember, they still have pre-intentional awareness of themselves through time. This pre-intentional awareness of the self through time consists in a sense of familiarity, which is explained in parallel with perception: in terms of a generated series of anticipations in which the person who remembers is implicated.
{"title":"In Different Times and Places","authors":"M. Rowlands","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The idea of pre-intentional self-awareness is extended to incorporate awareness of one’s mental states or acts and of the “lived” body. The temporal parameters of pre-intentional self-awareness are also extended by way of a detailed consideration of episodic memory in animals. Whether animals are capable of such memory is controversial, due to our inability to determine whether they represent past episodes in the right way. Even if animals cannot episodically remember, they still have pre-intentional awareness of themselves through time. This pre-intentional awareness of the self through time consists in a sense of familiarity, which is explained in parallel with perception: in terms of a generated series of anticipations in which the person who remembers is implicated.","PeriodicalId":168206,"journal":{"name":"Can Animals Be Persons?","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124374392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0002
M. Rowlands
According to the problem of other animal minds, claims to know anything about the minds of animals suffer from serious problems of justification. These problems parallel the problem of other human minds. Inferentialist approaches argue that the justification lies in the appropriate form of inference. These approaches are inadequate for a variety of reasons. Direct perception approaches claim our access to the minds of animals is, in some cases, perceptual. A novel form of the direct perception account is defended. This is based on three ideas: (a) a distinction between seeing and seeing that, (b) a distinction between formal and functional descriptions of behavior, and (c) the idea that functional descriptions of behavior are (often) disguised psychological descriptions. If we wish to have any useful descriptions of animal behavior, we must accept that we can often see their mental states.
{"title":"The Ghost of Clever Hans","authors":"M. Rowlands","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"According to the problem of other animal minds, claims to know anything about the minds of animals suffer from serious problems of justification. These problems parallel the problem of other human minds. Inferentialist approaches argue that the justification lies in the appropriate form of inference. These approaches are inadequate for a variety of reasons. Direct perception approaches claim our access to the minds of animals is, in some cases, perceptual. A novel form of the direct perception account is defended. This is based on three ideas: (a) a distinction between seeing and seeing that, (b) a distinction between formal and functional descriptions of behavior, and (c) the idea that functional descriptions of behavior are (often) disguised psychological descriptions. If we wish to have any useful descriptions of animal behavior, we must accept that we can often see their mental states.","PeriodicalId":168206,"journal":{"name":"Can Animals Be Persons?","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114887515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0001
M. Rowlands
Far from being contrary to common sense, the idea that some nonhuman animals can be persons conforms to a certain prominent strand in common sense. Three conceptions of personhood are distinguished: legal, moral, and metaphysical. The subject of this book is the metaphysical sense of person. Four essential conditions of metaphysical personhood are identified: consciousness, cognition, self-awareness, and other-awareness. These conditions are advanced as individually necessary and collectively sufficient for an individual to qualify as a person. A person is an individual that is conscious, in the sense that there is something it is like to be that individual; it is a cognitive agent capable of engaging in reasoning; it is aware of itself; and it is aware of others precisely as other persons.
{"title":"Animals as Persons","authors":"M. Rowlands","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Far from being contrary to common sense, the idea that some nonhuman animals can be persons conforms to a certain prominent strand in common sense. Three conceptions of personhood are distinguished: legal, moral, and metaphysical. The subject of this book is the metaphysical sense of person. Four essential conditions of metaphysical personhood are identified: consciousness, cognition, self-awareness, and other-awareness. These conditions are advanced as individually necessary and collectively sufficient for an individual to qualify as a person. A person is an individual that is conscious, in the sense that there is something it is like to be that individual; it is a cognitive agent capable of engaging in reasoning; it is aware of itself; and it is aware of others precisely as other persons.","PeriodicalId":168206,"journal":{"name":"Can Animals Be Persons?","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125902859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0007
M. Rowlands
In pre-intentional self-awareness, a person is self-aware without making herself into an object of any intentional act. The idea of pre-intentional self-awareness is examined through a historical lens provided by Kant and Sartre. The idea is further developed analytically. A perceived object is always perceived as something. This occurs because a series of anticipations are generated in the perceiver. The perceiver is implicated in many of these anticipations. In perceiving an object, therefore, the perceiver is pre-intentionally self-aware. A de-intellectualized way of understanding pre-intentional self-awareness is identified and defended. Pre-intentional self-awareness attaches to the possession of conscious experiences. To the extent animals have conscious experiences, therefore, they will, thereby, be pre-intentionally self-aware. Pre-intentional self-awareness is likely to be widely distributed through the animal kingdom.
