Pub Date : 2021-03-23DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780192893895.003.0015
S. Daniel
Berkeley’s use of a posteriori arguments supports a view of God that is accessible and persuasive for finite minds. However, those arguments ultimately support belief only in a God who is finite. This chapter shows how, by appealing to an a priori argument for God’s existence, Berkeley emphasizes God’s infinity. This does not undermine other arguments, for it does not aim to challenge how those arguments support belief in a God who accounts for all we experience. It only indicates that another kind of argument is needed to show how our knowledge of the existence of an infinite God does not depend a posteriori on our experience of things in the world.
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Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198755685.003.0009
S. Daniel
Since nothing about God is passive, and the perception of pain is inherently passive, then it seems that God does not know what it is like to experience pain. Nor would he be able to cause us to experience pain, for his experience would then be a sensation (which he does not have). My suggestion is that Berkeley avoids this situation by describing how God knows about pain “among other things” (i.e. as something whose identity is intelligible in terms of the integrated network of things). This avoids having to assume that God has ideas (including pain) apart from his willing that there be perceivers who have specific ideas that are in harmony or not in harmony with one another.
{"title":"Berkeley on God’s Knowledge of Pain","authors":"S. Daniel","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198755685.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198755685.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Since nothing about God is passive, and the perception of pain is inherently passive, then it seems that God does not know what it is like to experience pain. Nor would he be able to cause us to experience pain, for his experience would then be a sensation (which he does not have). My suggestion is that Berkeley avoids this situation by describing how God knows about pain “among other things” (i.e. as something whose identity is intelligible in terms of the integrated network of things). This avoids having to assume that God has ideas (including pain) apart from his willing that there be perceivers who have specific ideas that are in harmony or not in harmony with one another.","PeriodicalId":268491,"journal":{"name":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121464711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a widespread assumption that Berkeley and Spinoza have little in common, even though early Jesuit critics in France often linked them. Later commentators have also recognized their similarities. This chapter focuses on how Berkeley’s comments on the Arnauld–Malebranche debate regarding objective and formal reality, and on his treatment of God’s creation of finite minds within nature relate his theory of knowledge to his doctrine in a way similar to that of Spinoza.
{"title":"Berkeley and Spinoza","authors":"S. Daniel","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.101.0123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.101.0123","url":null,"abstract":"There is a widespread assumption that Berkeley and Spinoza have little in common, even though early Jesuit critics in France often linked them. Later commentators have also recognized their similarities. This chapter focuses on how Berkeley’s comments on the Arnauld–Malebranche debate regarding objective and formal reality, and on his treatment of God’s creation of finite minds within nature relate his theory of knowledge to his doctrine in a way similar to that of Spinoza.","PeriodicalId":268491,"journal":{"name":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133056220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0014
S. Daniel
The juxtaposition of the views of Leibniz and Berkeley indicate how the very points mistakenly cited to differentiate them are clarified precisely by appreciating their similarities, particularly in terms of understanding how minds differentiate and relate bodies. Such a strategy is especially useful for understanding how their accounts of perception, substance, and contingency depend on their mutual commitment to the harmony of all things and on their sensitivity to distinguishing the different domains of natural philosophy and metaphysics.
{"title":"The Harmony of the Leibniz–Berkeley Juxtaposition","authors":"S. Daniel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"The juxtaposition of the views of Leibniz and Berkeley indicate how the very points mistakenly cited to differentiate them are clarified precisely by appreciating their similarities, particularly in terms of understanding how minds differentiate and relate bodies. Such a strategy is especially useful for understanding how their accounts of perception, substance, and contingency depend on their mutual commitment to the harmony of all things and on their sensitivity to distinguishing the different domains of natural philosophy and metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":268491,"journal":{"name":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131584012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0004
S. Daniel
For Berkeley, a thing’s existence (esse) is nothing more than its being perceived “as that thing”. It makes no sense to ask (with Samuel Johnson) about the esse of the mind or the specific act of perception, for that would be like asking what it means for existence to exist. Berkeley’s “existere is percipi or percipere” thus carefully adopts the scholastic distinction between esse and existere ignored by Locke and others committed to a substantialist notion of mind. Following the Stoics, Berkeley proposes that, as the existence of ideas, minds “subsist” rather than “exist” and thus cannot be identified as independently existing things.
