Pub Date : 2020-05-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190927301.003.0008
S. Moreau
In the book’s Conclusion, the author summarizes three ways in which discrimination wrongs people: by unfairly subordinating them to others, by infringing their right to a particular deliberative freedom, and by denying them access to a basic good. She identifies a number of advantages of this theory. She relates the theory to the serigraph on the cover of the book, discussing the wrongful discrimination faced by indigenous peoples in Canada.
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Pub Date : 2020-05-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190927301.003.0007
S. Moreau
Chapter Seven, “The Duty to Treat Others as Equals: Who Stands Under It?,” focuses on the obligations of governments and private individuals to treat people as equals. The author considers several arguments for the claim that governments owe those whom they govern a duty to treat them as equals. The author then turns to the duties of individuals. The author argues that we do not acquire a duty to treat others as equals only when we occupy certain institutional roles. Rather, we always have an obligation to treat others as equals, in the specific senses discussed in this book: we must not unfairly subordinate some to others, or infringe their right to a particular deliberative freedom, or deny them access to a basic good when it is in our power to give it to them. The author argues that this obligation is not too demanding, and distinguishes it from the duty to give equal concern to everyone’s interests in one’s deliberations. The author tries to show that this duty is consistent with recognizing the importance of a variety of individual freedoms, and that there are often good reasons for the state not to use anti-discrimination law to regulate decisions made in more personal contexts. The author also explains why, nevertheless, the state has an obligation to help us fulfil our obligations in these more personal context, by creating the conditions under which we can relate to others as equals.
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Pub Date : 2020-05-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190927301.003.0006
S. Moreau
Chapter Six, “Indirect Discrimination,” makes explicit the implications that the author’s pluralist theory of wrongful discrimination has for our understanding of indirect discrimination. The author argues that the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination is not always morally significant. Indirect discrimination, like direct discrimination, can subordinate people; it can infringe their right to deliberative freedom; and it can deny them access to a basic good. The author also considers questions of responsibility and culpability. The author distinguishes between “responsibility for cost” and “responsibility as culpability.” Agents of indirect discrimination are, in many cases, both responsible for the costs of rectifying discrimination and also responsible in the sense of “culpable.” The author explains how we can see both indirect and direct discrimination as involving negligence on the part of the discriminator.
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Pub Date : 2020-05-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190927301.003.0002
S. Moreau
Chapter Two, “Unfair Subordination,” develops a theory of unfair subordination and then uses this theory to help explain why discrimination wrongs people. The author explains why, in this context, it is important to think of subordination as “social subordination”—that is, as something that happens to a person by virtue of her membership in a certain social group. The author argues that social subordination involves not only differences in the power, authority, and deference given to particular social groups, but also, crucially, the presence of what the author calls “structural accommodations.” These are practices that normalize the needs of the superior groups and render invisible the needs of inferior groups. The author then uses this account of subordination to explain a variety of ways in which direct and indirect discrimination contribute to unfair subordination. Both forms of discrimination perpetuate differences in power, authority, and deference. Direct discrimination also subordinates by marking out certain people or groups as inferior, constituting an expression of censure. And indirect discrimination contributes to unfair subordination when it leaves in place problematic structural accommodations, rendering certain groups invisible, and thereby marking them out as inferior, in certain contexts.
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