Pub Date : 2019-05-02DOI: 10.31585/JBBA-2-2-(1)2019
P. Goorha
We consider the potential blockchains have for building a framework for all manner of contracts that can characterize an economy using the unifying idea of control over their duration. Such a contractual cryptoeconomy (**CCE**) would accommodate a broader variety of contracts than smart contracts, which are suitable for a relatively small portion of the set of all feasible contracts. We proceed by examining the idea of a contract’s natural life as a common feature shared across all contracts, be they incomplete or complete. This simplifying idea suggests why providing flexibility over a contract’s duration on a blockchain – through innovations such as HTLCs — is necessary to increasing the variety of contracts that can be feasibly represented. We also assess participation in a CCE that features blockchains with differing degrees of security. We do so by focusing on how the value of a contract is related directly to its natural life for both its immediate participants and, through externalities across the CCE, to a wider set of users. A key idea provides the overall impetus: When contracts rely on third-party intermediation, at least some contractual surplus is dissipated in arbiter rent, making the quality of third-party arbitration as important as its scale. By contrast, blockchains create contractual mechanisms that act as Coasian exchanges that can internalize this arbiter rent. However, crucially, the degree to which their use requires forgoing contractual complexity and absorbing the cost of externalities can determine the relative benefits provided by a CCE.
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This article considers social and cooperative enterprises whose governance differs categorically from the shareholder corporation, and asks what scope there is for these alternative formats of the firm to transform what has become a “market society” into a more social market economy, in which society and its interests and ordering are embedded into the way markets function. In this way, the article asks whether we can embed society within the firm itself by structuring firms in ways that are more open to societal interests beyond those that are mediated through market incentives. These possibilities also force us to reconsider whether certain forms of social and cooperative enterprises that have traditionally been celebrated as achieving wider political concerns, do in fact enable this embedding of society in the firm.
{"title":"Embedding Society in the Firm — The Role of Social and Cooperative Enterprise in Shaping Capitalism","authors":"N. Boeger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3008987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3008987","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers social and cooperative enterprises whose governance differs categorically from the shareholder corporation, and asks what scope there is for these alternative formats of the firm to transform what has become a “market society” into a more social market economy, in which society and its interests and ordering are embedded into the way markets function. In this way, the article asks whether we can embed society within the firm itself by structuring firms in ways that are more open to societal interests beyond those that are mediated through market incentives. These possibilities also force us to reconsider whether certain forms of social and cooperative enterprises that have traditionally been celebrated as achieving wider political concerns, do in fact enable this embedding of society in the firm.","PeriodicalId":345158,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Markets as Institutions (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122044898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper proposes a method for introducing ‘context’ within the contractual environment based on a simple application of intuitive control theory. A market-based contractual space is framed within the larger formal institutional space and an even larger cultural space – the spaces together forming a contextual environment. Each space is characterized by a governing law built on a selection of control mechanisms that differ in their approach as well as their reliance on information from feedback. I suggest how these governing laws tie together the contextual spaces and present some ideas on how they might evolve over time through interaction with other spaces.
{"title":"Towards a Cross-Disciplinary and Contextual Contract Theory","authors":"P. Goorha","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2837454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2837454","url":null,"abstract":"The paper proposes a method for introducing ‘context’ within the contractual environment based on a simple application of intuitive control theory. A market-based contractual space is framed within the larger formal institutional space and an even larger cultural space – the spaces together forming a contextual environment. Each space is characterized by a governing law built on a selection of control mechanisms that differ in their approach as well as their reliance on information from feedback. I suggest how these governing laws tie together the contextual spaces and present some ideas on how they might evolve over time through interaction with other spaces.","PeriodicalId":345158,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Markets as Institutions (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123484695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-09-17DOI: 10.4324/9781315702414-11
A. Zaman
In face of the strong conflict between market norms and social norms, peaceful co-existence is impossible. In traditional societies, markets were subordinated to society. Modern society emerged via a number of revolutions which made society subordinate to markets. This led to a reversal of traditional values of social cooperation and harmony with nature. Instead, men, nature, society became objects to be exploited for creating profits. A market society generates profits by exploiting men and nature, and requires increasing profits to sustain itself. This process has run into its limits as planetary resources are being destroyed on a scale large enough to threaten the planet. Saving the planet requires reversing the transition to modernity by subordinating markets to society. This is a difficult task.
