Pub Date : 2020-10-22DOI: 10.1017/9781108699747.010
M. Cherry
The Medusa trope depicts women who are angry as having no real reason for being angry, since more often than not, they are not really victims. It also depicts such angry women as dangerous, and society concludes that these angry, blameworthy women must be conquered and controlled through patriarchal norms, laws, expectations, and hostility. This chapter describes the reality of such a trope for many women and girls. It then discusses some implications of it, particularly the urge for women and girls to escape features of the trope in order to escape being conquered and controlled. The author also wonders to what extent it is possible to escape the trope, and offers some reasons for why women should not escape it, even if they could. The chapter concludes by arguing why and how women and girls can embrace the Medusa trope as a form of resistance against sexism and misogyny.
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Pub Date : 2020-10-22DOI: 10.4135/9781446278901.n6
Tabatha Leggett
This chapter examines consciousness-raising as a means of challenging oppression. Bringing the #MeToo movement into contact with first-person accounts and criticisms of the radical feminist consciousness-raising groups that formed in New York and Chicago in the 1960s and 1970s, it suggests that they remain an essential force to challenge female oppression today. It touches on the various ways that patriarchal structures silence women, how consciousness-raising undercuts this silencing by giving women a collective voice, and how social media can amplify this voice. Finally, it addresses common criticisms of consciousness-raising movements, especially concerning the disproportionate focus on white women’s concerns that they have historically represented and universalized. It touches on Kimberlé Crenhaw’s theory of intersectionality as well as Paulo Friere’s conception of critical consciousness theory to explore the notion of truly inclusive consciousness-raising movements.
{"title":"Consciousness-Raising","authors":"Tabatha Leggett","doi":"10.4135/9781446278901.n6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446278901.n6","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines consciousness-raising as a means of challenging oppression. Bringing the #MeToo movement into contact with first-person accounts and criticisms of the radical feminist consciousness-raising groups that formed in New York and Chicago in the 1960s and 1970s, it suggests that they remain an essential force to challenge female oppression today. It touches on the various ways that patriarchal structures silence women, how consciousness-raising undercuts this silencing by giving women a collective voice, and how social media can amplify this voice. Finally, it addresses common criticisms of consciousness-raising movements, especially concerning the disproportionate focus on white women’s concerns that they have historically represented and universalized. It touches on Kimberlé Crenhaw’s theory of intersectionality as well as Paulo Friere’s conception of critical consciousness theory to explore the notion of truly inclusive consciousness-raising movements.","PeriodicalId":259685,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy for Girls","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124245135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter asks whether there is any such thing as feminist logic. It defines feminism and logic, and then goes on to present and evaluate four possible views, introducing and critiquing the work of Andrea Nye, Val Plumwood, and Susan Stebbing. It argues that Stebbing’s approach—on which feminism is one among many political applications of logic—is correct, but that feminist logic could do more, by providing a formal framework for the study of social hierarchies, much as it presently provides a formal framework for the study of numbers and similarity rankings among possible worlds.
{"title":"Logic","authors":"Gillian Russell","doi":"10.1201/9781315275444-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1201/9781315275444-8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter asks whether there is any such thing as feminist logic. It defines feminism and logic, and then goes on to present and evaluate four possible views, introducing and critiquing the work of Andrea Nye, Val Plumwood, and Susan Stebbing. It argues that Stebbing’s approach—on which feminism is one among many political applications of logic—is correct, but that feminist logic could do more, by providing a formal framework for the study of social hierarchies, much as it presently provides a formal framework for the study of numbers and similarity rankings among possible worlds.","PeriodicalId":259685,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy for Girls","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127104156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-22DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190072919.003.0006
K. Stohr
The chapter is a discussion of value of self-knowledge and the role that reflection plays in its acquisition. It employs the title character in Jane Austen’s Emma as an illustration of the importance of reflection in people understanding themselves and developing self-trust. It argues that appropriate self-trust is a virtue in Aristotle’s sense. The person with the virtue of self-trust employs self-doubt effectively, avoiding both insufficient and excessive confidence in her own judgment. The chapter shows how Emma uses reflection as a way of correcting her own tendency toward overconfidence, enabling her to have greater self-knowledge and hence, greater self-trust. The chapter explains how reflection conducive to self-knowledge and self-trust is a skill and argues that it is a skill worth acquiring.
{"title":"Self-Knowledge","authors":"K. Stohr","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190072919.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190072919.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter is a discussion of value of self-knowledge and the role that reflection plays in its acquisition. It employs the title character in Jane Austen’s Emma as an illustration of the importance of reflection in people understanding themselves and developing self-trust. It argues that appropriate self-trust is a virtue in Aristotle’s sense. The person with the virtue of self-trust employs self-doubt effectively, avoiding both insufficient and excessive confidence in her own judgment. The chapter shows how Emma uses reflection as a way of correcting her own tendency toward overconfidence, enabling her to have greater self-knowledge and hence, greater self-trust. The chapter explains how reflection conducive to self-knowledge and self-trust is a skill and argues that it is a skill worth acquiring.","PeriodicalId":259685,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy for Girls","volume":"282 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131769069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-22DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-8905-9_300066
Serene J. Khader
{"title":"Autonomy","authors":"Serene J. Khader","doi":"10.1007/978-94-017-8905-9_300066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8905-9_300066","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":259685,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy for Girls","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128697650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines the role that empathy plays in understanding the experiences of human and nonhuman others. The chapter first distinguishes between two often confused concepts, sympathy and empathy, to show how empathy builds connections with others by trying to understand their perspectives and worlds. The chapter then traces different kinds of empathy (affective resonance, and storied empathy) to argue for a concept of entangled empathy, which requires recognizing the manifold relationships people are in, including social and material conditions. The chapter also addresses worries about empathy. The chapter concludes by showing how entangled empathy can help people address the ways that many human and nonhuman animals can be and are oppressed.
{"title":"Empathy","authors":"Lori Gruen","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv14npjng.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv14npjng.9","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the role that empathy plays in understanding the experiences of human and nonhuman others. The chapter first distinguishes between two often confused concepts, sympathy and empathy, to show how empathy builds connections with others by trying to understand their perspectives and worlds. The chapter then traces different kinds of empathy (affective resonance, and storied empathy) to argue for a concept of entangled empathy, which requires recognizing the manifold relationships people are in, including social and material conditions. The chapter also addresses worries about empathy. The chapter concludes by showing how entangled empathy can help people address the ways that many human and nonhuman animals can be and are oppressed.","PeriodicalId":259685,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy for Girls","volume":"253 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121138821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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