Pub Date : 2020-07-09DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0006
S. P. Garvey
Using as a frame the famous case of Daniel M’Naghten, who suffered from delusions of persecution, this chapter offers a theory of insanity as lost agency, according to which a person is insane if he acts but does not experience himself as the author of his actions. Insofar as the application of the actus reus and mens rea requirements presuppose that the defendant acted with a sense of agency, and insofar as actus reus and mens rea are limits on a democratic state’s authority to ascribe guilt, acting without a sense of agency constitutes another limit on the state’s authority. If a defendant acted without a sense of agency, he is beyond the authority of a democratic state to ascribe guilt to any criminal choice he makes while lacking a sense of agency. Before reaching this conclusion, the chapter explores and criticizes the law’s prevailing account of insanity, which grounds insanity in an incapacity, as well as a proposed alternative account, which grounds insanity in irrationality. After then elaborating on the idea of insanity as lost agency, it compares insanity to other defects of consciousness (hypnosis, sleepwalking, and multiple personality disorder).
本章以丹尼尔·纳格滕(Daniel M 'Naghten)遭受迫害妄想的著名案例为框架，提出了一种精神错乱作为丧失代理的理论，根据这种理论，如果一个人有行为，但没有体验到自己是行为的作者，那么他就是精神错乱的。既然适用实质行为和事由要求的前提是被告具有代理意识，既然实质行为和事由限制了民主国家的罪责归属，那么没有代理意识的行为就构成了对国家权力的另一种限制。如果被告的行为没有代理意识，那么他就没有权力在一个民主国家将自己的任何犯罪选择归咎于缺乏代理意识。在得出这个结论之前，本章探讨并批评了法律上对精神错乱的普遍解释，这种解释将精神错乱置于无行为能力的基础上，以及一种被提议的替代解释，这种解释将精神错乱置于非理性的基础上。在详细阐述了精神错乱作为丧失代理的概念之后，它将精神错乱与其他意识缺陷(催眠、梦游和多重人格障碍)进行了比较。
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Pub Date : 2020-07-09DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0008
S. P. Garvey
This concluding chapter reflects on what has gone before. The idea that a democratic state’s reason for being is to authoritatively resolve disagreements among free and equal citizens over the demands of justice suggests that peace, not justice, is the first virtue of social institutions, including the institutions through which the state imposes punishment. It then ponders, in light of the actus reus and mens rea requirements, the legitimacy of state punishment as currently administered in the various jurisdictions of the United States. Judged only in terms of the actus reus and mens rea requirements, it seems those jurisdictions earn passing grades. Existing rules and doctrines, enacted in the exercise of democratic authority, appear to keep the state’s power to ascribe guilt largely within the bounds of legitimacy. One might nonetheless think those jurisdictions illegitimately criminalize forms of conduct they have no authority to criminalize, or that they illegitimately impose punishments so severe as to exceed their authority. These questions are left for others to address.
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Pub Date : 2020-07-09DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0002
S. P. Garvey
Opening with the case of United States v. Campbell, a case from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit involving a real estate broker charged with money laundering, this chapter offers two stories. The first, involving a fictional king named Rex, illustrates the extent to which criminal law theorists (and citizens more generally) disagree about what justice requires across a range of rules governing the imposition of state punishment. In light of such disagreement, how is Rex to decide what, as a matter of justice, the criminal law should be? The second story, involving an imaginary island named Anarchia, illustrates how state authority provides an important good—authoritatively resolving reasonable disagreements among free and equal democratic citizens about the requirements of justice—and explains why those subject to a democratic state’s authority are morally bound to conform their conduct to the law resolving those disagreements. It then argues that a democratic state’s authority to resolve disagegreements among its citizens over the demands of justice is nonetheless limited authority. A democratic state has wide authority, but not unlimited authority. The actus reus and mens rea requirements limit the authority of a democratic state to ascribe guilt.
本章以美国诉坎贝尔案(United States v. Campbell)作为开篇，该案来自美国第十一巡回上诉法院，涉及一名被控洗钱的房地产经纪人。第一个是虚构的国王雷克斯(Rex)，它说明了刑法理论家(以及更普遍的公民)在一系列管理国家惩罚的规则中对正义的要求存在多大分歧。鉴于这种分歧，雷克斯如何决定，作为一个司法问题，刑法应该是什么?第二个故事，涉及一个名为无政府主义的虚构岛屿，说明了国家权力如何提供一个重要的好处——权威地解决自由平等的民主公民之间关于正义要求的合理分歧——并解释了为什么那些服从民主国家权威的人在道德上必须使他们的行为符合解决这些分歧的法律。然后，它认为，一个民主国家解决其公民对正义要求的分歧的权力仍然是有限的。民主国家有广泛的权力，但不是无限的权力。事实依据和行为依据的要求限制了民主国家追究罪责的权力。
{"title":"Authority","authors":"S. P. Garvey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Opening with the case of United States v. Campbell, a case from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit involving a real estate broker charged with money laundering, this chapter offers two stories. The first, involving a fictional king named Rex, illustrates the extent to which criminal law theorists (and citizens more generally) disagree about what justice requires across a range of rules governing the imposition of state punishment. In light of such disagreement, how is Rex to decide what, as a matter of justice, the criminal law should be? The second story, involving an imaginary island named Anarchia, illustrates how state authority provides an important good—authoritatively resolving reasonable disagreements among free and equal democratic citizens about the requirements of justice—and explains why those subject to a democratic state’s authority are morally bound to conform their conduct to the law resolving those disagreements. It then argues that a democratic state’s authority to resolve disagegreements among its citizens over the demands of justice is nonetheless limited authority. A democratic state has wide authority, but not unlimited authority. The actus reus and mens rea requirements limit the authority of a democratic state to ascribe guilt.","PeriodicalId":296621,"journal":{"name":"Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127023870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-09DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0004
S. P. Garvey
This chapter begins with United States v. Moore, a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia involving a heroin addict charged with drug possession. It describes in more detail what the actus reus and mens rea requirements entail when applied to a defendant who realized he was committing a crime. It discusses, in relation to actus reus, free will as the capacity to choose otherwise, proposes a test to help determine if a defendant lacked the capacity to choose otherwise (the Stephen test), and compares the actus reus requirement to the existing defense of insanity. In relation to mens rea, the chapter explains how the Jekyll test (introduced in Chapter 2) applies to defendants who realized there were committing a crime, and then compares mens rea to the existing defenses of duress and provocation, as well as to the problem of the “willing addict.” It concludes with a discussion of the circumstances under which the state can legitimately ascribe guilt to a defendant who lacked actus reus or mens rea at the time of the crime but whose guilt can nonetheless be traced to a prior guilty act or omission.
