Pub Date : 2019-06-11DOI: 10.21511/PPM.17(2).2019.25
M. Ibrahim
Several systems of budgeting have been introduced into practice over the last fifty years. While more popular budgeting systems such as incrementalism and Planning Programming Budgeting Systems (PPBS) have seen continued popularity and resilience as budgeting systems, zero-based budgeting (ZBB) has experienced a resurgence in popularity, as governments and public organizations alike seek to control wasteful spending within their departments. The aim of this article is to provide users with a step-by-step guide to designing zero-based budgeting for public organizations. This article begins by describing the foundations of zero-based budgeting, as well as providing a brief comparative exploration of ZBB alongside other contemporary budgeting systems. To gain a deeper understanding of zero-base budgeting and the potential, as well as the drawbacks that this type of budgeting system holds, this paper examines the actual experience of several organizations that have implemented the zero-based budgeting method. This is accomplished by conducting a critical review of all the research and case studies that have been conducted on this topic. It is the hope of the author that both public sector and non-profit organizations will benefit from the findings of this paper when considering the implementation of their own zero-based budgeting, resulting in better planning and performance evaluation.
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This paper presents comparative statics of the three classic forms of organizing natural monopolies --- private monopoly, public monopoly, and regulated monopoly.
本文比较了自然垄断组织的三种经典形式——私人垄断、公共垄断和管制垄断。
{"title":"Comparative Statics of Organizational Forms of Public Utilities","authors":"Marian W. Moszoro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2872335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2872335","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents comparative statics of the three classic forms of organizing natural monopolies --- private monopoly, public monopoly, and regulated monopoly.","PeriodicalId":306925,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Public Sector Organizations (Topic)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114871645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Commission has announced that it would issue a proposal to amend the European Union (EU) anti-dumping regulation to tackle the forthcoming expiry of the provision in China’s Protocol of Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) which allows WTO Members to derogate from the WTO rules on dumping determinations against imports from China. The proposal will include the removal of the ‘non-market economies’ (NME) list, which justifies the use of the ‘analogue country’ methodology, and the adoption of a new, country-neutral methodology to ‘capture distortions linked to State intervention’. This article analyses the consistency of this alternative approach to NME conditions with the WTO anti-dumping rules. It argues that the EU’s approach may amount to a continuous treatment of China as a NME for anti-dumping purposes. Such an approach, however, finds no legal basis under the WTO Antidumping Agreement which does not concern any government intervention per se but concerns a proper comparison between export price and normal value. Moreover, should normal value be constructed, the investigating authority shall take into account costs actually incurred by exporters. It follows that an investigating authority cannot use the WTO anti-dumping rules to sanction all forms of State intervention that results in lower export prices.
{"title":"Replacing the Non-Market Economy Methodology: Is the European Union's Alternative Approach Justified Under the World Trade Organization Anti-Dumping Agreement?","authors":"S. Noël, Weihuan Zhou","doi":"10.54648/gtcj2016071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2016071","url":null,"abstract":"The European Commission has announced that it would issue a proposal to amend the European Union (EU) anti-dumping regulation to tackle the forthcoming expiry of the provision in China’s Protocol of Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) which allows WTO Members to derogate from the WTO rules on dumping determinations against imports from China. The proposal will include the removal of the ‘non-market economies’ (NME) list, which justifies the use of the ‘analogue country’ methodology, and the adoption of a new, country-neutral methodology to ‘capture distortions linked to State intervention’. This article analyses the consistency of this alternative approach to NME conditions with the WTO anti-dumping rules. It argues that the EU’s approach may amount to a continuous treatment of China as a NME for anti-dumping purposes. Such an approach, however, finds no legal basis under the WTO Antidumping Agreement which does not concern any government intervention per se but concerns a proper comparison between export price and normal value. Moreover, should normal value be constructed, the investigating authority shall take into account costs actually incurred by exporters. It follows that an investigating authority cannot use the WTO anti-dumping rules to sanction all forms of State intervention that results in lower export prices.","PeriodicalId":306925,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Public Sector Organizations (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125042552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
В работе основное внимание уделено направлениям оптимизации государственного сектора российской экономики. Проанализированы возможные пути реформирования сектора унитарных предприятий и возможные механизмы повышения эффективности государственного участия в капитале хозяйственных обществ. На широком фактическом материале проанализированы вопросы оптимизации государственного сектора и приватизации в переходных экономиках в 2000-е гг.This paper focuses on the areas of optimization the public sector of the Russian economy. The possible ways of reforming the sector of the unitary enterprises and possible mechanisms for increasing the effectiveness of public participation in the capital of business entities. On the broad factual data analyzed by the optimization of the public sector and privatization in transition economies in the 2000s.
