Pub Date : 2020-04-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198827399.003.0003
C. Möllers
This chapter examines pairs of conceptual alternatives in order to develop a notion of what marks a normative practice. These are alternatives between which many theories of normativity implicitly or explicitly take sides. This chapter is concerned with a critique of the notion that norms could appropriately be described by reference to these alternatives or juxtapositions. This form of critique is necessary because in many theories of normativity one of these alternatives is presented as the exclusive explanatory option. Because the deficit of this approach does not simply lie in the quality of the explanatory option presented, but already in discussing questions of normativity within such a framework of alternatives. That is because these alternative pairs are assumed to conceptually mislead in their exclusivity. As distinctions, these alternatives have a limited descriptive capacity; as exclusive, counter-positional alternative pairs, they lead to lamentably narrow notions of social normativity.
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Pub Date : 2020-04-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198827399.003.0008
C. Möllers
This chapter offers some research perspectives. In the realm of empirics, it discusses a twofold level of observation and examines the description of forms as a point of departure. It also looks at the observation of social norms. Next, this chapter turns to norms beyond functional differentiation and autonomy. Here, it considers Luhmann's model of the pure norm. It comments on the inevitable hybrid character of social norms as well. In addition to these remarks, the chapter turns toward the challenge of historicism and the project of a comparison of theories, after which it discusses two perspectives on normativity succeeding—over-normativization and under-normativization.
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Pub Date : 2020-04-03DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198827399.003.0004
C. Möllers
This book elaborates on a concept of the normative. It aims to explicate what is meant when norms are spoken of as such. Hence, this book is only concerned with developing a concept of the normative; it seeks to crystallize that which makes a norm a norm. In doing so, the focus is limited to a concept of social norms, of norms that have arisen out of a social context. Questions with which every practice of social norms sees itself confronted are compared and contrasted with philosophical theories of the morally appropriate. What implication does it have for the value and accuracy of philosophical theories of morally right action that social norms need a location, a time, and a form of illustration, that one has to be able to perceive them? Along such a line of inquiry, moral norms represent an important reference, though frequently they are only used as a contrast. Social norms such as religious commandments, legal prescriptions, or rules of etiquette operate quite differently from norms that are typically debated in practical philosophy. The commonalities of social norms are thus the object of this book.
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