Pub Date : 2021-08-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198868903.003.0002
Bernard Reginster
The chapter examines the concept of a genealogy of morality and its critical significance. I consider and criticize interpretations of Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiries that take them to challenge the epistemic standing of moral judgments. I argue that genealogies aim instead to determine the function of these judgments by identifying what particular affective need they are suited to serve. This functional approach allows to shed light on the much-disputed role of history in genealogical inquiry, and to circumscribe what Nietzsche has in mind when he calls into question the “value” of moral values. In particular, I address two salient problems his functional approach poses for a functional critique of morality: respectively, the problem of dysfunctionality and the problem of multiple functionality.
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Pub Date : 2021-08-19DOI: 10.1007/springerreference_70246
Bernard Reginster
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Pub Date : 2021-08-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198868903.003.0003
Bernard Reginster
This chapter attempts to circumscribe the character of ressentiment, the affect that plays a prominent role in Nietzsche’s genealogical account of Christian morality. This affect, and the revengefulness that is closely associated with it, is a response to suffering when it is construed as challenging the agent’s standing, understood in a fundamental non-moral sense of having the world reflect her will, or having her presence in the world make a difference in it. Suffering is so construed when it is experienced from the perspective of a special drive, the will to power, or the drive toward bending the world to one’s will. Revenge aims to bolster or restore power when it is threatened, and the adoption of the conceptual apparatus of Christian morality, including its new values, is a particular way to do so: by altering the agent’s will (her values), it alters what counts as power for her.
{"title":"Ressentiment","authors":"Bernard Reginster","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868903.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868903.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter attempts to circumscribe the character of ressentiment, the affect that plays a prominent role in Nietzsche’s genealogical account of Christian morality. This affect, and the revengefulness that is closely associated with it, is a response to suffering when it is construed as challenging the agent’s standing, understood in a fundamental non-moral sense of having the world reflect her will, or having her presence in the world make a difference in it. Suffering is so construed when it is experienced from the perspective of a special drive, the will to power, or the drive toward bending the world to one’s will. Revenge aims to bolster or restore power when it is threatened, and the adoption of the conceptual apparatus of Christian morality, including its new values, is a particular way to do so: by altering the agent’s will (her values), it alters what counts as power for her.","PeriodicalId":249169,"journal":{"name":"The Will to Nothingness","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116576774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-19DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198868903.003.0005
Bernard Reginster
This chapter focuses on the genealogical account of guilt and punishment. I argue that Nietzsche’s focus on the relation between guilt and indebtedness is highly significant: it allows one to understand how punishment (or penance) can expunge guilt, by constituting an alternative way of repaying a debt. I argue that Nietzsche analyses guilt as a loss of self-esteem that accompanies the failure to keep faith with one’s commitments (understood as promises), rather than as a fear of the painful consequences incurred for breaking them. I then turn to his analysis of “bad conscience,” or conscience that speaks in a primarily admonishing and critical voice. Nietzsche locates its origin in the adoption of “negative ideals,” or ideals of self-denial or self-mastery, motivated by the ressentiment aroused by the constraints of socialization. The combination of these two trends then produces the concept of “guilt before God.”
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Pub Date : 2021-07-16DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198868903.003.0004
Bernard Reginster
This chapter examines Nietzsche’s genealogical account of the concepts “good and evil.” I suggest that the introduction of this conceptual pair involves two fundamental innovations, both of which motivated by ressentiment: a normative concept of equality, or the idea that all human beings have equal worth; and a certain conception of moral agency, centered around the possession of freedom of will, which underwrite a descriptive concept of equality, or the idea that all moral agents are not only subject to the new evaluative categories, but also may be expected to comply with them. I also examine the sense in which the invention of Christian morality constitutes an imaginary revenge, and argue that this indicates a change in the very character of the revenge, rather than an ordinary act of revenge that is merely imagined. I conclude with a discussion of the manner in which self-deception is involved in this imaginary revenge.
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