{"title":"Markets and Society","authors":"A. Zaman","doi":"10.4324/9781315702414-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315702414-11","url":null,"abstract":"In face of the strong conflict between market norms and social norms, peaceful co-existence is impossible. In traditional societies, markets were subordinated to society. Modern society emerged via a number of revolutions which made society subordinate to markets. This led to a reversal of traditional values of social cooperation and harmony with nature. Instead, men, nature, society became objects to be exploited for creating profits. A market society generates profits by exploiting men and nature, and requires increasing profits to sustain itself. This process has run into its limits as planetary resources are being destroyed on a scale large enough to threaten the planet. Saving the planet requires reversing the transition to modernity by subordinating markets to society. This is a difficult task.","PeriodicalId":345158,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Markets as Institutions (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127340118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stability is often the goal for clearinghouses in matching markets, such as those matching residents to hospitals, students to schools, etc. Stable outcomes absent transfers need not be utilitarian efficient, suggesting the potential value of transfers. We study the wedge between stability and efficiency in large one-to-one matching markets. We show stable matchings are efficient asymptotically for a large class of preferences. In these environments, stability remains an appealing objective even on efficiency grounds, and monetary transfers are not necessary for efficiency purposes. Nonetheless, for severely imbalanced markets, when preferences entail sufficient idiosyncrasies, stable outcomes may be inefficient even asymptotically.
{"title":"On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets","authors":"SangMok Lee, Leeat Yariv","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2464401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464401","url":null,"abstract":"Stability is often the goal for clearinghouses in matching markets, such as those matching residents to hospitals, students to schools, etc. Stable outcomes absent transfers need not be utilitarian efficient, suggesting the potential value of transfers. We study the wedge between stability and efficiency in large one-to-one matching markets. We show stable matchings are efficient asymptotically for a large class of preferences. In these environments, stability remains an appealing objective even on efficiency grounds, and monetary transfers are not necessary for efficiency purposes. Nonetheless, for severely imbalanced markets, when preferences entail sufficient idiosyncrasies, stable outcomes may be inefficient even asymptotically.","PeriodicalId":345158,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Markets as Institutions (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121645844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The modern global textile industry requires cotton with strong and consistent fibers in order to produce high quality goods at the high speeds necessary to recover capital costs. The introduction of high volume instrument (HVI) measurement of cotton fiber quality has strengthened the link between cotton prices and attributes on world markets. The spread of genetically modified (GMO) cotton in India has driven India to the second ranked producer and exporter of cotton in the world. However, contamination and other quality problems are endemic to Indian cotton. Using a unique data set of Indian cotton prices and quality attributes from 5 Indian states, this study uses hedonic price modeling to demonstrate that the linkages between cotton quality and price are weaker in India than they are in the United States.
{"title":"Markets, Institutions, and the Quality of Agricultural Products: Cotton Quality in India","authors":"G. Naik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2124395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2124395","url":null,"abstract":"The modern global textile industry requires cotton with strong and consistent fibers in order to produce high quality goods at the high speeds necessary to recover capital costs. The introduction of high volume instrument (HVI) measurement of cotton fiber quality has strengthened the link between cotton prices and attributes on world markets. The spread of genetically modified (GMO) cotton in India has driven India to the second ranked producer and exporter of cotton in the world. However, contamination and other quality problems are endemic to Indian cotton. Using a unique data set of Indian cotton prices and quality attributes from 5 Indian states, this study uses hedonic price modeling to demonstrate that the linkages between cotton quality and price are weaker in India than they are in the United States.","PeriodicalId":345158,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Markets as Institutions (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122101958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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