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Transparency in Corporate Groups 企业集团的透明度
Pub Date : 2018-11-19 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3287378
J. L. Westbrook
This Article addresses a remarkable blind spot in American law: the failure to apply the well-established principles of secured credit to prevent inefficiency, confusion, and fraud in the manipulation of the webs of subsidiaries within corporate groups. In particular, “asset partitioning” has been a fashionable subject in which the central problem of non-transparency has been often mentioned, but little addressed. This Article offers a concept for a new system of corporate disclosure for the benefit of creditors and other stakeholders. It would require disclosure of corporate structures and allocations of assets among affiliates to the extent the affiliates are to be treated as independent legal entities. Enforcement would follow the secured creditor model: the failure to follow the rules would lead to disregard of corporate independence. Modern secured credit law is subject to many criticisms, but the emerging versions of credit security transparency found around the world have increased both efficiency and fairness in commercial transactions. Its example suggests the basis for reforms to achieve an analogous result for the extension of credit to groups of corporations, especially in international finance where partitioning is often used in lieu of secured financing. The long-term objective is to create a body of scholarship examining this problem and to propose a regime of corporate responsibility and transparency to correct it.
本文解决了美国法律中一个显著的盲点:未能应用公认的担保信贷原则来防止企业集团内部子公司网络操纵中的效率低下、混乱和欺诈。特别是,“资产分割”一直是一个时髦的话题,其中不透明的核心问题经常被提及,但很少得到解决。本文提出了一种新的公司信息披露制度的概念,以使债权人和其他利益相关者受益。它将要求披露公司结构和关联公司之间的资产分配情况,以使关联公司被视为独立的法律实体。执行将遵循有担保债权人模式:不遵守规则将导致无视公司独立性。现代担保信贷法受到许多批评,但在世界各地发现的信用安全透明度的新版本提高了商业交易的效率和公平性。它的例子表明了改革的基础,以便在向公司集团提供信贷方面取得类似的结果,特别是在经常使用分割代替担保融资的国际金融领域。长期目标是建立一个研究这一问题的学术机构,并提出一种企业责任和透明度制度,以纠正这一问题。
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引用次数: 3
The Customer's Non-Waivable Right to Choose Arbitration in the Securities Industry 证券业客户选择仲裁的不可放弃权
Pub Date : 2016-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2728972
Jill I. Gross
Arbitration has been the predominant form of dispute resolution in the securities industry since the 1980s. Virtually all brokerage firms include pre-dispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs) in their retail customer contracts, and have successfully fought off challenges to their validity. Additionally, the industry has long mandated that firms submit to arbitration at the demand of a customer, even in the absence of a PDAA. More recently, however, brokerage firms have been arguing that forum selection clauses in their agreements with sophisticated customers (such as institutional investors and issuers) supersede firms’ duty to arbitrate under FINRA Rule 12200. The Courts of Appeal currently are split on the question of whether, under general principles of contract interpretation, FINRA member firms can circumvent their duty to arbitrate by inserting forum selection clauses in their customer agreements.Most of these courts have not addressed the argument that the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (§ 29(a)) bars securities firms from forcing customers to waive their right to arbitrate disputes. The Supreme Court long ago interpreted § 29(a) to apply to waivers of substantive rights arising under the Exchange Act. Is the right to arbitrate in the FINRA forum, which is heavily regulated by the SEC to promote investor protection, a right that cannot be waived? This paper will explore the interaction between the anti-waiver provision of the Exchange Act, and the right of a customer to demand a particular dispute resolution process. This paper argues that investors’ long-standing right to choose arbitration in the securities industry is a right that brokerage firms cannot force their customers to waive.
自20世纪80年代以来,仲裁一直是证券业争议解决的主要形式。几乎所有的经纪公司都在其零售客户合同中包含争议前仲裁协议(PDAAs),并成功地应对了对其有效性的挑战。此外,该行业长期以来一直强制要求公司根据客户的要求提交仲裁,即使在没有PDAA的情况下也是如此。然而,最近,经纪公司一直在辩称,它们与老练的客户(如机构投资者和发行人)签订的协议中的论坛选择条款取代了公司根据FINRA规则12200进行仲裁的义务。上诉法院目前在以下问题上存在分歧:根据合同解释的一般原则,FINRA成员公司是否可以通过在客户协议中插入选择仲裁地点的条款来规避其仲裁义务。大多数法院都没有解决1934年《证券交易法》(§29(a))的反放弃条款禁止证券公司强迫客户放弃其仲裁纠纷的权利的论点。最高法院很久以前就将第29(a)条解释为适用于《交易法》下产生的实质性权利的放弃。在FINRA论坛上进行仲裁的权利是一项不能放弃的权利吗?该论坛受到SEC的严格监管,以促进投资者保护。本文将探讨交易法的反豁免条款与客户要求特定争议解决程序的权利之间的相互作用。本文认为,证券行业中投资者长期享有的选择仲裁的权利是经纪公司不能强迫其客户放弃的权利。
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引用次数: 0
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The Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law
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