Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0002
A. Tanesini
This chapter sets out the philosophical foundations of the proposed account of virtues and vices of intellectual self-appraisal. It explains the nature of intellectual vices in general by distinguishing between sensibilities, thinking styles, and character traits. Subsequently, it describes the specific features of the epistemic vices of self-appraisal. The chapter supplies an account of what makes epistemic vices vicious, and argues in favour of a motivational view. In the author’s view the vices of intellectual self-appraisal are impairments of epistemic agency caused by motivations, such as those of self-enhancement or impression management, that also bring other epistemically bad motives in their trail. Such motivations bias epistemic evaluations of one’s cognitive abilities, processes, and states. These appraisals, in turn, have widespread negative influences on agents’ epistemic conduct as a whole.
{"title":"Intellectual Virtues and Vices","authors":"A. Tanesini","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter sets out the philosophical foundations of the proposed account of virtues and vices of intellectual self-appraisal. It explains the nature of intellectual vices in general by distinguishing between sensibilities, thinking styles, and character traits. Subsequently, it describes the specific features of the epistemic vices of self-appraisal. The chapter supplies an account of what makes epistemic vices vicious, and argues in favour of a motivational view. In the author’s view the vices of intellectual self-appraisal are impairments of epistemic agency caused by motivations, such as those of self-enhancement or impression management, that also bring other epistemically bad motives in their trail. Such motivations bias epistemic evaluations of one’s cognitive abilities, processes, and states. These appraisals, in turn, have widespread negative influences on agents’ epistemic conduct as a whole.","PeriodicalId":269200,"journal":{"name":"The Mismeasure of the Self","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121671323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0007
A. Tanesini
The vices of superiority and of inferiority comprise evaluations of one’s own intellectual abilities, competencies, and skills for their intellectual worth that track the effectiveness of these qualities in defending the ego or gaining social acceptance rather than appraising them for their epistemic value. There is, therefore, something inherently self-deceptive about these vices. This chapter discusses some of the ways in which vices of inferiority and superiority obstruct effective and responsible inquiry. These vices are shown to distort self-trust, obstruct self-knowledge, and to cause harms to other agents and to the epistemic community as a whole. It is also argued that these vices are causally responsible for numerous moral wrongs.
{"title":"Harms and Wrongs","authors":"A. Tanesini","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The vices of superiority and of inferiority comprise evaluations of one’s own intellectual abilities, competencies, and skills for their intellectual worth that track the effectiveness of these qualities in defending the ego or gaining social acceptance rather than appraising them for their epistemic value. There is, therefore, something inherently self-deceptive about these vices. This chapter discusses some of the ways in which vices of inferiority and superiority obstruct effective and responsible inquiry. These vices are shown to distort self-trust, obstruct self-knowledge, and to cause harms to other agents and to the epistemic community as a whole. It is also argued that these vices are causally responsible for numerous moral wrongs.","PeriodicalId":269200,"journal":{"name":"The Mismeasure of the Self","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122325737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0009
A. Tanesini
This chapter discusses the prospects of interventions designed to weaken epistemic vices and promote virtues. The first section discusses the prospects of two strategies for the cultivation of intellectual virtues. These are: explicit education and the habituation of virtue. It concludes that both strategies encounter obstacles that make their success unlikely. The second section is dedicated to attempts to foster virtue by stimulating emulation when in the presence of role models or exemplars. It argues that despite its current popularity, and evidence of some success when educating cohorts of children, this strategy is unlikely on its own to be very effective for those who are most in need of virtue education. The third section describes self-affirmation techniques consisting in the affirmation of values and offers indirect empirical evidence that indicates that the self-affirmation strategy might be successful when trying to reduce the expression of vicious behaviour, and over time, might even lead to the development of more virtuous conduct.
{"title":"Teaching Intellectual Virtues, Changing Attitudes","authors":"A. Tanesini","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the prospects of interventions designed to weaken epistemic vices and promote virtues. The first section discusses the prospects of two strategies for the cultivation of intellectual virtues. These are: explicit education and the habituation of virtue. It concludes that both strategies encounter obstacles that make their success unlikely. The second section is dedicated to attempts to foster virtue by stimulating emulation when in the presence of role models or exemplars. It argues that despite its current popularity, and evidence of some success when educating cohorts of children, this strategy is unlikely on its own to be very effective for those who are most in need of virtue education. The third section describes self-affirmation techniques consisting in the affirmation of values and offers indirect empirical evidence that indicates that the self-affirmation strategy might be successful when trying to reduce the expression of vicious behaviour, and over time, might even lead to the development of more virtuous conduct.","PeriodicalId":269200,"journal":{"name":"The Mismeasure of the Self","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121233058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0001
A. Tanesini
This chapter introduces the virtues and vices of intellectual self-evaluation that are the main topic of the book. It explains that humility consists in having the measure of one’s strengths and weaknesses, whilst arrogance, vanity, or servility are ways in which one fails to have such a measure because one’s self-appraisals are biased by needs for self-enhancement or for social acceptance. In addition, the chapter argues for thinking of vice epistemology as a form of social epistemology whose main aim is ameliorative because it offers concrete proposals to improve common epistemic predicaments. The chapter concludes with a summary of the book.
