Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0008
P. Ludlow
The book has made the case that linguistic tense and other perspectival language are used to express interperspectival contents and that such contents are needed to explain and understand a number of phenomena, ranging from human action and emotion, to perception, consciousness, normative behavior (understood broadly enough to include the behavior of computers), etc. The fact that physics may not need perspectival contents does not undermine the case for such contents. Indeed, as this chapter argues, perspectival content is critical to the practice of scientific investigation (particularly in the context of scientific experimentation), and may well need to be a component in our base-level descriptions of the world. It is further argued that perspectival contents like tense are compatible with the Special Theory of Relativity, given our theory of the expression of interperspectival contents.
{"title":"Interperspectival Content and Physical Theory","authors":"P. Ludlow","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The book has made the case that linguistic tense and other perspectival language are used to express interperspectival contents and that such contents are needed to explain and understand a number of phenomena, ranging from human action and emotion, to perception, consciousness, normative behavior (understood broadly enough to include the behavior of computers), etc. The fact that physics may not need perspectival contents does not undermine the case for such contents. Indeed, as this chapter argues, perspectival content is critical to the practice of scientific investigation (particularly in the context of scientific experimentation), and may well need to be a component in our base-level descriptions of the world. It is further argued that perspectival contents like tense are compatible with the Special Theory of Relativity, given our theory of the expression of interperspectival contents.","PeriodicalId":187590,"journal":{"name":"Interperspectival Content","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130640120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0003
P. Ludlow
The problem we encounter with any semantic theory that expresses perspectival content is that when we engage in communication we of necessity communicate with people in other perspectival positions. So, for example, we often speak with people in different physical locations. Sometimes, we communicate across time, e.g. by leaving messages, and we often report on thoughts and comments made at an earlier time. Unless we are talking to ourselves, we also communicate with other persons, who are, obviously, in different perspectival positions. This chapter explores how people routinely communicate across such perspectival positions. The same interperspectival content is expressed in different ways in different perspectival contents. A theory of cognitive dynamics is developed which explains how these modes of expression are coordinated.
{"title":"Communication Using Interperspectival Contents","authors":"P. Ludlow","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"The problem we encounter with any semantic theory that expresses perspectival content is that when we engage in communication we of necessity communicate with people in other perspectival positions. So, for example, we often speak with people in different physical locations. Sometimes, we communicate across time, e.g. by leaving messages, and we often report on thoughts and comments made at an earlier time. Unless we are talking to ourselves, we also communicate with other persons, who are, obviously, in different perspectival positions. This chapter explores how people routinely communicate across such perspectival positions. The same interperspectival content is expressed in different ways in different perspectival contents. A theory of cognitive dynamics is developed which explains how these modes of expression are coordinated.","PeriodicalId":187590,"journal":{"name":"Interperspectival Content","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115346149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0004
P. Ludlow
This chapter looks at a number of attempts to exorcise perspectival content from the semantics (and thus, presumably, from our metaphysics). First, perhaps, we can make do with token indexical (token reflexive) content, give the account of human action and emotion that we needed, and avoid the use of perspectival contents. The chapter also considers other approaches to perspectival contents including David Lewis’s account of the de se, Kaplan’s theory of indexicals, and use-based accounts. It is argued that all such accounts sweep the perspectival content under the rug and fail to eliminate it.
{"title":"Some Alternative Accounts of Interperspectival Content","authors":"P. Ludlow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter looks at a number of attempts to exorcise perspectival content from the semantics (and thus, presumably, from our metaphysics). First, perhaps, we can make do with token indexical (token reflexive) content, give the account of human action and emotion that we needed, and avoid the use of perspectival contents. The chapter also considers other approaches to perspectival contents including David Lewis’s account of the de se, Kaplan’s theory of indexicals, and use-based accounts. It is argued that all such accounts sweep the perspectival content under the rug and fail to eliminate it.","PeriodicalId":187590,"journal":{"name":"Interperspectival Content","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122773722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0002
P. Ludlow
Is tense, as some contend, merely a feature of language (linguistic tense) or is it used to express some perspectival feature of the world? Many have argued that a proper analysis of linguistic tense would say that the tense operators in natural language express nonperspectival features of the world—that past and future linguistic tense are just used to express static universal relations between events or times. Tensers and detensers are split on precisely this point: tensers take tense to express an irreducible and real perspectival feature of the world, and detensers think it is a superficial property of language or thought that refers to aperspectival contents. In this chapter tense is among several examples of perspectival content. It is argued that perspectival contents, or interperspectival contents, are expressed in different ways from different perspectival positions.
{"title":"Tense and Interperspectival Content","authors":"P. Ludlow","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Is tense, as some contend, merely a feature of language (linguistic tense) or is it used to express some perspectival feature of the world? Many have argued that a proper analysis of linguistic tense would say that the tense operators in natural language express nonperspectival features of the world—that past and future linguistic tense are just used to express static universal relations between events or times. Tensers and detensers are split on precisely this point: tensers take tense to express an irreducible and real perspectival feature of the world, and detensers think it is a superficial property of language or thought that refers to aperspectival contents. In this chapter tense is among several examples of perspectival content. It is argued that perspectival contents, or interperspectival contents, are expressed in different ways from different perspectival positions.","PeriodicalId":187590,"journal":{"name":"Interperspectival Content","volume":"237 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125756189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0005
P. Ludlow
It is argued that perspectival contents run deeply through our accounts of computation and information, and that perspectival content is critical to our interpretation of natural and artifactual computational systems, and the very notion of information itself. The chapter concludes that we get to call the shots on what information is being transmitted between systems in nature. This is analogous to our interpretation and reports on the beliefs and desires of other persons. The relevant information is information that is accessible to us as observers and is a function of our explanation and understanding of the behaviors of informational systems in nature. In short, all information flow, whether natural or the product of human intentions, ultimately bottoms out in perspectival contents.