{"title":"Pre-Intentional Awareness of Self","authors":"M. Rowlands","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"In pre-intentional self-awareness, a person is self-aware without making herself into an object of any intentional act. The idea of pre-intentional self-awareness is examined through a historical lens provided by Kant and Sartre. The idea is further developed analytically. A perceived object is always perceived as something. This occurs because a series of anticipations are generated in the perceiver. The perceiver is implicated in many of these anticipations. In perceiving an object, therefore, the perceiver is pre-intentionally self-aware. A de-intellectualized way of understanding pre-intentional self-awareness is identified and defended. Pre-intentional self-awareness attaches to the possession of conscious experiences. To the extent animals have conscious experiences, therefore, they will, thereby, be pre-intentionally self-aware. Pre-intentional self-awareness is likely to be widely distributed through the animal kingdom.","PeriodicalId":168206,"journal":{"name":"Can Animals Be Persons?","volume":"311 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133557889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0011
M. Rowlands
This book has been a protracted case in worst-case scenario philosophy. Assume the absolute worst about animals, and the most stringent conception of a person imaginable, and then argue that animals still qualify as persons. Some of the limitations of this strategy are identified. If animals are persons, it changes the way we think about our obligations to them. The principal change is from a treatment paradigm to a listening paradigm. In a treatment paradigm, the primary question is how we should treat them. This is an inadequate way of understanding our obligations to persons. For persons, prior to the question of how we should treat them is the necessity of listening to them: of learning to ask them the right questions and make ourselves capable of understanding their response.
{"title":"Animals as Persons and Why It Matters","authors":"M. Rowlands","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This book has been a protracted case in worst-case scenario philosophy. Assume the absolute worst about animals, and the most stringent conception of a person imaginable, and then argue that animals still qualify as persons. Some of the limitations of this strategy are identified. If animals are persons, it changes the way we think about our obligations to them. The principal change is from a treatment paradigm to a listening paradigm. In a treatment paradigm, the primary question is how we should treat them. This is an inadequate way of understanding our obligations to persons. For persons, prior to the question of how we should treat them is the necessity of listening to them: of learning to ask them the right questions and make ourselves capable of understanding their response.","PeriodicalId":168206,"journal":{"name":"Can Animals Be Persons?","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116756450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0010
M. Rowlands
Other-awareness is the ability to recognize another as minded. This sort of ability is usually identified with mindreading: the ability to attribute mental states to another and use this attribution to predict and/or explain his or her behavior. It is unclear whether animals have mindreading abilities. However, even if they do not, there is another way of being aware of the mindedness of another. Just as there is a pre-intentional form of self-awareness, so too is there a pre-intentional form of other-awareness. In pre-intentional self-awareness, one is aware of oneself in virtue of being aware of something else in a certain way. In pre-intentional other-awareness, one is aware of the other in virtue of being aware of oneself in a certain way. Arguments are presented for the claim that many animals can be pre-intentionally other-aware.
{"title":"Other-Awareness","authors":"M. Rowlands","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Other-awareness is the ability to recognize another as minded. This sort of ability is usually identified with mindreading: the ability to attribute mental states to another and use this attribution to predict and/or explain his or her behavior. It is unclear whether animals have mindreading abilities. However, even if they do not, there is another way of being aware of the mindedness of another. Just as there is a pre-intentional form of self-awareness, so too is there a pre-intentional form of other-awareness. In pre-intentional self-awareness, one is aware of oneself in virtue of being aware of something else in a certain way. In pre-intentional other-awareness, one is aware of the other in virtue of being aware of oneself in a certain way. Arguments are presented for the claim that many animals can be pre-intentionally other-aware.","PeriodicalId":168206,"journal":{"name":"Can Animals Be Persons?","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123911064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-27DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0009
M. Rowlands
Since there are two forms of self-awareness, there is question concerning which is relevant, or most relevant, in the formation of the person. The relevance of self-awareness in the formation of the person consists in the role it plays in underwriting the unity of a mental life. Intentional self-awareness is incapable of doing this. Appeal to the apparatus of intentional act and object presupposes the unity of a mental life and, therefore, cannot explain it. Pre-intentional self-awareness is much more promising as a candidate for underwriting the unity of a mental life. The identity of the person is imprinted on the content of each mental act of which he is pre-intentionally aware. Thus, to whom the act belongs is part of the content of the mental act. This can explain the unity of a mental life.