{"title":"Оптимизация Государственного Сектора: Зарубежный Опыт и Рекомендации Для России (Optimizing the Public Sector: Foreign Experience and Recommendations for Russia)","authors":"Georgy Malginov, Galiya U. Ilyasova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2265783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2265783","url":null,"abstract":"В работе основное внимание уделено направлениям оптимизации государственного сектора российской экономики. Проанализированы возможные пути реформирования сектора унитарных предприятий и возможные механизмы повышения эффективности государственного участия в капитале хозяйственных обществ. На широком фактическом материале проанализированы вопросы оптимизации государственного сектора и приватизации в переходных экономиках в 2000-е гг.This paper focuses on the areas of optimization the public sector of the Russian economy. The possible ways of reforming the sector of the unitary enterprises and possible mechanisms for increasing the effectiveness of public participation in the capital of business entities. On the broad factual data analyzed by the optimization of the public sector and privatization in transition economies in the 2000s.","PeriodicalId":306925,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Public Sector Organizations (Topic)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124076497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There has been marked change in recent years in the positions taken by many nation states involved in climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While these changes in position track with shifting priorities of both developing and developed countries, a consensus on how a nation formulates its negotiation policy has not been reached, and therefore understanding these vicissitudes in global climate talks have thus far been difficult.Traditional approaches to explaining a nation’s position on climate change are often rooted in an interest-based methodological framework, such as Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta’s (S&V) well-known cost-benefit model. While the S&V approach offers valuable insight and an intellectual base from which to conduct further study, it fails, as this paper demonstrates, to stand the test of time. That is, a thorough review of the history on global climate change negotiation reveals inaccuracies in the S&V model, particularly with regard to one of its primary variables – ecological vulnerability – which is difficult to measure and the model itself is fails to accurately account for processes of change in strategy formation. In light of these shortcomings, this paper offers an alternative analytical framework to better understand how a nation formulates its climate change negotiation policy and strategy.To this end, a four variable matrix – patterns A, B, C, and D – is developed which keys off of two central inputs affecting climate change negotiations: emission and cost. Emission, a nation’s share of the global greenhouse gas (GHG) portfolio, is representative of a country’s responsibility to actively engage with the global community on climate change. Cost can be understood as the expense incurred by a country that seeks to reduce its GHG emissions, and thus is a means of gauging the rational attractiveness for it to do so. When taken together and viewed under the four variable matrix developed in this paper, one is able to better understand the fundamental features influencing a country’s position on climate change negotiations. In order to analyze changes in national position, the variables of emission and cost are taken alongside a third factor – national support for climate change negotiation regime. This variable explores the motivation and impetus underlying a country’s decision to recalibrate its negotiation strategy, and incorporates such influences as national interest and political factors. In order to test the model formulated in this paper, a case study on China’s position and transition in UN climate change negotiations is undertaken. Major catalysts, stemming from national interests and political factors, are examined as explanatory factors influencing China’s gradual movement from a passive to active attitude toward climate change negotiation regime. This change, exemplified by its increased support for the UNFCCC, is born out in the four variable m
{"title":"Dynamics of National Position in Climate Change Negotiations: An Analysis of Emission, Cost and Regime Support","authors":"Fang-Ting Cheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1948322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1948322","url":null,"abstract":"There has been marked change in recent years in the positions taken by many nation states involved in climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While these changes in position track with shifting priorities of both developing and developed countries, a consensus on how a nation formulates its negotiation policy has not been reached, and therefore understanding these vicissitudes in global climate talks have thus far been difficult.Traditional approaches to explaining a nation’s position on climate change are often rooted in an interest-based methodological framework, such as Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta’s (S&V) well-known cost-benefit