Heap-based attacks depend on a combination of memory management error and an exploitable memory allocator. Many allocators include ad hoc countermeasures against particular exploits but their effectiveness against future exploits has been uncertain. This paper presents the first formal treatment of the impact of allocator design on security. It analyzes a range of widely-deployed memory allocators, including those used by Windows, Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD, and shows that they remain vulnerable to attack. It them presents DieHarder, a new allocator whose design was guided by this analysis. DieHarder provides the highest degree of security from heap-based attacks of any practical allocator of which we are aware while imposing modest performance overhead. In particular, the Firefox web browser runs as fast with DieHarder as with the Linux allocator.
{"title":"DieHarder","authors":"Gene Novark, E. Berger","doi":"10.1145/1866307.1866371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866371","url":null,"abstract":"Heap-based attacks depend on a combination of memory management error and an exploitable memory allocator. Many allocators include ad hoc countermeasures against particular exploits but their effectiveness against future exploits has been uncertain. This paper presents the first formal treatment of the impact of allocator design on security. It analyzes a range of widely-deployed memory allocators, including those used by Windows, Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD, and shows that they remain vulnerable to attack. It them presents DieHarder, a new allocator whose design was guided by this analysis. DieHarder provides the highest degree of security from heap-based attacks of any practical allocator of which we are aware while imposing modest performance overhead. In particular, the Firefox web browser runs as fast with DieHarder as with the Linux allocator.","PeriodicalId":322294,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '10","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116562114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dongho Kim, Jerry T. Chiang, Yih-Chun Hu, A. Perrig, P. R. Kumar
Congestion control algorithms seek to optimally utilize network resources by allocating a certain rate for each user. However, malicious clients can disregard the congestion control algorithms implemented at the clients and induce congestion at bottleneck links. Thus, in an adversarial environment, the network must enforce the congestion control algorithm in order to attain the optimal network utilization offered by the algorithm. Prior work protects only a single link incident on the enforcement routers neglecting damage inflicted upon other downstream links. We present CRAFT, a capability-based scheme to secure all downstream links of a deploying router. Our goal is to enforce a network-wide congestion control algorithm on all flows. As a reference design, we develop techniques to enforce the TCP congestion control. Our design regulates all flows to share bandwidth resources in a TCP-fair manner by emulating the TCP state machine in a CRAFT router. As a result, once a flow passes a single CRAFT router, it is TCP-fair on all downstream links of that router.
{"title":"CRAFT","authors":"Dongho Kim, Jerry T. Chiang, Yih-Chun Hu, A. Perrig, P. R. Kumar","doi":"10.1145/1866307.1866404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866404","url":null,"abstract":"Congestion control algorithms seek to optimally utilize network resources by allocating a certain rate for each user. However, malicious clients can disregard the congestion control algorithms implemented at the clients and induce congestion at bottleneck links. Thus, in an adversarial environment, the network must enforce the congestion control algorithm in order to attain the optimal network utilization offered by the algorithm. Prior work protects only a single link incident on the enforcement routers neglecting damage inflicted upon other downstream links. We present CRAFT, a capability-based scheme to secure all downstream links of a deploying router. Our goal is to enforce a network-wide congestion control algorithm on all flows. As a reference design, we develop techniques to enforce the TCP congestion control. Our design regulates all flows to share bandwidth resources in a TCP-fair manner by emulating the TCP state machine in a CRAFT router. As a result, once a flow passes a single CRAFT router, it is TCP-fair on all downstream links of that router.","PeriodicalId":322294,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '10","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116189893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：