An inclusive involvement of the entirety of the population is the desirable model of development. Each local society and community has its own features and interests and there is a need of organisations that are capable of catering them. The cooperative form of organisation is suited in addressing the needs of local communities and contributing to social and economic aspects of the civil society. The extent of this achievement of cooperatives depends on their efficiency. The organisational structure and the operational model have to be developed taking into consideration the requirements of the local communities. India as a country is characterised by a high diversity in multiple aspects. In such a context, the priority must be to reach out to the local communities and identify their needs. A collective and inclusive development of the local population will contribute to the larger development of the country as a whole. The creation of cooperative forms of organisations and a proper structuring of them is required for achieving this objective of reaching out to the local community. This paper is an attempt to analyse the structure and functioning of credit cooperatives in India and to assess to what extent the same is conducive for connecting the local societies.
{"title":"Linking of Credit Cooperatives with Local Societies: The Indian Experience","authors":"Lakshmi Arakkathara Jayan, S. Jayan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3770573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3770573","url":null,"abstract":"An inclusive involvement of the entirety of the population is the desirable model of development. Each local society and community has its own features and interests and there is a need of organisations that are capable of catering them. The cooperative form of organisation is suited in addressing the needs of local communities and contributing to social and economic aspects of the civil society. The extent of this achievement of cooperatives depends on their efficiency. The organisational structure and the operational model have to be developed taking into consideration the requirements of the local communities. India as a country is characterised by a high diversity in multiple aspects. In such a context, the priority must be to reach out to the local communities and identify their needs. A collective and inclusive development of the local population will contribute to the larger development of the country as a whole. The creation of cooperative forms of organisations and a proper structuring of them is required for achieving this objective of reaching out to the local community. This paper is an attempt to analyse the structure and functioning of credit cooperatives in India and to assess to what extent the same is conducive for connecting the local societies.","PeriodicalId":250396,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Other Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129348225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Daniëlle A. M. Melis, L. Paape, M. Lückerath-Rovers
Corporate governance codes have been drafted to guide listed companies to improve corporate governance. Shareholders, in particular institutional investors, are being asked to play a critical role in safeguarding good corporate governance. However, addressing shareholders of Dutch listed companies through the Dutch Corporate Governance Code and describing their responsibilities as active owners has not so far resulted in a broad range of engagement of institutional investors with investee companies. This is possibly because there is a misalignment of key assumptions underlying the Dutch Code with actual capital market practices. Driven by those practices, institutional investors are first and foremost concerned with maximizing the returns on their investments. Enforcing institutional investors to take responsibility in improving corporate governance cannot be done through laws and codes alone. Passing laws and codes is one thing and enforcing them – and even inspiring buy in on the part of those they are aimed at – is something entirely different. Ultimately, enforceability is about the value that ultimate beneficiaries of institutional investors place on ‘stewardship’, and hold their (fiduciary) asset manager accountable for. This paper is a call to reconsider the ultimate function of corporate governance codes in a context of international capital market practice in which codes can never be a goal in itself, but more a means for improving corporate governance around the world.
{"title":"'Enforceability of Institutional Investors’ Responsibilities in Corporate Governance Through the Dutch Corporate Governance Code: Are Regulators and Practitioners on the Same Page (and to Who are Institutional Investors Accountable)?","authors":"Daniëlle A. M. Melis, L. Paape, M. Lückerath-Rovers","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1975763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1975763","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate governance codes have been drafted to guide listed companies to improve corporate governance. Shareholders, in particular institutional investors, are being asked to play a critical role in safeguarding good corporate governance. However, addressing shareholders of Dutch listed companies through the Dutch Corporate Governance Code and describing their responsibilities as active owners has not so far resulted in a broad range of engagement of institutional investors with investee companies. This is possibly because there is a misalignment of key assumptions underlying the Dutch Code with actual capital market practices. Driven by those practices, institutional investors are first and foremost concerned with maximizing the returns on their investments. Enforcing institutional investors to take responsibility in improving corporate governance cannot be done through laws and codes alone. Passing laws and codes is one thing and enforcing them – and even inspiring buy in on the part of those they are aimed at – is something entirely different. Ultimately, enforceability is about the value that ultimate beneficiaries of institutional investors place on ‘stewardship’, and hold their (fiduciary) asset manager accountable for. This paper is a call to reconsider the ultimate function of corporate governance codes in a context of international capital market practice in which codes can never be a goal in itself, but more a means for improving corporate governance around the world.","PeriodicalId":250396,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Other Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders (Topic)","volume":"56 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114121280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I present an optimal contracting theory of short term contracts. Short term contracts arise as shareholders’ response to conflicting intergenerational managerial incentives. High return projects may be longer lived than the tenure of managers who implement them. Consequently, long term contracts must align incentives across multiple managers, which comes at greater costs than providing incentives for a single manager. Short term bias is amplified further when shareholders can only observe the returns of accepted projects. Managers choose short term projects and earn all information rents and avoid long term projects, in which these rents accrue to future managers.
