Several strands in the international development of taxation during the last decades have contributed to structural problems that act as a hinder and even counteract the basis for gender equality. A general problem is that tax equity has become equivalent to what is good for economic growth. When social justice no longer plays a part in tax policy concern, the welfare state erodes. The income gap becomes extremely large, poverty increases, and the rich don’t pay their fair share of the tax burden. As women relative to men in most intersections of society have a subordinated socio-economic position, the outcome of this tax policy is not beneficial for women. This outcome stands out as deeply contradictory to the layers of legal obligations and policies, on both a national and international level, aiming to promote gender equality. The aim of this paper is to expose how tax laws can consolidate and even strengthen economic inequalities between men and women. I will discuss the deeply rooted culture of supporting the bread-winner family model by extensive tax expenditures, and why these type of regulations serves as disincentives to women’s labour market supply and the gendered inequality in the distribution of paid and unpaid work. Another topic is to explain why the world-wide loss of redistributive power in national tax systems is fuelling gender inequalities. The relation between gender equality and the taxation of capital income will be given some extra attention, with the purpose to make an argument that sustainable tax bases is very much a women’s issue.
{"title":"Gender Equality and Taxation – International Perspectives","authors":"Åsa Gunnarsson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3818771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3818771","url":null,"abstract":"Several strands in the international development of taxation during the last decades have contributed to structural problems that act as a hinder and even counteract the basis for gender equality. A general problem is that tax equity has become equivalent to what is good for economic growth. When social justice no longer plays a part in tax policy concern, the welfare state erodes. The income gap becomes extremely large, poverty increases, and the rich don’t pay their fair share of the tax burden. As women relative to men in most intersections of society have a subordinated socio-economic position, the outcome of this tax policy is not beneficial for women. This outcome stands out as deeply contradictory to the layers of legal obligations and policies, on both a national and international level, aiming to promote gender equality. The aim of this paper is to expose how tax laws can consolidate and even strengthen economic inequalities between men and women. I will discuss the deeply rooted culture of supporting the bread-winner family model by extensive tax expenditures, and why these type of regulations serves as disincentives to women’s labour market supply and the gendered inequality in the distribution of paid and unpaid work. Another topic is to explain why the world-wide loss of redistributive power in national tax systems is fuelling gender inequalities. The relation between gender equality and the taxation of capital income will be given some extra attention, with the purpose to make an argument that sustainable tax bases is very much a women’s issue.","PeriodicalId":281828,"journal":{"name":"CBS Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123065727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article analyzes whether the investment in a private equity fund may create a permanent establishment (PE) for foreign investors. The analysis is divided into two main parts, as the question of creating a PE for the foreign investors is considered with respect to both the main PE-rule and the agency PE-rule. The amendments to the PE-definition prescribed in the OECD/G20 BEPS Report on Action 7, and incorporated into the 2017-version of the OECD Model with Commentary, are taken into consideration. It is concluded that the final outcome depends on the specific setup of the private equity fund at hand, and that some degree of uncertainty may often remain. Moreover, the recent amendments to the PE-definition do not appear to have reduced this uncertainty – rather the contrary.
{"title":"Permanent Establishment for Investors in Private Equity Funds – A Legal Analysis in Light of the Changes to the OECD Model (2017)","authors":"Peter Koerver Schmidt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3303240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3303240","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes whether the investment in a private equity fund may create a permanent establishment (PE) for foreign investors. The analysis is divided into two main parts, as the question of creating a PE for the foreign investors is considered with respect to both the main PE-rule and the agency PE-rule. The amendments to the PE-definition prescribed in the OECD/G20 BEPS Report on Action 7, and incorporated into the 2017-version of the OECD Model with Commentary, are taken into consideration. It is concluded that the final outcome depends on the specific setup of the private equity fund at hand, and that some degree of uncertainty may often remain. Moreover, the recent amendments to the PE-definition do not appear to have reduced this uncertainty – rather the contrary.","PeriodicalId":281828,"journal":{"name":"CBS Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122737178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As an instrument of regulation of externalities, tort law can be particularly effective when it is important to induce victims of harm to come forward with information about harmful acts committed by injurers. The point of the present paper is that this informational role of tort law is more pronounced under the rule of negligence than under strict liability, since victims are induced to provide detailed information that can justify a ruling of negligence. It is argued that the greater production of information under the negligence rule may render the negligence rule more efficient than strict liability when the parties are risk averse. This is illustrated in simple examples of unilateral care, including both an example of an idealized tort system and an example where the injurer may be negligent by mistake. Under the ideally functioning tort system, the injurer will not take out insurance under the negligence rule but will simply take due care and then not be subject to liability. Under strict liability, by contrast, the injurer will take out insurance, which induces moral hazard. The rule of negligence hence induces a first-best outcome while strict liability induces only a second-best outcome. When the injurer may commit mistakes, he is likely to take out insurance, in which case moral hazard arises also under the negligence rule. However, it is shown that the more informative signal conveyed by the victim about the injurer's behavior may render the insurance contract more efficient under the rule of negligence.
{"title":"The Information Advantage of the Negligence Rule Over Strict Liability","authors":"Henrik Lando","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3283638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3283638","url":null,"abstract":"As an instrument of regulation of externalities, tort law can be particularly effective when it is important to induce victims of harm to come forward with information about harmful acts committed by injurers. The point of the present paper is that this informational role of tort law is more pronounced under the rule of negligence than under strict liability, since victims are induced to provide detailed information that can justify a ruling of negligence. It is argued that the greater production of information under the negligence rule may render the negligence rule more efficient than strict liability when the parties are risk averse. This is illustrated in simple examples of unilateral care, including both an example of an idealized tort system and an example where the injurer may be negligent by mistake. Under the ideally functioning tort system, the injurer will not take out insurance under the negligence rule but will simply take due care and then not be subject to liability. Under strict liability, by contrast, the injurer will take out insurance, which induces moral hazard. The rule of negligence hence induces a first-best outcome while strict liability induces only a second-best outcome. When the injurer may commit mistakes, he is likely to take out insurance, in which case moral hazard arises also under the negligence rule. However, it is shown that the more informative signal conveyed by the victim about the injurer's behavior may render the insurance contract more efficient under the rule of negligence.","PeriodicalId":281828,"journal":{"name":"CBS Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126303417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：