{"title":"Self-Awareness and Persons","authors":"M. Rowlands","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190846039.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Since there are two forms of self-awareness, there is question concerning which is relevant, or most relevant, in the formation of the person. The relevance of self-awareness in the formation of the person consists in the role it plays in underwriting the unity of a mental life. Intentional self-awareness is incapable of doing this. Appeal to the apparatus of intentional act and object presupposes the unity of a mental life and, therefore, cannot explain it. Pre-intentional self-awareness is much more promising as a candidate for underwriting the unity of a mental life. The identity of the person is imprinted on the content of each mental act of which he is pre-intentionally aware. Thus, to whom the act belongs is part of the content of the mental act. This can explain the unity of a mental life.","PeriodicalId":168206,"journal":{"name":"Can Animals Be Persons?","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131658391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0004
M. Rowlands
Problems in attributing beliefs to animals stem from the fact that the contents (of beliefs and desires) used in such attribution are anchored to humans. This chapter spells out a de-anchoring strategy. The result of this is that it can be appropriate to explain the behavior of an animal using contents that only humans can entertain as long as our contents track theirs. That is: (a) the truth of a belief with our content guarantees the truth of their belief, and (b) our belief and theirs share narrow content. This is important not just in the case of animals. There are good reasons for thinking that tracking begins at home. There are no stable belief contents shared by different humans or even attaching to a single human through time. Content must be de-anchored in order to make sense of ourselves as well as other animals.
{"title":"Tracking Belief","authors":"M. Rowlands","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Problems in attributing beliefs to animals stem from the fact that the contents (of beliefs and desires) used in such attribution are anchored to humans. This chapter spells out a de-anchoring strategy. The result of this is that it can be appropriate to explain the behavior of an animal using contents that only humans can entertain as long as our contents track theirs. That is: (a) the truth of a belief with our content guarantees the truth of their belief, and (b) our belief and theirs share narrow content. This is important not just in the case of animals. There are good reasons for thinking that tracking begins at home. There are no stable belief contents shared by different humans or even attaching to a single human through time. Content must be de-anchored in order to make sense of ourselves as well as other animals.","PeriodicalId":168206,"journal":{"name":"Can Animals Be Persons?","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115865167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Standard ways of thinking about self-awareness in animals—the mirror test and the debate over metacognition—assume self-awareness must take an intentional form, where a bodily or psychological facet of an individual is taken as an intentional object of a mental act of that same individual. There are several reasons for supposing that this intentional model of self-awareness is inadequate. These include Wittgenstein’s analysis of the idea of knowing one is in pain, Shoemaker’s arguments that much self-awareness is immune to error through misidentification, and Perry’s argument for the non-eliminability of an indexical component of self-awareness. These cases show that, in self-awareness, what one is aware of is often not independent of the act of awareness, and this is something that cannot be accommodated by the intentional model.
{"title":"Beyond the Looking Glass","authors":"M. Rowlands","doi":"10.5840/TPM20177624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/TPM20177624","url":null,"abstract":"Standard ways of thinking about self-awareness in animals—the mirror test and the debate over metacognition—assume self-awareness must take an intentional form, where a bodily or psychological facet of an individual is taken as an intentional object of a mental act of that same individual. There are several reasons for supposing that this intentional model of self-awareness is inadequate. These include Wittgenstein’s analysis of the idea of knowing one is in pain, Shoemaker’s arguments that much self-awareness is immune to error through misidentification, and Perry’s argument for the non-eliminability of an indexical component of self-awareness. These cases show that, in self-awareness, what one is aware of is often not independent of the act of awareness, and this is something that cannot be accommodated by the intentional model.","PeriodicalId":168206,"journal":{"name":"Can Animals Be Persons?","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134352276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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