Pub Date : 2021-06-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780192894793.003.0003
T. Dougherty
This chapter introduces the Autonomy Argument for the Mental View of consent. The Mental View is that consent consists in a mental attitude. The key ideas of the Autonomy Argument are that since consent is an expression of our autonomy, and since our thoughts are maximally under our control, consent consists in our thoughts. This argument provides support for the Mental View over its rival, the Behavioural View, according to which consent requires outward behaviour. However, this support is limited by the fact that the Behavioural View also implies that we have a robust amount of control over our consent. If we accept the Mental View, then we face a further question of which mental attitude constitutes consent. Since consent must persist until the time at which the consent-receiver acts, the most plausible version of the Mental View identifies consent with the mental state of intention.
{"title":"The Mental View","authors":"T. Dougherty","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780192894793.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780192894793.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the Autonomy Argument for the Mental View of consent. The Mental View is that consent consists in a mental attitude. The key ideas of the Autonomy Argument are that since consent is an expression of our autonomy, and since our thoughts are maximally under our control, consent consists in our thoughts. This argument provides support for the Mental View over its rival, the Behavioural View, according to which consent requires outward behaviour. However, this support is limited by the fact that the Behavioural View also implies that we have a robust amount of control over our consent. If we accept the Mental View, then we face a further question of which mental attitude constitutes consent. Since consent must persist until the time at which the consent-receiver acts, the most plausible version of the Mental View identifies consent with the mental state of intention.","PeriodicalId":327090,"journal":{"name":"The Scope of Consent","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124059313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192894793.003.0013
T. Dougherty
This concluding chapter summarizes the Evidential Account that is comprised of the Interpersonal Justification Argument, the Expression of Will View, and the Due Diligence Principle. After elaborating how the account applies, this chapter surveys remaining doubts that we may have about this account. Doubts are inevitable because there is a tension between two attractive thoughts. On the one hand, there is a pull to thinking that a consent-giver should be able to control the scope of their consent. On the other hand, there is a pull to thinking that the consent-receiver should have epistemic access to the scope of the consent. Since the consent-giver may fail to control the epistemic access of the consent-receiver, these thoughts cannot be fully reconciled, and so any account will miss out on something attractive. After discussing how the Evidential Account responds to this tension, this book ends by revisiting the topic of sexual deception. The Evidential Account entails an expansive view of sexual misconduct in so far as the account implies that many sexual deceivers engage in non-consensual sex with their victims.
{"title":"Conclusions","authors":"T. Dougherty","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192894793.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192894793.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"This concluding chapter summarizes the Evidential Account that is comprised of the Interpersonal Justification Argument, the Expression of Will View, and the Due Diligence Principle. After elaborating how the account applies, this chapter surveys remaining doubts that we may have about this account. Doubts are inevitable because there is a tension between two attractive thoughts. On the one hand, there is a pull to thinking that a consent-giver should be able to control the scope of their consent. On the other hand, there is a pull to thinking that the consent-receiver should have epistemic access to the scope of the consent. Since the consent-giver may fail to control the epistemic access of the consent-receiver, these thoughts cannot be fully reconciled, and so any account will miss out on something attractive. After discussing how the Evidential Account responds to this tension, this book ends by revisiting the topic of sexual deception. The Evidential Account entails an expansive view of sexual misconduct in so far as the account implies that many sexual deceivers engage in non-consensual sex with their victims.","PeriodicalId":327090,"journal":{"name":"The Scope of Consent","volume":"22 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125845726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780192894793.003.0006
T. Dougherty
This chapter introduces the case for the ‘Successful Communication Principle’ for the scope of consent, according to which an action falls within the scope of someone’s consent when the consent-giver successfully communicates an intention to permit this action. This principle pairs with a view of consent as consisting in successful communication between the consent-giver and the consent-receiver. This principle and view can be motivated by the Control Argument, which appeals to the idea that an agent wrongs a victim by acting in the victim’s personal domain in a way that the victim does not control. For a consent-giver to control a consent-receiver’s conduct in virtue of the consent-receiver being guided by their consent, there must be successful communication between the consent-giver and the consent-receiver.
{"title":"The Successful Communication Principle","authors":"T. Dougherty","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780192894793.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780192894793.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the case for the ‘Successful Communication Principle’ for the scope of consent, according to which an action falls within the scope of someone’s consent when the consent-giver successfully communicates an intention to permit this action. This principle pairs with a view of consent as consisting in successful communication between the consent-giver and the consent-receiver. This principle and view can be motivated by the Control Argument, which appeals to the idea that an agent wrongs a victim by acting in the victim’s personal domain in a way that the victim does not control. For a consent-giver to control a consent-receiver’s conduct in virtue of the consent-receiver being guided by their consent, there must be successful communication between the consent-giver and the consent-receiver.","PeriodicalId":327090,"journal":{"name":"The Scope of Consent","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123409221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780192894793.003.0008
T. Dougherty
This chapter argues that we should reject the Intention Condition, according to which an action falls within the scope of consent only if the consent-giver intends to permit this action. There are two key objections to the Intention Condition. The False Belief Objection concerns the possibility that a consent-giver lacks a permissive intention because they express their consent while falsely believing that this expression does not constitute valid consent. The Mistake Objection concerns consent-givers who make mistakes when communicating consent. Because of these mistakes, the consent-givers do not intend to permit certain actions, even though their behaviour expresses permission for these actions. When the consent-giver’s intentions diverge from their public behaviour, the scope of their consent is determined by the appropriate interpretation of their behaviour. Since the Intention Condition implies otherwise, we must reject the Intention Condition. Since the Intention Condition is entailed by both the Permissive Intention Principle and the Successful Communication Principle, we must reject both these principles.
{"title":"Why We Should Reject the Intention Condition","authors":"T. Dougherty","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780192894793.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780192894793.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that we should reject the Intention Condition, according to which an action falls within the scope of consent only if the consent-giver intends to permit this action. There are two key objections to the Intention Condition. The False Belief Objection concerns the possibility that a consent-giver lacks a permissive intention because they express their consent while falsely believing that this expression does not constitute valid consent. The Mistake Objection concerns consent-givers who make mistakes when communicating consent. Because of these mistakes, the consent-givers do not intend to permit certain actions, even though their behaviour expresses permission for these actions. When the consent-giver’s intentions diverge from their public behaviour, the scope of their consent is determined by the appropriate interpretation of their behaviour. Since the Intention Condition implies otherwise, we must reject the Intention Condition. Since the Intention Condition is entailed by both the Permissive Intention Principle and the Successful Communication Principle, we must reject both these principles.","PeriodicalId":327090,"journal":{"name":"The Scope of Consent","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124954234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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