{"title":"Computation, Information, and Interperspectival Content","authors":"P. Ludlow","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"It is argued that perspectival contents run deeply through our accounts of computation and information, and that perspectival content is critical to our interpretation of natural and artifactual computational systems, and the very notion of information itself. The chapter concludes that we get to call the shots on what information is being transmitted between systems in nature. This is analogous to our interpretation and reports on the beliefs and desires of other persons. The relevant information is information that is accessible to us as observers and is a function of our explanation and understanding of the behaviors of informational systems in nature. In short, all information flow, whether natural or the product of human intentions, ultimately bottoms out in perspectival contents.","PeriodicalId":187590,"journal":{"name":"Interperspectival Content","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126826761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0007
P. Ludlow
The book has been making the case that perspectival content is necessary for the explanation of much of human activity, and that the best approach to tense is to think in terms of interperspectival contents. It has already covered a number of metaphysical worries about tense and perspectival contents (McTaggart’s argument, for example) but there are two additional worries that need to be addressed. The first has to do with the problem of truth-makers. The second has to do with the kinds of contents that are metaphysically admissible. It is argued that metaphysical concerns about truth-makers and Humean supervenience do not undermine the positing of interperspectival contents. Such contents are part and parcel of basic low-level descriptions and they do not thwart attempts at naturalization of our accounts of action, emotion, etc.
{"title":"Some Additional Metaphysical Questions","authors":"P. Ludlow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The book has been making the case that perspectival content is necessary for the explanation of much of human activity, and that the best approach to tense is to think in terms of interperspectival contents. It has already covered a number of metaphysical worries about tense and perspectival contents (McTaggart’s argument, for example) but there are two additional worries that need to be addressed. The first has to do with the problem of truth-makers. The second has to do with the kinds of contents that are metaphysically admissible. It is argued that metaphysical concerns about truth-makers and Humean supervenience do not undermine the positing of interperspectival contents. Such contents are part and parcel of basic low-level descriptions and they do not thwart attempts at naturalization of our accounts of action, emotion, etc.","PeriodicalId":187590,"journal":{"name":"Interperspectival Content","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116832415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0006
P. Ludlow
The preceding chapters made the case that perspectival contents are indispensible for accounts of human action, emotion, perception, normative behavior, computation, and information, and that they cannot be eliminated or replaced by aperspectival contents. One idea that has been widely held (and previously held by the author) is the idea that tensism is not compatible with the B-series conception of time. This chapter argues that competing accounts of tense—the A-series and the B-series—are in fact compatible. One can wed perspectival temporal contents to an aperspectival picture of the world without creating fatal philosophical puzzles. The solution, it is argued, is to deploy resources from the dynamic lexicon and understand that perspectival contents are not to be confused with their modes of expression.
{"title":"A-Series/B-Series Compatibilism","authors":"P. Ludlow","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823797.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"The preceding chapters made the case that perspectival contents are indispensible for accounts of human action, emotion, perception, normative behavior, computation, and information, and that they cannot be eliminated or replaced by aperspectival contents. One idea that has been widely held (and previously held by the author) is the idea that tensism is not compatible with the B-series conception of time. This chapter argues that competing accounts of tense—the A-series and the B-series—are in fact compatible. One can wed perspectival temporal contents to an aperspectival picture of the world without creating fatal philosophical puzzles. The solution, it is argued, is to deploy resources from the dynamic lexicon and understand that perspectival contents are not to be confused with their modes of expression.","PeriodicalId":187590,"journal":{"name":"Interperspectival Content","volume":"130 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132622484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0001
P. Ludlow
Perspectival content, or what is sometimes called indexical content, is critical to the proper understanding of human action and emotion, perception, consciousness, normative behavior and attitudes, and even linguistic rule following. Recent attempts to eliminate such contents are shown to be unsuccessful. Philosophers have disagreed about whether perspectival content is really a feature of the world, and they have disagreed about whether it is eliminable, but they have more or less been on the same page about one thing: Perspectival content, at least understood in a very weak sense of ‘content’ that includes narrow psychological states, is necessary for the explanation of human action, emotion, etc.
{"title":"Why We Need Interperspectival Content","authors":"P. Ludlow","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198823797.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Perspectival content, or what is sometimes called indexical content, is critical to the proper understanding of human action and emotion, perception, consciousness, normative behavior and attitudes, and even linguistic rule following. Recent attempts to eliminate such contents are shown to be unsuccessful. Philosophers have disagreed about whether perspectival content is really a feature of the world, and they have disagreed about whether it is eliminable, but they have more or less been on the same page about one thing: Perspectival content, at least understood in a very weak sense of ‘content’ that includes narrow psychological states, is necessary for the explanation of human action, emotion, etc.","PeriodicalId":187590,"journal":{"name":"Interperspectival Content","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123077230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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