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Pub Date : 2020-07-09DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0005
S. P. Garvey
This chapter begins Lambert v. California, a 1957 U.S. Supreme Court case involving a woman charged with a crime she didn’t realize she was committing. Lambert violated a Los Angles ordinance making it a crime for convicted felons to remain in the city for more than five days without registering with the police, but she was unaware of her duty to register. It describes in more detail what the actus reus and mens rea requirements entail when applied to a defendant who didn’t realize she was committing a crime. As a preface to that effort it discusses and criticizes the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. It then introduces a test, in relation to actus reus, for determining if a defendant who didn’t realize she was committing a crime could have realized she was (the Lex test) and then compares the actus reus requirement to the existing defense of insanity. It thereafter turns to a discussion of the mens rea requirement as applied to ignorant defendants, analyzing some hard cases, and then concludes with a discussion of tracing.
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Pub Date : 2020-07-09DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0003
S. P. Garvey
This chapter uses two well-known Supreme Court cases—Powell v. Texas and Morissette v. United States—to frame the subsequent discussion. It offers the reasonable doubt test as a way for each citizen to decide for himself if a proposed limit on democratic authority is a legitimate limit. It introduces formulations of the actus reus and mens rea meant to pass that test, such that they can serve as immunity rights limiting the authority of a democratic states to ascribe guilt to those accused of crimes. It distinguishes actus reus and mens rea as they are conventionally understood (as tools lawyers use to analyze and dissect the elements of criminal statute) from how they will be understood here (as immunity rights). It explains how actus reus and mens rea so understood mean one thing when applied to defendants who realized they were committing a crime and another thing when they didn’t realize they were committing a crime. It then details how mens rea is ultimately grounded in an ill or indifferent will—a lack of sufficient concern for the law and its ends—and proposes a test (the Jekyll test) for sorting ill and indifferent wills from law-abiding ones.
{"title":"Rights","authors":"S. P. Garvey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter uses two well-known Supreme Court cases—Powell v. Texas and Morissette v. United States—to frame the subsequent discussion. It offers the reasonable doubt test as a way for each citizen to decide for himself if a proposed limit on democratic authority is a legitimate limit. It introduces formulations of the actus reus and mens rea meant to pass that test, such that they can serve as immunity rights limiting the authority of a democratic states to ascribe guilt to those accused of crimes. It distinguishes actus reus and mens rea as they are conventionally understood (as tools lawyers use to analyze and dissect the elements of criminal statute) from how they will be understood here (as immunity rights). It explains how actus reus and mens rea so understood mean one thing when applied to defendants who realized they were committing a crime and another thing when they didn’t realize they were committing a crime. It then details how mens rea is ultimately grounded in an ill or indifferent will—a lack of sufficient concern for the law and its ends—and proposes a test (the Jekyll test) for sorting ill and indifferent wills from law-abiding ones.","PeriodicalId":296621,"journal":{"name":"Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128968970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-09DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0007
S. P. Garvey
This chapter starts off with Alexander v. United States, a case from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia involving a defendant from a “rotten social background” charged with murder. The question it ultimately seeks to answer is this: When a democratic state has treated a citizen so badly, as a matter of distributive justice, that we are inclined to say of him that he has been excluded from the life of the polity, is the state nonetheless morally permitted to punish him if and when he commits a crime? It starts with several answers an anarchist might give to this question, distinguishing between a revolutionary response and a reformist response. It then moves onto discuss how a statist, as a believer in the authority of a democratic state, might respond. It concludes that a democratic state, even if it has lost its authority over the disadvantaged, is nonetheless morally permitted to punish those among the disadvantaged who commit serious (or core) crimes, but that it lacks any moral permission, derived from its own authority, to punish them for less serious (non-core) crimes.
{"title":"Injustice","authors":"S. P. Garvey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190924324.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter starts off with Alexander v. United States, a case from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia involving a defendant from a “rotten social background” charged with murder. The question it ultimately seeks to answer is this: When a democratic state has treated a citizen so badly, as a matter of distributive justice, that we are inclined to say of him that he has been excluded from the life of the polity, is the state nonetheless morally permitted to punish him if and when he commits a crime? It starts with several answers an anarchist might give to this question, distinguishing between a revolutionary response and a reformist response. It then moves onto discuss how a statist, as a believer in the authority of a democratic state, might respond. It concludes that a democratic state, even if it has lost its authority over the disadvantaged, is nonetheless morally permitted to punish those among the disadvantaged who commit serious (or core) crimes, but that it lacks any moral permission, derived from its own authority, to punish them for less serious (non-core) crimes.","PeriodicalId":296621,"journal":{"name":"Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132453562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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