{"title":"The Measure and Mismeasure of the Self","authors":"A. Tanesini","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the virtues and vices of intellectual self-evaluation that are the main topic of the book. It explains that humility consists in having the measure of one’s strengths and weaknesses, whilst arrogance, vanity, or servility are ways in which one fails to have such a measure because one’s self-appraisals are biased by needs for self-enhancement or for social acceptance. In addition, the chapter argues for thinking of vice epistemology as a form of social epistemology whose main aim is ameliorative because it offers concrete proposals to improve common epistemic predicaments. The chapter concludes with a summary of the book.","PeriodicalId":269200,"journal":{"name":"The Mismeasure of the Self","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121456779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0006
A. Tanesini
This chapter provides account of four character traits in the intellectual domain: vanity and narcissism; timidity and self-fatalism. It argues that vanity and narcissism are vices of superiority while timidity and self-fatalism are vices of inferiority. They are characterized as opposed to acceptance of limitations and proper concern to be esteemed by others. Vanity is typical of those who show an excessive concern for being held in high esteem by other people. Timidity is instead exemplified by those whose fear to be exposed as intellectually inadequate is so extreme that they shun being noticed by other epistemic agents. Consequently, they exhibit insufficient concern for being held in esteem by their epistemic community. Narcissism is related to intellectual vanity. It involves a failure to accept one’s intellectual limitations due to an infatuation with one’s own intellectual abilities. Fatalism is a strengthening of timidity that consists in a disposition to resign oneself to the alleged intractability of one’s own intellectual limitations. The chapter also defends the view that vanity and narcissism are based on attitudes whose function is social-adjustive, while timidity and self-fatalism have attitudes serving an ego-defensive function as their causal bases.
{"title":"Vanity, Narcissism, Timidity, and Fatalism","authors":"A. Tanesini","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides account of four character traits in the intellectual domain: vanity and narcissism; timidity and self-fatalism. It argues that vanity and narcissism are vices of superiority while timidity and self-fatalism are vices of inferiority. They are characterized as opposed to acceptance of limitations and proper concern to be esteemed by others. Vanity is typical of those who show an excessive concern for being held in high esteem by other people. Timidity is instead exemplified by those whose fear to be exposed as intellectually inadequate is so extreme that they shun being noticed by other epistemic agents. Consequently, they exhibit insufficient concern for being held in esteem by their epistemic community. Narcissism is related to intellectual vanity. It involves a failure to accept one’s intellectual limitations due to an infatuation with one’s own intellectual abilities. Fatalism is a strengthening of timidity that consists in a disposition to resign oneself to the alleged intractability of one’s own intellectual limitations. The chapter also defends the view that vanity and narcissism are based on attitudes whose function is social-adjustive, while timidity and self-fatalism have attitudes serving an ego-defensive function as their causal bases.","PeriodicalId":269200,"journal":{"name":"The Mismeasure of the Self","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127784506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0005
A. Tanesini
This chapter provides account of four character traits in the intellectual domain: superbia and arrogance; servility and self-abasement. It argues that superbia and arrogance are vices of superiority while servility and self-abasement are vices of inferiority. They are characterized as opposed to modesty and authentic pride. The chapter also defends the view that superbia and arrogance are based on attitudes whose function is ego-defence, while servility and self-abasement have attitudes serving a social-adjustive function as their causal bases. A case is made that the defensive attitudes characteristic of these vices of superiority constitute what is known as defensive high self-esteem while those on which servility is based are typical of damaged low self-esteem.
