This paper examines the effect of internal information quality on workplace safety. Using establishment-level data on workplace injuries from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and employing a strict fixed-effects structure, we show that higher information quality is associated with significantly lower work-related injury rates. Further investigation reveals that the effect is stronger when more decision rights reside in headquarters, weaker when employees have greater bargaining power, and weaker when firms are subject to financial constraints. Our findings are robust to the use of two plausibly exogenous shocks and other robustness checks. Our study suggests an important economic consequence of information quality not examined by prior literature.
{"title":"Information Quality and Workplace Safety","authors":"Ole‐Kristian Hope, Danye Wang, Heng Yue, Jianyu Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3762656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3762656","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effect of internal information quality on workplace safety. Using establishment-level data on workplace injuries from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and employing a strict fixed-effects structure, we show that higher information quality is associated with significantly lower work-related injury rates. Further investigation reveals that the effect is stronger when more decision rights reside in headquarters, weaker when employees have greater bargaining power, and weaker when firms are subject to financial constraints. Our findings are robust to the use of two plausibly exogenous shocks and other robustness checks. Our study suggests an important economic consequence of information quality not examined by prior literature.","PeriodicalId":248519,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Control Systems (Topic)","volume":"31 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130709954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this dissertation, I aim to explore the Corporate Governance (CG) regimes of India and China using CG parameters such as board size and composition, board busyness, board committees, board independence and ownership structure. The reason for undertaking this comparative analysis is that in both these countries, changes to their CG framework were made primarily due to globalization as opposed to the internal domestic requirements like it has been observed in countries such as the United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). I believe that this relative recency of CG reforms in India and China provides a unique opportunity to study the evolution of institutional and legal settings with respect to CG practices and to identify challenges that assume considerable importance to the shareholders of listed companies in both these jurisdictions.
{"title":"Challenges in the Corporate Governance Framework of Indian and Chinese Listed Companies: A Comparative Analysis and the Way Forward","authors":"Ananya Singh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3741202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3741202","url":null,"abstract":"In this dissertation, I aim to explore the Corporate Governance (CG) regimes of India and China using CG parameters such as board size and composition, board busyness, board committees, board independence and ownership structure. The reason for undertaking this comparative analysis is that in both these countries, changes to their CG framework were made primarily due to globalization as opposed to the internal domestic requirements like it has been observed in countries such as the United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). I believe that this relative recency of CG reforms in India and China provides a unique opportunity to study the evolution of institutional and legal settings with respect to CG practices and to identify challenges that assume considerable importance to the shareholders of listed companies in both these jurisdictions.","PeriodicalId":248519,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Control Systems (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121638882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Boeing’s 2011 launch of the 737 Max has been a disastrous decision for the company and could even threaten its long-term viability. In the 2011 letter to shareholder, the CEO said it will “reduce our business risk substantially for the next decade.” The CEO also convinced his compensation committee to factor “risk reduction” into its measure of economic profit and company performance score. Consequently, CEO pay rose from less than $20 million in the two years preceding 2011, to over $26 million in the three years after 2011. Coincidentally, the CEO was a long-term veteran of General Electric, as were two of the four members of the compensation committee. This case study illustrates that management can capture the compensation committee and put into place compensation incentives that can harm the company in the long-run.
{"title":"Was Boeing’s Compensation Committee Sufficiently Independent in Judging the Business Risk of the 737 Max?","authors":"Dov Fischer, D. Augustine, Ngoc Cindy Pham","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3370066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3370066","url":null,"abstract":"Boeing’s 2011 launch of the 737 Max has been a disastrous decision for the company and could even threaten its long-term viability. In the 2011 letter to shareholder, the CEO said it will “reduce our business risk substantially for the next decade.” The CEO also convinced his compensation committee to factor “risk reduction” into its measure of economic profit and company performance score. Consequently, CEO pay rose from less than $20 million in the two years preceding 2011, to over $26 million in the three years after 2011. Coincidentally, the CEO was a long-term veteran of General Electric, as were two of the four members of the compensation committee. This case study illustrates that management can capture the compensation committee and put into place compensation incentives that can harm the company in the long-run.","PeriodicalId":248519,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Control Systems (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132671242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lobo and Zhou (2006) find an increase in accounting conservatism following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. In Japan, the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of 2006, the so-called Japanese Sarbanes–Oxley Act (J-SOX), was implemented for fiscal years ending on or after March 31, 2009. Consistent with Lobo and Zhou (2006), we first investigate the change in accounting conservatism following J-SOX and demonstrate an increase in accounting conservatism in the post-J-SOX period. In particular, using the Basu (1997) measure of conservatism, we find that the degree to which firms incorporate losses more quickly than gains in their earnings is greater in the post-J-SOX period. We also find that firms report lower discretionary accruals in the post-J-SOX period. In addition to accounting conservatism, this study focuses on income smoothing and demonstrates a decrease in income smoothing following J-SOX. The evidence suggests that J-SOX may have altered managers’ accounting discretionary behavior.
