Pub Date : 2009-06-23DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2009.00313.x
Michael S. Mitsopoulos
The use of interdependent preferences provides an intuitive link between institutions and growth. Envious agents that care about relative wealth choose to use an available destruction technology to inflict harm on the wealth of other agents when institutions fail to make property rights secure, while they use a production technology to increase their wealth when institutions make it easy and hassle-free to engage in production. The use of interdependent preferences is justified by an extensive literature and can provide a motive for agents to take actions that block growth in the absence of theft or other concrete gains.
{"title":"Envy, Institutions and Growth","authors":"Michael S. Mitsopoulos","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-8586.2009.00313.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2009.00313.x","url":null,"abstract":"The use of interdependent preferences provides an intuitive link between institutions and growth. Envious agents that care about relative wealth choose to use an available destruction technology to inflict harm on the wealth of other agents when institutions fail to make property rights secure, while they use a production technology to increase their wealth when institutions make it easy and hassle-free to engage in production. The use of interdependent preferences is justified by an extensive literature and can provide a motive for agents to take actions that block growth in the absence of theft or other concrete gains.","PeriodicalId":222585,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119985673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-01-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2008.00293.x
Prasanna Gai, Kamakshya Trivedi
This note presents a simple model that nests the “excess liquidity” and “savings glut” hypotheses of the debate on the recent asset price boom. It clarifies the notion of investors’ ‘search for yield’ and shows how financial frictions influence asset price dynamics.
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This paper studies how schooling admission tests affect economic performance in an economy where individuals are endowed with both academic and non-academic abilities and both abilities matter for labour productivity. We develop a simple model with schools run by the goverment, where individuals signal their abilities by taking an admission test and sort into low quality and high quality schools. When abilities are poorly correlated in the population, as documented in the literature, a standard test based only on academic abilities can be less efficient than a balanced test, which considers both ability types. We show that a sequential testing strategy, with schools testing academic abilities and firms testing non-academic abilities on the sub-sample of graduates of high quality schools, does not necessarily replicate the outcome of a balanced test.
{"title":"Selective Schools","authors":"G. Brunello, Massimo Giannini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.200592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.200592","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how schooling admission tests affect economic performance in an economy where individuals are endowed with both academic and non-academic abilities and both abilities matter for labour productivity. We develop a simple model with schools run by the goverment, where individuals signal their abilities by taking an admission test and sort into low quality and high quality schools. When abilities are poorly correlated in the population, as documented in the literature, a standard test based only on academic abilities can be less efficient than a balanced test, which considers both ability types. We show that a sequential testing strategy, with schools testing academic abilities and firms testing non-academic abilities on the sub-sample of graduates of high quality schools, does not necessarily replicate the outcome of a balanced test.","PeriodicalId":222585,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Bulletin of Economic Research","volume":"688 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122703085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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