Pub Date : 2019-09-26DOI: 10.1093/actrade/9780198829164.003.0004
D. Pritchard
‘Scepticism as a way of life’ considers the case for a moderate scepticism, by looking at the work of the philosopher Aristotle (384–322 bce). This idea concerns the role of the virtues, and the intellectual virtues in particular, in the ‘good life’ of human flourishing; what the ancient Greeks called eudaimonia. Understanding the role that the intellectual virtues play in the good life enables us to see how embracing a moderate scepticism could be necessary for living such a life. It also helps us to resolve a possible tension between adopting a healthy moderately sceptical attitude while at the same time living a life of genuine conviction.
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Pub Date : 2019-09-26DOI: 10.1093/actrade/9780198829164.003.0001
D. Pritchard
Scepticism concerns doubt, primarily doubt about what is true. So construed, the sceptic is not proposing that truth is just subjective opinion in the way that the relativist is. Indeed, what is motivating scepticism is rather the worry that our beliefs might not be true in an objective sense. However, scepticism can slide into relativism if the former becomes extensive enough. ‘What is scepticism?’ asks how we would differentiate between a healthy scepticism that targets only specific claims, and a more generalized radical scepticism that has pernicious consequences. It considers different types of knowledge—propositional, ability, and perceptual—and why it might matter to us that we do have the widespread knowledge that we take ourselves to have.
{"title":"1. What is scepticism?","authors":"D. Pritchard","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198829164.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198829164.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Scepticism concerns doubt, primarily doubt about what is true. So construed, the sceptic is not proposing that truth is just subjective opinion in the way that the relativist is. Indeed, what is motivating scepticism is rather the worry that our beliefs might not be true in an objective sense. However, scepticism can slide into relativism if the former becomes extensive enough. ‘What is scepticism?’ asks how we would differentiate between a healthy scepticism that targets only specific claims, and a more generalized radical scepticism that has pernicious consequences. It considers different types of knowledge—propositional, ability, and perceptual—and why it might matter to us that we do have the widespread knowledge that we take ourselves to have.","PeriodicalId":318239,"journal":{"name":"Scepticism: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116745936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-26DOI: 10.1093/actrade/9780198829164.003.0003
D. Pritchard
‘Defending knowledge’ considers some of the different philosophical responses to the problem of radical scepticism. It begins with the natural response to a philosophical puzzle: to insist on our commonsense principles and work back from there, focusing on the work of G.E. Moore. It then looks at a different kind of response to the sceptical problem, which involves the idea that perhaps there is some sort of context-shift in play in the sceptical reasoning. Finally, it discusses a more radical approach to the problem of radical scepticism outlined by Ludwig Wittgenstein. There is no one particular solution to radical scepticism, but numerous philosophical responses to the problem.
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Pub Date : 2019-09-26DOI: 10.1093/actrade/9780198829164.003.0002
D. Pritchard
‘Is knowledge impossible?’ considers an influential argument that purports to show that we do not know much of what we take ourselves to know. If this argument works, then it licenses a radical sceptical doubt. It first looks at Descartes’s formulation of radical scepticism—Cartesian scepticism—which employs an important theoretical innovation known as a radical sceptical hypothesis. The closure principle is also discussed along with the radical sceptical paradox. If this radical sceptical argument works, then we not only lack knowledge of much of what we believe, but we do not even have any good epistemic reasons for believing what we do.
{"title":"2. Is knowledge impossible?","authors":"D. Pritchard","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198829164.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198829164.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"‘Is knowledge impossible?’ considers an influential argument that purports to show that we do not know much of what we take ourselves to know. If this argument works, then it licenses a radical sceptical doubt. It first looks at Descartes’s formulation of radical scepticism—Cartesian scepticism—which employs an important theoretical innovation known as a radical sceptical hypothesis. The closure principle is also discussed along with the radical sceptical paradox. If this radical sceptical argument works, then we not only lack knowledge of much of what we believe, but we do not even have any good epistemic reasons for believing what we do.","PeriodicalId":318239,"journal":{"name":"Scepticism: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"23 6 Pt 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130906292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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