model. While the S&V approach offers valuable insight and an intellectual base from which to conduct further study, it fails, as this paper demonstrates, to stand the test of time. That is, a thorough review of the history on global climate change negotiation reveals inaccuracies in the S&V model, particularly with regard to one of its primary variables – ecological vulnerability – which is difficult to measure and the model itself is fails to accurately account for processes of change in strategy formation. In light of these shortcomings, this paper offers an alternative analytical framework to better understand how a nation formulates its climate change negotiation policy and strategy.To this end, a four variable matrix – patterns A, B, C, and D – is developed which keys off of two central inputs affecting climate change negotiations: emission and cost. Emission, a nation’s share of the global greenhouse gas (GHG) portfolio, is representative of a country’s responsibility to actively engage with the global community on climate change. Cost can be understood as the expense incurred by a country that seeks to reduce its GHG emissions, and thus is a means of gauging the rational attractiveness for it to do so. When taken together and viewed under the four variable matrix developed in this paper, one is able to better understand the fundamental features influencing a country’s position on climate change negotiations. In order to analyze changes in national position, the variables of emission and cost are taken alongside a third factor – national support for climate change negotiation regime. This variable explores the motivation and impetus underlying a country’s decision to recalibrate its negotiation strategy, and incorporates such influences as national interest and political factors. In order to test the model formulated in this paper, a case study on China’s position and transition in UN climate change negotiations is undertaken. Major catalysts, stemming from national interests and political factors, are examined as explanatory factors influencing China’s gradual movement from a passive to active attitude toward climate change negotiation regime. This change, exemplified by its increased support for the UNFCCC, is born out in the four variable m","PeriodicalId":306925,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Public Sector Organizations (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131218570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prompted by widespread concerns about public school quality, a growing empirical literature has measured the effects of greater choice on school performance. This paper contributes to that literature in three ways. First, it makes the observation that the overall effect of greater choice, which has been the focus of prior research, can be decomposed into demand and supply components: knowing the relative sizes of the two is very relevant for policy. Second, using rich data from a large metropolitan area, it provides a direct and intuitive measure of the competition each school faces. This takes the form of a school-specific elasticity that measures the extent to which reductions in school quality would lead to reductions in demand. Third, the paper provides evidence that these elasticity measures are strongly related to school performance: a one-standard deviation increase in the competitiveness of a school's local environment within the Bay Area leads to a 0.15 standard deviation increase in average test scores. This positive correlation is robust and is consistent with strong supply responsiveness on the part of public schools, of relevance to the broader school choice debate.
{"title":"Choice and Competition in Local Education Markets","authors":"P. Bayer, R. Mcmillan","doi":"10.3386/W11802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W11802","url":null,"abstract":"Prompted by widespread concerns about public school quality, a growing empirical literature has measured the effects of greater choice on school performance. This paper contributes to that literature in three ways. First, it makes the observation that the overall effect of greater choice, which has been the focus of prior research, can be decomposed into demand and supply components: knowing the relative sizes of the two is very relevant for policy. Second, using rich data from a large metropolitan area, it provides a direct and intuitive measure of the competition each school faces. This takes the form of a school-specific elasticity that measures the extent to which reductions in school quality would lead to reductions in demand. Third, the paper provides evidence that these elasticity measures are strongly related to school performance: a one-standard deviation increase in the competitiveness of a school's local environment within the Bay Area leads to a 0.15 standard deviation increase in average test scores. This positive correlation is robust and is consistent with strong supply responsiveness on the part of public schools, of relevance to the broader school choice debate.","PeriodicalId":306925,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Public Sector Organizations (Topic)","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132782273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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