Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.4324/9781315175027.CH7
K. Westphal
Does epistemology collapse for lack of resources other than logic, conceptual analysis and descriptions of one’s own apparent experiences, thoughts and beliefs? No, but understanding how and why not requires, Kant noted, a ‘changed method of thinking’ (veranderte Methode der Denkungsart; KdrV Bxvii, 704). Some of these methodological changes are summarised in §2 in order to identify a philosophical role for thought experiments to help identify logically contingent, though cognitively fundamental capacities and circumstances necessary to human thought, experience and knowledge. As Kant also noted, experiments are only informative in response to posing the right question, indeed: the right kind of question (KdrV Bxii–xiv). Accordingly, preparations for these epistemological thought experiments (§2) fill half of this chapter. The second half (§§3–5), examines three such thought experiments, variously developed by Kant, Hegel, C. I. Lewis, Austin, Wittgenstein and F. L. Will.
认识论是否会因为缺乏逻辑、概念分析和对个人明显经验、思想和信仰的描述之外的资源而崩溃?不，但是理解如何以及为什么不需要，康德指出，需要一种“改变的思维方法”(veranderte Methode der Denkungsart;KdrV Bxvii, 704)。在§2中，我们总结了其中一些方法上的变化，以便确定思维实验的哲学作用，以帮助确定人类思维、经验和知识所必需的，虽然是认知上的基本能力和环境，但在逻辑上是偶然的。正如康德所指出的那样，实验只有在回答正确的问题时才有信息，事实上，是正确的问题(KdrV Bxii-xiv)。因此，为这些认识论的思想实验(§2)所作的准备，占了本章的一半。后半部分(§§3-5)考察康德、黑格尔、路易斯、奥斯丁、维特根斯坦和威尔的三个思想实验。
{"title":"Thought Experiments, Epistemology and Our Cognitive (In)Capacities","authors":"K. Westphal","doi":"10.4324/9781315175027.CH7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315175027.CH7","url":null,"abstract":"Does epistemology collapse for lack of resources other than logic, conceptual analysis and descriptions of one’s own apparent experiences, thoughts and beliefs? No, but understanding how and why not requires, Kant noted, a ‘changed method of thinking’ (veranderte Methode der Denkungsart; KdrV Bxvii, 704). Some of these methodological changes are summarised in §2 in order to identify a philosophical role for thought experiments to help identify logically contingent, though cognitively fundamental capacities and circumstances necessary to human thought, experience and knowledge. As Kant also noted, experiments are only informative in response to posing the right question, indeed: the right kind of question (KdrV Bxii–xiv). Accordingly, preparations for these epistemological thought experiments (§2) fill half of this chapter. The second half (§§3–5), examines three such thought experiments, variously developed by Kant, Hegel, C. I. Lewis, Austin, Wittgenstein and F. L. Will.","PeriodicalId":179732,"journal":{"name":"Kant’s Critical Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125541783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.1515/kantyb.2013.5.1.127
K. Westphal
Abstract Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason contains an original and powerful semantics of singular, specifically cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science (and which is entirely independent of Transcendental Idealism). Here I argue that Kant’s cognitive semantics directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton’s Rule 4 and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force (§ 1). I then briefly summarize Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§ 2), and show that it is embedded in, and strongly supports, Newton’s Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (per Harper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§ 3). This result exposes a key fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s main argument for his anti-realist Constructive Empiricism, and in many common objections to realism (§ 4). These problems reveal yet a further important regard in which Constructive Empiricism is not (so to speak) ‘empirically’ adequate, not even to Classical Newtonian Mechanics (§ 5). This inadequacy of Constructive Empiricism highlights a chronic empiricist misunderstanding of Newton’s mechanics (§ 6). Finally, Kant’s cognitive semantics improves upon the semantic interpretation of scientific theories, and rectifies the presumption that laws of physics literally ‘lie’ (§ 7). Thus Kant and Newton still have invaluable lessons for contemporary philosophy and history of science (§ 8).
{"title":"Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today","authors":"K. Westphal","doi":"10.1515/kantyb.2013.5.1.127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kantyb.2013.5.1.127","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason contains an original and powerful semantics of singular, specifically cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science (and which is entirely independent of Transcendental Idealism). Here I argue that Kant’s cognitive semantics directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton’s Rule 4 and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force (§ 1). I then briefly summarize Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§ 2), and show that it is embedded in, and strongly supports, Newton’s Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (per Harper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§ 3). This result exposes a key fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s main argument for his anti-realist Constructive Empiricism, and in many common objections to realism (§ 4). These problems reveal yet a further important regard in which Constructive Empiricism is not (so to speak) ‘empirically’ adequate, not even to Classical Newtonian Mechanics (§ 5). This inadequacy of Constructive Empiricism highlights a chronic empiricist misunderstanding of Newton’s mechanics (§ 6). Finally, Kant’s cognitive semantics improves upon the semantic interpretation of scientific theories, and rectifies the presumption that laws of physics literally ‘lie’ (§ 7). Thus Kant and Newton still have invaluable lessons for contemporary philosophy and history of science (§ 8).","PeriodicalId":179732,"journal":{"name":"Kant’s Critical Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123698061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-27DOI: 10.17990/RPF/2019_75_1_0017
K. Westphal
{"title":"Kant’s Two Models of Human Actions","authors":"K. Westphal","doi":"10.17990/RPF/2019_75_1_0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2019_75_1_0017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":179732,"journal":{"name":"Kant’s Critical Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132368136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-06-14DOI: 10.1017/CCOL9780521883863.018
K. Westphal, P. Guyer
{"title":"Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Analytic Philosophy","authors":"K. Westphal, P. Guyer","doi":"10.1017/CCOL9780521883863.018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521883863.018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":179732,"journal":{"name":"Kant’s Critical Epistemology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123625857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：