{"title":"Superbia, Arrogance, Servility, and Self-Abasement","authors":"A. Tanesini","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides account of four character traits in the intellectual domain: superbia and arrogance; servility and self-abasement. It argues that superbia and arrogance are vices of superiority while servility and self-abasement are vices of inferiority. They are characterized as opposed to modesty and authentic pride. The chapter also defends the view that superbia and arrogance are based on attitudes whose function is ego-defence, while servility and self-abasement have attitudes serving a social-adjustive function as their causal bases. A case is made that the defensive attitudes characteristic of these vices of superiority constitute what is known as defensive high self-esteem while those on which servility is based are typical of damaged low self-esteem.","PeriodicalId":269200,"journal":{"name":"The Mismeasure of the Self","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114116057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0004
A. Tanesini
This chapter provides accounts of four character traits: intellectual modesty and acceptance of intellectual limitations (which together constitute intellectual humility); proper pride in one’s epistemic achievements and proper concern for one’s intellectual reputation. It argues that these are intellectual virtues. The main difference between humility (as comprising of modesty and of acceptance of limitations) on the one hand, and pride and concern for esteem on the other, lies in the nature of social comparisons on which they are based. Humility relies on appraisals of the worth of one’s qualities that might be gauged by comparing oneself to other people and which are driven by a concern for accuracy. The chapter also makes a case that overlapping clusters of attitudes serving knowledge and value expressive functions are the causal bases of these character traits.
{"title":"Intellectual Humility, Proper Pride, and Proper Concern with Others’ Esteem","authors":"A. Tanesini","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides accounts of four character traits: intellectual modesty and acceptance of intellectual limitations (which together constitute intellectual humility); proper pride in one’s epistemic achievements and proper concern for one’s intellectual reputation. It argues that these are intellectual virtues. The main difference between humility (as comprising of modesty and of acceptance of limitations) on the one hand, and pride and concern for esteem on the other, lies in the nature of social comparisons on which they are based. Humility relies on appraisals of the worth of one’s qualities that might be gauged by comparing oneself to other people and which are driven by a concern for accuracy. The chapter also makes a case that overlapping clusters of attitudes serving knowledge and value expressive functions are the causal bases of these character traits.","PeriodicalId":269200,"journal":{"name":"The Mismeasure of the Self","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123201340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0003
A. Tanesini
Virtue ethicists and epistemologists have generally presumed that virtue and vices are real psychological states or traits amenable to empirical study. There is, however, no agreement on the psychological constructs that may play this role. This chapter introduces the apparatus of attitude psychology that, in the author’s view, supplies a theoretical framework suitable to understand those intellectual vices which in Chapter 2 have been described as defects in epistemic agency. The approach throws light on the affective, motivational, and cognitive dimensions of the vices which are under scrutiny in this book. The chapter provides an overview of key concepts in attitude psychology including that of an attitude as a summary evaluation of its object. It makes a case that attitudes are the causal bases of intellectual virtues and vices. It concludes by addressing various objections to the framework and briefly addresses the questions raised by the situationist criticism of virtue epistemology.
{"title":"Attitude Psychology and Virtue Epistemology","authors":"A. Tanesini","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Virtue ethicists and epistemologists have generally presumed that virtue and vices are real psychological states or traits amenable to empirical study. There is, however, no agreement on the psychological constructs that may play this role. This chapter introduces the apparatus of attitude psychology that, in the author’s view, supplies a theoretical framework suitable to understand those intellectual vices which in Chapter 2 have been described as defects in epistemic agency. The approach throws light on the affective, motivational, and cognitive dimensions of the vices which are under scrutiny in this book. The chapter provides an overview of key concepts in attitude psychology including that of an attitude as a summary evaluation of its object. It makes a case that attitudes are the causal bases of intellectual virtues and vices. It concludes by addressing various objections to the framework and briefly addresses the questions raised by the situationist criticism of virtue epistemology.","PeriodicalId":269200,"journal":{"name":"The Mismeasure of the Self","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122818218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0008
A. Tanesini
This chapter addresses the question of moral and epistemic responsibility for intellectual vices and the beliefs that stem from them. It distinguishes three aspects of responsibility: accountability, answerability, and attributability. It argues that people are accountable but not fully answerable for their intellectual vices that are also attributable to them. Nevertheless, the chapter also cautions against blaming (in the sense of resenting) those who are blameworthy because one might lack the standing required to blame others. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance of taking responsibility for oneself and the importance for self-respect of adopting this stance.
{"title":"Wrongs, Responsibility, Blame, and Oppression","authors":"A. Tanesini","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858836.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses the question of moral and epistemic responsibility for intellectual vices and the beliefs that stem from them. It distinguishes three aspects of responsibility: accountability, answerability, and attributability. It argues that people are accountable but not fully answerable for their intellectual vices that are also attributable to them. Nevertheless, the chapter also cautions against blaming (in the sense of resenting) those who are blameworthy because one might lack the standing required to blame others. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance of taking responsibility for oneself and the importance for self-respect of adopting this stance.","PeriodicalId":269200,"journal":{"name":"The Mismeasure of the Self","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129902926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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