Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1017/9781108886611.004
In, D. Nouy
In 2014, Danièle Nouy – the first Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB – praised the ‘robust accountability’ framework of the newly established SSM. In her introductory remarks at an EP committee hearing, Nouy argued that ‘this framework is perhaps one of the most far-reaching that is in place for an independent central bank that is responsible for supervision. I believe we have already lived up to the word and spirit of this framework’ (Nouy 2014). The Chair of the Supervisory Board is not alone in emphasising the strength of the accountability obligations set in place by the SSM Regulation (Council Regulation 1024/2013). Ter Kuile and colleagues claim that the SSM has successfully established a form of ‘tailor-made accountability which keeps power in check while respecting the independence of the banking supervisors’ (2015: 155). In terms of political accountability, the SSM created multiple reporting requirements for the ECB – regulated for the first time through an Interinstitutional Agreement with the EP and a Memorandum of Understanding with the Council (European Central Bank 2021a). In this context, Fromage and Ibrido argue that the accountability framework of the SSM ‘could open new avenues in the ECB’s . . . quest for reinforced democratic accountability’ that could be extended to the relationship with the EPG on monetary policy (2018: 306). Overall, the mechanisms to hold the ECB accountable in banking supervision are generally seen as a marked improvement over similar arrangements in monetary policy (Braun 2017: 47). The reason why ECB accountability was contentious in the first place concerns its status as a non-majoritarian, technocratic organisation and at the same time one of the most independent central banks in the world (Curtin 2017; Elgie 2002; Naurin 2009). Generally speaking, independent
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Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1017/9781108886611.002
The EMU is one of the central policy fields of the European Union. Established in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty, the EMU comprises a tangible symbol of European integration – the euro – present in the lives of millions of citizens across Europe. For countries that adopted the euro and formed the Eurozone, the economic, fiscal, and social impact of EMU policies is profound. Non-Eurozone economies are also affected by EMU decisions, albeit to a more limited extent. Yet despite the significant shift in decision-making powers from the national to the EU level entailed in the EMU, its architects did not establish corresponding mechanisms to hold relevant actors accountable for policy decisions in the field. The global economic and financial crisis of 2007–2008 triggered a prolonged sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone (henceforth the ‘euro crisis’) that forced a reckoning of the original EMU architecture. Since then, the institutional design and policy scope of EMU have expanded, while the accountability framework has been strengthened – especially when it comes to the role of the EP in scrutinising the decisions of different executive actors. To introduce the policy specifics of the book, this chapter provides an overview of the EMU and its political accountability structure. The starting point is the historical development of the EMU at the EU level, emphasising the institutional asymmetry between its economic and monetary policy arms. The reforms triggered by the euro crisis (roughly 2009–2014) are hence contextualised against the background of the systemic deficiencies of EMU design. Next, the chapter moves to discussing the accountability framework of EMU and, in particular, the characteristics of its political accountability mechanisms. Focusing on national parliaments and the EP, the chapter underlines the difficulties of holding executive actors accountable for EMU decisions. Since the euro crisis, the EP gained new scrutiny powers over both intergovernmental and supranational institutions in the EMU. The question
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Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1017/9781108886611.006
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Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1017/9781108886611.003
{"title":"Studying Accountability at the European Parliament","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/9781108886611.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108886611.003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":254291,"journal":{"name":"The European Parliament as an Accountability Forum","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130630226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1017/9781108886611.005
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