Pub Date : 2004-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82227
Lars De Nul
{"title":"Brain-Wise.Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2002. Patricia Churchland","authors":"Lars De Nul","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82227","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":244460,"journal":{"name":"The inside/outside distinction and the issue of boundaries","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128877671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82226
A. Mishara
Patients with schizophrenia demonstrate an inability to distinguish internal from external sources of some experiences. Although there are numerous models, the causes and neural substrates are largely unknown. In schizophrenia, the commonsensical overlapping oppositions of internal/external, self/other, active/passive, mind/body, voluntary/involuntary become disentangled. Due to the loss of common sense, the imprecise coincidence of these oppositions inner and self, outer and other, mind and body lose their obviousness to the patient. Once the nexus of oppositions is unraveled, the patient tries to recover order by keeping the oppositions clear and separate in delusional interpretations of reality. The patient counters with delusional schemes that artificially keep these oppositions from merging. However, this web of proximate and overlapping oppositions lost to the patient not only inform the way we describe our everyday experience but also implicitly guide our conceptual models in psychology and neuroscience. Their source is a resilient but also protective common sense. Phenomenological method brackets the oppositions of common sense to study the otherwise concealed structures of consciousness. However, when applied to schizophrenia as a disorder of consciousness, phenomenology is burdened by controversy between two approaches: the Apollonian and Dionysian. Both traditions propose that the loss of common sense (in which the paradoxes and contradictions implicit to everyday experience are "overlooked" (von Weizsaecker)) is core to schizophrenia. Experience no longer rests on what is assumed to be probable (Blankenburg), but only proceeds in staccato, what must be, or delusional certainty. The Apollonian approach (Minkowski, Sass, Cutting) claims that the destruction of common sense in schizophrenia comes from above, melting under the scrutiny of an intact but too intense "hyperreflection." The Dionysian approach (Binswanger, Blankenburg, von Weizsaecker) attributes the erosion of common sense, coming from below, to a disruption of pre-attentive, automatic processing. The patient attempts to piece together experience by means of delusions in terms of the remaining fragments. However, both traditions have not been directly studied experimentally. The Apollonian model is hard
{"title":"Disconnection of External and Internal in the Conscious Experience of Schizophrenia: Phenomenological Literary and Neuroanatomical Archaeologies of Self.","authors":"A. Mishara","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82226","url":null,"abstract":"Patients with schizophrenia demonstrate an inability to distinguish internal from external sources of some experiences. Although there are numerous models, the causes and neural substrates are largely unknown. In schizophrenia, the commonsensical overlapping oppositions of internal/external, self/other, active/passive, mind/body, voluntary/involuntary become disentangled. Due to the loss of common sense, the imprecise coincidence of these oppositions inner and self, outer and other, mind and body lose their obviousness to the patient. Once the nexus of oppositions is unraveled, the patient tries to recover order by keeping the oppositions clear and separate in delusional interpretations of reality. The patient counters with delusional schemes that artificially keep these oppositions from merging. However, this web of proximate and overlapping oppositions lost to the patient not only inform the way we describe our everyday experience but also implicitly guide our conceptual models in psychology and neuroscience. Their source is a resilient but also protective common sense. Phenomenological method brackets the oppositions of common sense to study the otherwise concealed structures of consciousness. However, when applied to schizophrenia as a disorder of consciousness, phenomenology is burdened by controversy between two approaches: the Apollonian and Dionysian. Both traditions propose that the loss of common sense (in which the paradoxes and contradictions implicit to everyday experience are \"overlooked\" (von Weizsaecker)) is core to schizophrenia. Experience no longer rests on what is assumed to be probable (Blankenburg), but only proceeds in staccato, what must be, or delusional certainty. The Apollonian approach (Minkowski, Sass, Cutting) claims that the destruction of common sense in schizophrenia comes from above, melting under the scrutiny of an intact but too intense \"hyperreflection.\" The Dionysian approach (Binswanger, Blankenburg, von Weizsaecker) attributes the erosion of common sense, coming from below, to a disruption of pre-attentive, automatic processing. The patient attempts to piece together experience by means of delusions in terms of the remaining fragments. However, both traditions have not been directly studied experimentally. The Apollonian model is hard","PeriodicalId":244460,"journal":{"name":"The inside/outside distinction and the issue of boundaries","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126812294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82224
A. Rayner
Inclusionality expresses the idea that space, far from passively surrounding and isolating discrete, massy objects, is a vital, dynamic inclusion within, around and permeating natural form across all scales of organization, allowing diverse possibilities for movement and communication. This way of understanding natural form radically affects the way we interpret all kinds of irreversible dynamic processes. Boundaries that from a conventionally rationalistic perspective are regarded as discrete, fixed limits - smooth, space-excluding, Euclidean lines or surfaces - are seen inclusionally as pivotal places. Here, complex, dynamic arrays of voids and relief both emerge from and pattern the co-creative togetherness of inner and outer domains, as in the banks of a river that simultaneously express and mould both flowing stream (and what this stream contains) and receptive landscape (and what this landscape is contained in). At the heart of inclusionality, then, is a radical shift in the way we frame reality, from fixed to dynamic. We thereby move from a conventionally rationalistic, impositionai logic of discrete, assertive (independent) objects (simple entities) transacting in Cartesian space, to a relational, inclusional logic of distinct, inductive places (interdependent, complex identities) communicating between reciprocally coupled insides and outsides through intermediary spatial domains. This inclusional logic removes the paradoxes of completeness characteristic of atomistic thought and enables evolution to be understood primarily as a process of contextual transformation rather than the operation of external selective force on discrete informational units lacking internal agency.
