Pub Date : 2021-10-14DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0007
J. Woodward
This chapter applies the ideas about invariance from Chapter 5 to the analysis (both normative and descriptive) of various aspects of commonsense cause reasoning. The focus is mainly on one particular kind of invariance—invariance under changes in background conditions, here called insensitivity. This is used to cast light on causal judgments involving omissions and examples involving double prevention (in which the occurrence of c prevents the occurrence of e, which had it occurred, would have prevented the occurrence of f, with the result that f occurs). It is argued that causal claims regarding omissions and double prevention relations differ normatively depending on the invariance of the relations involved and that this is also reflected in the judgments that people make about such claims.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-14DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0005
J. Woodward
This chapter explores some empirical results bearing on the descriptive and normative adequacy of different accounts of causal learning and representation. It begins by contrasting associative accounts with accounts that attribute additional structure to causal representation, arguing in favor of the latter. Empirical results supporting the claim that adult humans often reason about causal relationships using interventionist counterfactuals are presented. Contrasts between human and nonhuman primate causal cognition are also discussed, as well as some experiments concerning causal cognition in young children. A proposal about what is involved in having adult human causal representations is presented and some issues about how these might develop over time are explored.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-14DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0006
James Woodward
This chapter explores the notion of invariance, which is of central normative importance in causal reasoning and is also central to its descriptive characterization, as shown in subsequent chapters. The invariance of a causal relationship has to do with the extent that it continues to be operative across various sorts of changes—in background conditions, changes in the distribution of initial conditions, and different micro-realizations of a cause, to describe just a few of the possibilities that are considered. Invariance is distinguished from exceptionlessness and needs to be understood against the background of our epistemic and calculational limitations.
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