首页 > 最新文献

FARS Midyear Meeting Concurrent Research Sessions最新文献

英文 中文
Executive Stock Options, Missed Earnings Targets and Earnings Management 高管股票期权,未实现的盈利目标和盈利管理
Pub Date : 2007-05-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.925584
M. McAnally, Anup Srivastava, C. Weaver
This paper examines whether stock‐option grants explain missed earnings targets, including reported losses, earnings declines, and missed analysts' forecasts. Anecdotal evidence and surveys suggest that managers believe that missing an earnings target can cause stock‐price drops (Graham et al. 2006). Empirical studies corroborate this notion (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). Thus, a missed target could benefit an executive via lower strike price on subsequent option grants. Prior option grant studies explore only general downward earnings management (Balsam et al. 2003; Baker et al. 2003), but our study is the first to explore whether option grants encourage missed earnings targets. Indeed, if missed targets drive the prior results, then the literature has failed to document an important negative outcome of stock‐option incentives. We use quarterly and annual data for fixed‐date options granted after firms announce they have missed earnings targets. We find that firms that miss earnings targe...
本文考察了股票期权授予是否解释了错过的盈利目标,包括报告的亏损、盈利下降和错过的分析师预测。轶事证据和调查表明,经理们认为,未能达到盈利目标会导致股价下跌(Graham et al. 2006)。实证研究证实了这一观点(Skinner and Sloan 2002;Lopez and Rees 2002)。因此,未能实现目标的高管可以通过降低后续期权授予的执行价格而受益。先前期权授予研究只探讨了一般的向下盈余管理(Balsam et al. 2003;Baker et al. 2003),但我们的研究首次探讨了期权授予是否会鼓励未能实现盈利目标。事实上,如果未实现的目标驱动了先前的结果,那么文献就未能记录股票期权激励的重要负面结果。我们使用季度和年度数据来计算在公司宣布未能实现盈利目标后授予的固定日期期权。我们发现,未能达到盈利目标的公司……
{"title":"Executive Stock Options, Missed Earnings Targets and Earnings Management","authors":"M. McAnally, Anup Srivastava, C. Weaver","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.925584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.925584","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether stock‐option grants explain missed earnings targets, including reported losses, earnings declines, and missed analysts' forecasts. Anecdotal evidence and surveys suggest that managers believe that missing an earnings target can cause stock‐price drops (Graham et al. 2006). Empirical studies corroborate this notion (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). Thus, a missed target could benefit an executive via lower strike price on subsequent option grants. Prior option grant studies explore only general downward earnings management (Balsam et al. 2003; Baker et al. 2003), but our study is the first to explore whether option grants encourage missed earnings targets. Indeed, if missed targets drive the prior results, then the literature has failed to document an important negative outcome of stock‐option incentives. We use quarterly and annual data for fixed‐date options granted after firms announce they have missed earnings targets. We find that firms that miss earnings targe...","PeriodicalId":247168,"journal":{"name":"FARS Midyear Meeting Concurrent Research Sessions","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132260721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 168
Fundamentals-Based Risk Measurement in Valuation 估值中基于基本面的风险度量
Pub Date : 2007-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.930729
Alexander Nekrasov, Pervin K. Shroff
ABSTRACT: We propose a methodology to incorporate risk measures based on economic fundamentals directly into the valuation model. Fundamentals‐based risk adjustment in the residual income valuation model is captured by the covariance of ROE with market‐wide factors. We demonstrate a method of estimating covariance risk out of sample based on the accounting beta and betas of size and book‐to‐market factors in earnings. We show how the covariance risk estimate can be transformed to obtain the fundamentals‐based cost of equity. Our empirical analysis shows that value estimates based on fundamental risk adjustment produce significantly smaller deviations from price relative to the CAPM or the Fama‐French three‐factor model. We further find that our single‐factor risk measure, based on the accounting beta alone, captures aspects of risk that are indicated by the book‐to‐market factor, largely accounting for the “mispricing” of value and growth stocks. Our study highlights the usefulness of accounting numbers i...