{"title":"Inclusionality and the Role of Place Space and Dynamic Boundaries in Evolutionary Processes.","authors":"A. Rayner","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82224","url":null,"abstract":"Inclusionality expresses the idea that space, far from passively surrounding and isolating discrete, massy objects, is a vital, dynamic inclusion within, around and permeating natural form across all scales of organization, allowing diverse possibilities for movement and communication. This way of understanding natural form radically affects the way we interpret all kinds of irreversible dynamic processes. Boundaries that from a conventionally rationalistic perspective are regarded as discrete, fixed limits - smooth, space-excluding, Euclidean lines or surfaces - are seen inclusionally as pivotal places. Here, complex, dynamic arrays of voids and relief both emerge from and pattern the co-creative togetherness of inner and outer domains, as in the banks of a river that simultaneously express and mould both flowing stream (and what this stream contains) and receptive landscape (and what this landscape is contained in). At the heart of inclusionality, then, is a radical shift in the way we frame reality, from fixed to dynamic. We thereby move from a conventionally rationalistic, impositionai logic of discrete, assertive (independent) objects (simple entities) transacting in Cartesian space, to a relational, inclusional logic of distinct, inductive places (interdependent, complex identities) communicating between reciprocally coupled insides and outsides through intermediary spatial domains. This inclusional logic removes the paradoxes of completeness characteristic of atomistic thought and enables evolution to be understood primarily as a process of contextual transformation rather than the operation of external selective force on discrete informational units lacking internal agency.","PeriodicalId":244460,"journal":{"name":"The inside/outside distinction and the issue of boundaries","volume":"544 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123092777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82225
Bernhard Waldenfels
{"title":"The Boundaries of Orders.","authors":"Bernhard Waldenfels","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82225","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":244460,"journal":{"name":"The inside/outside distinction and the issue of boundaries","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122890430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82222
Á. Moreno, Xabier E. Barandiaran
The first fonn of the inside-outside dichotomy appears as a self-encapsulated system with an active border. These systems are based on two complementary but asymmetric processes: constructive and interactive. The fonner physically constitute the system as a recursive network of component production, defining an inside. The maintenance of the constructive processes implies that the internal organization also constrains certain flows of matter and energy across the border of the system, generating interactive processes. These interactive processes ensure the maintenance of the constructive processes thus specifying a meaningful outside. Upon this basic fonn of identity, the evolutionary and historical domain is open for the emergence of a whole hierarchy and ecology of insides and outsides.
{"title":"A Naturalizd Account of the Inside-Outside Dichotomy.","authors":"Á. Moreno, Xabier E. Barandiaran","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82222","url":null,"abstract":"The first fonn of the inside-outside dichotomy appears as a self-encapsulated system with an active border. These systems are based on two complementary but asymmetric processes: constructive and interactive. The fonner physically constitute the system as a recursive network of component production, defining an inside. The maintenance of the constructive processes implies that the internal organization also constrains certain flows of matter and energy across the border of the system, generating interactive processes. These interactive processes ensure the maintenance of the constructive processes thus specifying a meaningful outside. Upon this basic fonn of identity, the evolutionary and historical domain is open for the emergence of a whole hierarchy and ecology of insides and outsides.","PeriodicalId":244460,"journal":{"name":"The inside/outside distinction and the issue of boundaries","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125784059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82223
Helena De Preester
{"title":"Part-Whole Metaphysics Underlying Issues of Internality/Externality.","authors":"Helena De Preester","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82223","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":244460,"journal":{"name":"The inside/outside distinction and the issue of boundaries","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125033953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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