Pub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0004
Daniel Groll
This chapter vindicates the claim that donor-conceived people’s interest in acquiring genetic knowledge is worthwhile by offering an account of the value of genetic knowledge. The author develops and defends a view called “genetic pluralism” according to which having genetic knowledge can, but need not, play a central role in the task of identity determination. In this way, having genetic knowledge is prudentially optional. The author explains the task of identity determination in terms of answering the question “Who am I?,” which is, in turn, unpacked in terms of three other questions: “How did I come to be?,” “What am I like?,” and “Who am I like?” The author shows how having genetic knowledge can—but need not—play a role in answering each of these questions.
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Pub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0007
Daniel Groll
This chapter considers the nature and extent of a gamete donor’s responsibility for their genetic offspring. The author argues that even if gamete donation is the kind of activity that triggers parental responsibility, gamete donors do not typically ever incur actual parental responsibility. Instead, they incur prospective parental responsibility, which is typically transferred to intended parents before the child comes into existence. The author argues that while prospective parental responsibility can be responsibly transferred, potential donors are generally obligated to be open donors so as not to implicate themselves in the morally problematic practice of conceiving children with anonymously donated gametes.
{"title":"The Donor’s Responsibilities","authors":"Daniel Groll","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers the nature and extent of a gamete donor’s responsibility for their genetic offspring. The author argues that even if gamete donation is the kind of activity that triggers parental responsibility, gamete donors do not typically ever incur actual parental responsibility. Instead, they incur prospective parental responsibility, which is typically transferred to intended parents before the child comes into existence. The author argues that while prospective parental responsibility can be responsibly transferred, potential donors are generally obligated to be open donors so as not to implicate themselves in the morally problematic practice of conceiving children with anonymously donated gametes.","PeriodicalId":258257,"journal":{"name":"Conceiving People","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121989572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0006
Daniel Groll
In this chapter, the author argues that the weighty reason to use an open donor identified by the Significant Interest view is, normally, a decisive reason. The argument proceeds by first distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic reasons for using an anonymous donor and then showing that, generally speaking, there are no intrinsic reasons that outweigh the reason to use an open donor identified by the Significant Interest view. While there might be extrinsic reasons that give some people decisive reason to use an anonymous donor, the author argues that the lack of intrinsic reasons means that we should work to remove extrinsic reasons for using an anonymous donor.
{"title":"Tipping the Scale","authors":"Daniel Groll","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, the author argues that the weighty reason to use an open donor identified by the Significant Interest view is, normally, a decisive reason. The argument proceeds by first distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic reasons for using an anonymous donor and then showing that, generally speaking, there are no intrinsic reasons that outweigh the reason to use an open donor identified by the Significant Interest view. While there might be extrinsic reasons that give some people decisive reason to use an anonymous donor, the author argues that the lack of intrinsic reasons means that we should work to remove extrinsic reasons for using an anonymous donor.","PeriodicalId":258257,"journal":{"name":"Conceiving People","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116958485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0003
Daniel Groll
This chapter presents the Significant Interest view, which aims to show that people who intend to conceive a child with donated gametes have a weighty reason to use an open donor. According to the Significant Interest view, the fact that a donor-conceived person is likely to be very interested in acquiring genetic knowledge gives intended parents a weighty reason to use an open donor. This is because parents ought to promote their children’s well-being by helping satisfy their child’s worthwhile significant interests, and a donor-conceived person’s interest in genetic knowledge is one such interest. This chapter explains what it means for an interest to be significant and worthwhile, the role that parents can legitimately play in shaping a child’s significant interests, and what the connection is between a person’s well-being and the satisfaction of their significant interests.
{"title":"The Significant Interest View","authors":"Daniel Groll","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents the Significant Interest view, which aims to show that people who intend to conceive a child with donated gametes have a weighty reason to use an open donor. According to the Significant Interest view, the fact that a donor-conceived person is likely to be very interested in acquiring genetic knowledge gives intended parents a weighty reason to use an open donor. This is because parents ought to promote their children’s well-being by helping satisfy their child’s worthwhile significant interests, and a donor-conceived person’s interest in genetic knowledge is one such interest. This chapter explains what it means for an interest to be significant and worthwhile, the role that parents can legitimately play in shaping a child’s significant interests, and what the connection is between a person’s well-being and the satisfaction of their significant interests.","PeriodicalId":258257,"journal":{"name":"Conceiving People","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125308585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0008
Daniel Groll
In this chapter, the author argues that even though creating children with anonymously donated gametes is (usually) morally wrong, people should be legally allowed to do it. This is partly because the failure to use an open donor is on a par with other permissible parental failures. But it is also because legally prohibiting anonymous gamete donation without simultaneously working to disrupt the bionormative schema of society will have negative expressive effects. This last point leads to a longer answer to the question of whether anonymous gamete donation should be prohibited: if legal prohibition should be pursued, it should only happen in the context of combating the bionormativity of society so as to minimize the expressive effects of simply outlawing anonymous gamete donation.
{"title":"Policy and Practice","authors":"Daniel Groll","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, the author argues that even though creating children with anonymously donated gametes is (usually) morally wrong, people should be legally allowed to do it. This is partly because the failure to use an open donor is on a par with other permissible parental failures. But it is also because legally prohibiting anonymous gamete donation without simultaneously working to disrupt the bionormative schema of society will have negative expressive effects. This last point leads to a longer answer to the question of whether anonymous gamete donation should be prohibited: if legal prohibition should be pursued, it should only happen in the context of combating the bionormativity of society so as to minimize the expressive effects of simply outlawing anonymous gamete donation.","PeriodicalId":258257,"journal":{"name":"Conceiving People","volume":"47 42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123706652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0005
Daniel Groll
This chapter presents, and responds to, an objection to the Significant Interest view which claims that people’s interest in acquiring genetic knowledge is not worthwhile because it is insidiously morally problematic. What makes it insidiously morally problematic, according to this objection, is that the interest in genetic knowledge both reflects and further entrenches bionormative prejudice, i.e. a form of prejudice which maintains that the ideal family is one where parents are genetically related to their children. The author responds by showing that even though bionormative prejudice is prevalent in society, it does not undermine the value of people’s interest in genetic knowledge.
{"title":"The Bionormative Prejudice","authors":"Daniel Groll","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190063054.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents, and responds to, an objection to the Significant Interest view which claims that people’s interest in acquiring genetic knowledge is not worthwhile because it is insidiously morally problematic. What makes it insidiously morally problematic, according to this objection, is that the interest in genetic knowledge both reflects and further entrenches bionormative prejudice, i.e. a form of prejudice which maintains that the ideal family is one where parents are genetically related to their children. The author responds by showing that even though bionormative prejudice is prevalent in society, it does not undermine the value of people’s interest in genetic knowledge.","PeriodicalId":258257,"journal":{"name":"Conceiving People","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130399408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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