From 1977, New Zealand has had one of the simplest public pension systems in the world, a basic, universal pension – concentrating on the prevention of poverty in old age, with some success. The present set-up implies that without means tests, recipients can continue working, receiving a practically universal payment from their 65th birthday, and with only limited options for taking the pension before age 65. This paper samples work done at the New Zealand Treasury about the drivers of the decision to cease being active in the labour market. Hurnard (2005) analysed how changes in the eligibility age for New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) twice in the past 30 or so years have influenced older people’s decisions to participate actively in the labour market. Enright and Scobie (2009) have recently used survey data to quantify the separate effects of NZS, other income, health status, education, marital status, wealth, and so on, on the decision to participate for older workers, or to reduce the hours of working.While labour participation of older workers has risen since the gradual lift in the eligibility age from 60 to 65 between 1992 and 2001, there still is a 50% fall-off in participation between people aged 60-64 and 65-69 year olds. So New Zealand Superannuation, despite having no explicit financial disincentives, is still for many older than 65 a barrier to continued participation in the labour market. The coming acceleration of population ageing means that demand for older workers is likely to grow and that any barriers, real or imagined, should be removed.
{"title":"Public Pensions and the Labour Market in New Zealand","authors":"P. Rodway","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1991173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1991173","url":null,"abstract":"From 1977, New Zealand has had one of the simplest public pension systems in the world, a basic, universal pension – concentrating on the prevention of poverty in old age, with some success. The present set-up implies that without means tests, recipients can continue working, receiving a practically universal payment from their 65th birthday, and with only limited options for taking the pension before age 65. This paper samples work done at the New Zealand Treasury about the drivers of the decision to cease being active in the labour market. Hurnard (2005) analysed how changes in the eligibility age for New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) twice in the past 30 or so years have influenced older people’s decisions to participate actively in the labour market. Enright and Scobie (2009) have recently used survey data to quantify the separate effects of NZS, other income, health status, education, marital status, wealth, and so on, on the decision to participate for older workers, or to reduce the hours of working.While labour participation of older workers has risen since the gradual lift in the eligibility age from 60 to 65 between 1992 and 2001, there still is a 50% fall-off in participation between people aged 60-64 and 65-69 year olds. So New Zealand Superannuation, despite having no explicit financial disincentives, is still for many older than 65 a barrier to continued participation in the labour market. The coming acceleration of population ageing means that demand for older workers is likely to grow and that any barriers, real or imagined, should be removed.","PeriodicalId":275344,"journal":{"name":"2009 Pension Reform","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121745682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines several aspects of Israel's restructured retirement benefits system, focusing on distributive effects. We characterize 10 stylized representative prototypes of Israeli households, reflecting common demographic, wage and employment profiles. These prototypes are used to examine the joint effects of tax benefits for pensions and the public Old Age Allowances program's contributions and disbursements on the lifetime income distribution, net replacement rates at retirement and lifetime consumption smoothing. We find that the system is neutral in terms of its effect on lifetime income distribution, except for the top income decile which gains somewhat less than the others. We also find that pension savings result in a net loss for many low-income households, unsmooth their consumption and lead to "too high" post-retirement net replacement rates. Furthermore, evidence from a unique dataset point to rational and active behavior of most households with respect to these incentives. These findings suggest that the parameters of the retirement-age benefits system should be adjusted following the introduction of mandatory pensions.
{"title":"Distributive Effects of Israel’s Pension System","authors":"Adi Brender","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1992453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1992453","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines several aspects of Israel's restructured retirement benefits system, focusing on distributive effects. We characterize 10 stylized representative prototypes of Israeli households, reflecting common demographic, wage and employment profiles. These prototypes are used to examine the joint effects of tax benefits for pensions and the public Old Age Allowances program's contributions and disbursements on the lifetime income distribution, net replacement rates at retirement and lifetime consumption smoothing. We find that the system is neutral in terms of its effect on lifetime income distribution, except for the top income decile which gains somewhat less than the others. We also find that pension savings result in a net loss for many low-income households, unsmooth their consumption and lead to \"too high\" post-retirement net replacement rates. Furthermore, evidence from a unique dataset point to rational and active behavior of most households with respect to these incentives. These findings suggest that the parameters of the retirement-age benefits system should be adjusted following the introduction of mandatory pensions.","PeriodicalId":275344,"journal":{"name":"2009 Pension Reform","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126616391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Cuevas, María González, D. Lombardo, A. López-Marmolejo
This paper explores how privatizing a pension system can affect sovereign credit risk. For this purpose, it analyzes the importance that rating agencies give to implicit pension debt (IPD) in their assessments of sovereign creditworthiness. We find that rating agencies generally do not seem to give much weight to IPD, focusing instead on explicit public debt. However, by channeling pension contributions away from the government and creating a deficit of resources to cover the current pension liabilities during the reform's transition period, a pension privatization reform may transform IPD into explicit public debt, adversely affecting a sovereign's perceived creditworthiness, thus increasing its risk premium. In this light, accompanying pension reform with efforts to offset its transition costs through fiscal adjustment would help preserve a country's credit rating.
{"title":"Pension Privatization and Country Risk","authors":"A. Cuevas, María González, D. Lombardo, A. López-Marmolejo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1992445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1992445","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores how privatizing a pension system can affect sovereign credit risk. For this purpose, it analyzes the importance that rating agencies give to implicit pension debt (IPD) in their assessments of sovereign creditworthiness. We find that rating agencies generally do not seem to give much weight to IPD, focusing instead on explicit public debt. However, by channeling pension contributions away from the government and creating a deficit of resources to cover the current pension liabilities during the reform's transition period, a pension privatization reform may transform IPD into explicit public debt, adversely affecting a sovereign's perceived creditworthiness, thus increasing its risk premium. In this light, accompanying pension reform with efforts to offset its transition costs through fiscal adjustment would help preserve a country's credit rating.","PeriodicalId":275344,"journal":{"name":"2009 Pension Reform","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129162990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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