{"title":"Accounting Conservatism and Income Smoothing after the Japanese Sarbanes–Oxley Act","authors":"I. Eddie, Tomoyasu Yamaguchi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3186280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3186280","url":null,"abstract":"Lobo and Zhou (2006) find an increase in accounting conservatism following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. In Japan, the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of 2006, the so-called Japanese Sarbanes–Oxley Act (J-SOX), was implemented for fiscal years ending on or after March 31, 2009. Consistent with Lobo and Zhou (2006), we first investigate the change in accounting conservatism following J-SOX and demonstrate an increase in accounting conservatism in the post-J-SOX period. In particular, using the Basu (1997) measure of conservatism, we find that the degree to which firms incorporate losses more quickly than gains in their earnings is greater in the post-J-SOX period. We also find that firms report lower discretionary accruals in the post-J-SOX period. In addition to accounting conservatism, this study focuses on income smoothing and demonstrates a decrease in income smoothing following J-SOX. The evidence suggests that J-SOX may have altered managers’ accounting discretionary behavior.","PeriodicalId":248519,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Control Systems (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129964767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of the paper is to investigate, first, the association between multiple directorship assignments (busyness) undertaken by corporate directors and firm performance, second, whether endogenously determined limits of multiple directorships, highlighting the ownership structure and other institutional settings, explain the above association better than those by exogenously mandated by regulators and third, the association between the nature of busyness and firm performance. The study develops measures of busyness in the light of the agency and resource dependence theories. The spline regression technique is applied in order to reflect institutional settings of a large sample and sub-samples of firms classified as local private, foreign and government firms in India. For local private firms, the association between the number of directorships and firm performance becomes negative before reaching the maximum number of directorships set by legislation, whereas, for foreign and government firms, the same continues to remain positive throughout. Endogenously determined cut-off points of busyness reflect institutional settings of firms, which may remain masked otherwise. The findings of the current paper can be useful to study the same phenomenon in other emerging markets having corporate governance, and ownership structures similar to that of India. The effect of busyness can be different on different firms; however, exogenously fixed regulatory limits do not reflect their institutional settings. The current paper is an attempt to fill in this research gap.
{"title":"Multiple Directorships of Corporate Boards and Firm Performance in India","authors":"Shab Hundal","doi":"10.22495/COCV14I4ART13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/COCV14I4ART13","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the paper is to investigate, first, the association between multiple directorship assignments (busyness) undertaken by corporate directors and firm performance, second, whether endogenously determined limits of multiple directorships, highlighting the ownership structure and other institutional settings, explain the above association better than those by exogenously mandated by regulators and third, the association between the nature of busyness and firm performance. The study develops measures of busyness in the light of the agency and resource dependence theories. The spline regression technique is applied in order to reflect institutional settings of a large sample and sub-samples of firms classified as local private, foreign and government firms in India. For local private firms, the association between the number of directorships and firm performance becomes negative before reaching the maximum number of directorships set by legislation, whereas, for foreign and government firms, the same continues to remain positive throughout. Endogenously determined cut-off points of busyness reflect institutional settings of firms, which may remain masked otherwise. The findings of the current paper can be useful to study the same phenomenon in other emerging markets having corporate governance, and ownership structures similar to that of India. The effect of busyness can be different on different firms; however, exogenously fixed regulatory limits do not reflect their institutional settings. The current paper is an attempt to fill in this research gap.","PeriodicalId":248519,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Control Systems (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132417274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper outlines a detailed evaluation of intangible assets within the company, now more and more important and fundamental. It focuses on these resources through the use of direct valuation methods (scored card, Tobin's Q ratio, VAIC, interbrand, technology brokers), historical cost, customer relations, replacement cost, market and expected benefits.
{"title":"Valuation of Intangibles","authors":"A. Saravalle","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2016026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2016026","url":null,"abstract":"This paper outlines a detailed evaluation of intangible assets within the company, now more and more important and fundamental. It focuses on these resources through the use of direct valuation methods (scored card, Tobin's Q ratio, VAIC, interbrand, technology brokers), historical cost, customer relations, replacement cost, market and expected benefits.","PeriodicalId":248519,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Control Systems (Topic)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121597659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-12-21DOI: 10.2308/ACCR.2010.85.3.1001
Adi Masli, Gary F. Peters, V. Richardson, J. M. Sánchez
ABSTRACT: We analyze the potential benefits that firms can realize from implementing technology specifically aimed at monitoring the effectiveness of their internal control systems. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission asserts that effective internal control monitoring should enhance the efficiency of internal control processes, and, in turn, the assurance over such processes (COSO 2009a). We develop hypotheses to test the realization of these potential benefits. Specifically, we identify a sample of firms that implemented internal control monitoring technology in response to the internal control requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Consistent with our hypotheses, we document that the implementation of internal control monitoring technology is associated with lower likelihood of material weaknesses, smaller increases in audit fees, and smaller increases in audit delays during the post-SOX time period. We discuss the potential implications of our findings for research rel...
{"title":"Examining the Potential Benefits of Internal Control Monitoring Technology","authors":"Adi Masli, Gary F. Peters, V. Richardson, J. M. Sánchez","doi":"10.2308/ACCR.2010.85.3.1001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/ACCR.2010.85.3.1001","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: We analyze the potential benefits that firms can realize from implementing technology specifically aimed at monitoring the effectiveness of their internal control systems. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission asserts that effective internal control monitoring should enhance the efficiency of internal control processes, and, in turn, the assurance over such processes (COSO 2009a). We develop hypotheses to test the realization of these potential benefits. Specifically, we identify a sample of firms that implemented internal control monitoring technology in response to the internal control requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Consistent with our hypotheses, we document that the implementation of internal control monitoring technology is associated with lower likelihood of material weaknesses, smaller increases in audit fees, and smaller increases in audit delays during the post-SOX time period. We discuss the potential implications of our findings for research rel...","PeriodicalId":248519,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Internal Control Systems (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128062873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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