摘要:本文提出了一种将基于经济基本面的风险指标直接纳入估值模型的方法。剩余收益估值模型中基于基本面的风险调整由ROE与市场范围因素的协方差捕获。我们展示了一种估计样本外协方差风险的方法,该方法基于会计贝塔系数和规模贝塔系数以及盈余的账面市值因子。我们展示了如何将协方差风险估计转换为基于基本面的权益成本。我们的实证分析表明,与CAPM或Fama - French三因素模型相比,基于基本风险调整的价值估计产生的价格偏差要小得多。我们进一步发现,我们的单因素风险度量,仅基于会计贝塔,捕获了账面市值因子所指示的风险方面,这在很大程度上解释了价值股和成长型股票的“错误定价”。我们的研究强调了会计数字的有用性……
{"title":"Fundamentals-Based Risk Measurement in Valuation","authors":"Alexander Nekrasov, Pervin K. Shroff","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.930729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.930729","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: We propose a methodology to incorporate risk measures based on economic fundamentals directly into the valuation model. Fundamentals‐based risk adjustment in the residual income valuation model is captured by the covariance of ROE with market‐wide factors. We demonstrate a method of estimating covariance risk out of sample based on the accounting beta and betas of size and book‐to‐market factors in earnings. We show how the covariance risk estimate can be transformed to obtain the fundamentals‐based cost of equity. Our empirical analysis shows that value estimates based on fundamental risk adjustment produce significantly smaller deviations from price relative to the CAPM or the Fama‐French three‐factor model. We further find that our single‐factor risk measure, based on the accounting beta alone, captures aspects of risk that are indicated by the book‐to‐market factor, largely accounting for the “mispricing” of value and growth stocks. Our study highlights the usefulness of accounting numbers i...","PeriodicalId":247168,"journal":{"name":"FARS Midyear Meeting Concurrent Research Sessions","volume":"273 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125833527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 98
Institutional Monitoring and Corporate Restructurings 机构监督和公司重组
Pub Date : 2006-09-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.930156
R. Atiase, William J. Mayew, Y. Xue
We investigate the monitoring role performed by institutional investors in corporate restructurings. We hypothesize that institutional monitoring will (1) influence a firm's decision to restructure and (2) encourage restructurings that stop poor performance before it becomes too severe (i.e. pre-emptive restructurings) and that fix performance problems more completely (i.e. thorough restructurings). Consistent with these hypotheses, we document that the level of institutional ownership (changes in transient institutional holdings) is (are) increasing (decreasing) in the probability that a firm restructures. This result holds after controlling for other determinants of the restructuring choice, including existing internal corporate governance mechanisms. The association between institutional ownership and restructuring decisions is also robust after controlling for the possible endogeniety problem using a simultaneous equations approach. Among firms that restructure, we find the level of institutional ownership increases the probability that the firm's restructuring is pre-emptive (proxied by positive or negative prior growth in ROE). We also find that institutional holdings increase the probability that a firm undergoes a restructuring that is thorough (proxied by above or below the median value of scaled restructuring charges). As a whole, the results suggest that institutional investors play an important monitoring role in encouraging managers to make value maximizing restructuring decisions.
我们研究了机构投资者在公司重组中的监督作用。我们假设机构监督将(1)影响公司的重组决策,(2)鼓励重组,在糟糕的业绩变得过于严重之前阻止它(即先发制人的重组),并更彻底地解决绩效问题(即彻底的重组)。与这些假设一致,我们证明了机构所有权水平(临时机构持股的变化)在企业重组的概率中是增加(减少)的。这一结果在控制了重组选择的其他决定因素后成立,包括现有的内部公司治理机制。在使用联立方程方法控制了可能的内生性问题后,机构所有权与重组决策之间的关联也很稳健。在进行重组的公司中,我们发现机构所有权水平增加了公司先发制人重组的可能性(以净资产收益率的正或负先验增长为代表)。我们还发现,机构持股增加了企业进行彻底重组的可能性(以高于或低于规模重组费用中位数的方式表示)。总体而言,研究结果表明,机构投资者在激励管理者做出价值最大化重组决策方面发挥了重要的监督作用。
{"title":"Institutional Monitoring and Corporate Restructurings","authors":"R. Atiase, William J. Mayew, Y. Xue","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.930156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.930156","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the monitoring role performed by institutional investors in corporate restructurings. We hypothesize that institutional monitoring will (1) influence a firm's decision to restructure and (2) encourage restructurings that stop poor performance before it becomes too severe (i.e. pre-emptive restructurings) and that fix performance problems more completely (i.e. thorough restructurings). Consistent with these hypotheses, we document that the level of institutional ownership (changes in transient institutional holdings) is (are) increasing (decreasing) in the probability that a firm restructures. This result holds after controlling for other determinants of the restructuring choice, including existing internal corporate governance mechanisms. The association between institutional ownership and restructuring decisions is also robust after controlling for the possible endogeniety problem using a simultaneous equations approach. Among firms that restructure, we find the level of institutional ownership increases the probability that the firm's restructuring is pre-emptive (proxied by positive or negative prior growth in ROE). We also find that institutional holdings increase the probability that a firm undergoes a restructuring that is thorough (proxied by above or below the median value of scaled restructuring charges). As a whole, the results suggest that institutional investors play an important monitoring role in encouraging managers to make value maximizing restructuring decisions.","PeriodicalId":247168,"journal":{"name":"FARS Midyear Meeting Concurrent Research Sessions","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117214271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
期刊
FARS Midyear Meeting Concurrent Research Sessions
全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1