Pub Date : 2022-01-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197567814.003.0007
R. Veeraraghavan
How does the NREGA process unfold in a village that is deeply and historically divided by caste and class relations? The analysis in this chapter is based on a study of a large agricultural village that is sharply split in class and caste. The first section describes the sociopolitical context of the village, with a focus on how Dalits have been mobilizing to gain power that predated the introduction of NREGA, a phenomenon that was not just local to the village. The second section discusses how the implementation of NREGA further affects power relations in the village. It then shows how even in the context of entrenched social and economic boundaries, effective implementation of NREGA can improve circumstances for workers, extending beyond outcomes in NREGA to improving their bargaining power in relation to the dominant landowners and resulting in an overall increase in agricultural wages.
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Pub Date : 2022-01-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197567814.003.0005
R. Veeraraghavan
Social audits in Andhra Pradesh face an ongoing conundrum: How can they increase participation from NREGA workers while minimizing confrontation with hostile local elites? To answer this question, this chapter analyzes three different types of public meetings, all aimed at increasing participation from marginalized citizens. The gram sabhas—run by lower-level bureaucrats—are mandated but produce no real outcomes. Apolitical and of very little use, the gram sabhas can be seen as the case of an “anti-politics machine” that serves only to fulfill a bureaucratic requirement. By contrast, the rachabanda meeting, coordinated by the local political party, is useful in bringing state-level bureaucrats closer to the village and helping citizens “see the state,” yet fails to offer a deliberative platform. The experimental audit meeting shows the limits of outside actors intervening in local politics when events spiral out of hand, creating chaos and disorder.
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