{"title":"Berkeley, Suárez, and the Esse–Existere Distinction","authors":"S. Daniel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"For Berkeley, a thing’s existence (esse) is nothing more than its being perceived “as that thing”. It makes no sense to ask (with Samuel Johnson) about the esse of the mind or the specific act of perception, for that would be like asking what it means for existence to exist. Berkeley’s “existere is percipi or percipere” thus carefully adopts the scholastic distinction between esse and existere ignored by Locke and others committed to a substantialist notion of mind. Following the Stoics, Berkeley proposes that, as the existence of ideas, minds “subsist” rather than “exist” and thus cannot be identified as independently existing things.","PeriodicalId":268491,"journal":{"name":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125674767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-9243-4_1
S. Daniel
{"title":"How Berkeley’s Works Are Interpreted","authors":"S. Daniel","doi":"10.1007/978-90-481-9243-4_1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9243-4_1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":268491,"journal":{"name":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128510661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0002
S. Daniel
For Berkeley, minds are not Cartesian spiritual substances because they cannot be said to exist (even if only conceptually) abstracted from their activities. Similarly, Berkeley’s notion of mind differs from Locke’s in that, for Berkeley, minds are not abstract substrata in which ideas inhere. Instead, a mind is a substance in a way consistent with the Stoic logic of the seventeenth-century Ramists on which Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards draw. The Stoic character of Berkeley’s philosophy is recognizable only when we see how it is based on a doctrine in which perceptions or ideas are intelligible precisely because they are always embedded in the propositions of a discourse or language.
{"title":"Berkeley’s Stoic Notion of Spiritual Substances","authors":"S. Daniel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"For Berkeley, minds are not Cartesian spiritual substances because they cannot be said to exist (even if only conceptually) abstracted from their activities. Similarly, Berkeley’s notion of mind differs from Locke’s in that, for Berkeley, minds are not abstract substrata in which ideas inhere. Instead, a mind is a substance in a way consistent with the Stoic logic of the seventeenth-century Ramists on which Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards draw. The Stoic character of Berkeley’s philosophy is recognizable only when we see how it is based on a doctrine in which perceptions or ideas are intelligible precisely because they are always embedded in the propositions of a discourse or language.","PeriodicalId":268491,"journal":{"name":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","volume":"205 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123048801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0003
S. Daniel
Berkeley’s doctrines about mind, the language of nature, substance, minima sensibilia, notions, abstract ideas, inference, and freedom appropriate principles developed by the sixteenth-century logician Peter Ramus and his seventeenth-century followers (e.g. Alexander Richardson, William Ames, John Milton). Even though Berkeley expresses himself in Cartesian or Lockean terms, he relies on a Ramist way of thinking that is not a form of mere rhetoric or pedagogy but a logic and ontology grounded in Stoicism. This chapter summarizes the central features of Ramism, indicates how Berkeley adapts Ramist concepts and strategies, and chronicles Ramism’s pervasiveness in Berkeley’s education, especially at Trinity College Dublin.
{"title":"The Ramist Context of Berkeley’s Philosophy","authors":"S. Daniel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893895.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Berkeley’s doctrines about mind, the language of nature, substance, minima sensibilia, notions, abstract ideas, inference, and freedom appropriate principles developed by the sixteenth-century logician Peter Ramus and his seventeenth-century followers (e.g. Alexander Richardson, William Ames, John Milton). Even though Berkeley expresses himself in Cartesian or Lockean terms, he relies on a Ramist way of thinking that is not a form of mere rhetoric or pedagogy but a logic and ontology grounded in Stoicism. This chapter summarizes the central features of Ramism, indicates how Berkeley adapts Ramist concepts and strategies, and chronicles Ramism’s pervasiveness in Berkeley’s education, especially at Trinity College Dublin.","PeriodicalId":268491,"journal":{"name":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133509581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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