{"title":"Short Termism of Executive Compensation","authors":"Jonathan Pogach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1953277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1953277","url":null,"abstract":"I present an optimal contracting theory of short term contracts. Short term contracts arise as shareholders’ response to conflicting intergenerational managerial incentives. High return projects may be longer lived than the tenure of managers who implement them. Consequently, long term contracts must align incentives across multiple managers, which comes at greater costs than providing incentives for a single manager. Short term bias is amplified further when shareholders can only observe the returns of accepted projects. Managers choose short term projects and earn all information rents and avoid long term projects, in which these rents accrue to future managers.","PeriodicalId":250396,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Other Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124853052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We draw on a detailed grounded theory study of the reactions of Dutch food firms to the recent introduction of genetically modified foods to inductively identify the capabilities that firms develop in response to reputational threats. Central to the view on capabilities we propose are the decision rules organizations use to link individual actions to organizational outcomes. Four reputation management capabilities were identified, which were aimed at, respectively: (1) engaging in a cooperative dialogue with relevant stakeholders; (2) presenting the organizational point of view favourably in the eyes of external beholders; (3) avoiding organizational 'ownership' of critical reputational threats; and (4) communicating meaningfully with affected parties, even under conditions of high adversity and time-pressure.
{"title":"Reputation Management Capabilities as Decision Rules","authors":"P. Heugens, C. Riel, Frans A. J. Van Den Bosch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1103799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1103799","url":null,"abstract":"We draw on a detailed grounded theory study of the reactions of Dutch food firms to the recent introduction of genetically modified foods to inductively identify the capabilities that firms develop in response to reputational threats. Central to the view on capabilities we propose are the decision rules organizations use to link individual actions to organizational outcomes. Four reputation management capabilities were identified, which were aimed at, respectively: (1) engaging in a cooperative dialogue with relevant stakeholders; (2) presenting the organizational point of view favourably in the eyes of external beholders; (3) avoiding organizational 'ownership' of critical reputational threats; and (4) communicating meaningfully with affected parties, even under conditions of high adversity and time-pressure.","PeriodicalId":250396,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Other Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124896244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Share buy-backs are a relatively new concept in the Australian business environment. This study surveys managements' motivations and various other aspects concerning share buy-back activity. The results reveal that these motivations vary across the five different types of buy-backs. For on-market buy-backs the most relevant motivations are to improve financial performance (i.e., earnings per share) and financial position (i.e., net asset backing per share) followed by signalling of future expectations or underpricing. Interestingly, managements' response regarding the relevant motivations is similar regardless of whether their companies had conducted a buy-back or not. This provides evidence of widespread support for the relevant motivations. In addition, Australian managers believe that they are familiar with the potential benefits and legislative requirements of buy-backs, but that their shareholders often do not understand or are not favourably disposed towards buy-back events. Finally, two major explanations are identified for the initial conservatism towards buy-backs. Those explanations are (i) legal complexity and cost and (ii) the perceived negative disposition of the sharemarket towards buy-backs.
{"title":"Managements' Views on Share Buy-Backs: An Australian Survey","authors":"Jason D. Mitchell, G. Dharmawan, A. Clarke","doi":"10.1111/1467-629X.00055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-629X.00055","url":null,"abstract":"Share buy-backs are a relatively new concept in the Australian business environment. This study surveys managements' motivations and various other aspects concerning share buy-back activity. The results reveal that these motivations vary across the five different types of buy-backs. For on-market buy-backs the most relevant motivations are to improve financial performance (i.e., earnings per share) and financial position (i.e., net asset backing per share) followed by signalling of future expectations or underpricing. Interestingly, managements' response regarding the relevant motivations is similar regardless of whether their companies had conducted a buy-back or not. This provides evidence of widespread support for the relevant motivations. In addition, Australian managers believe that they are familiar with the potential benefits and legislative requirements of buy-backs, but that their shareholders often do not understand or are not favourably disposed towards buy-back events. Finally, two major explanations are identified for the initial conservatism towards buy-backs. Those explanations are (i) legal complexity and cost and (ii) the perceived negative disposition of the sharemarket towards buy-backs.","PeriodicalId":250396,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Other Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127635169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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