Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833666.003.0007
H. Lawford-Smith
The Conclusion summarizes the chapter content of the book and restates some of the major findings on culpability, blame, and punishment. It poses further questions for consideration, relating particularly to collective punishment and a shift from immoral to moral institutional cultures.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"H. Lawford-Smith","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198833666.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833666.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The Conclusion summarizes the chapter content of the book and restates some of the major findings on culpability, blame, and punishment. It poses further questions for consideration, relating particularly to collective punishment and a shift from immoral to moral institutional cultures.","PeriodicalId":348129,"journal":{"name":"Not In Their Name","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132634802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833666.003.0004
H. Lawford-Smith
In light of the failure of the preferred model to count as a collective agent on the strong or moderate accounts, this chapter turns to the citizen-exclusive state. It outlines the structure of two versions of the model—one accounting for the separation of powers and one including only the smallest group with decision-making power in government. It argues that the bigger group is characterized by two important features: it has a hierarchical power structure, and it includes ‘nested’ agency (some of its members are collective agents rather than individuals). The chapter concludes with a general discussion of whether this group has both agency and moral agency, and argues that it does.
{"title":"Is the Citizen-Exclusive State an Agent?","authors":"H. Lawford-Smith","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198833666.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833666.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"In light of the failure of the preferred model to count as a collective agent on the strong or moderate accounts, this chapter turns to the citizen-exclusive state. It outlines the structure of two versions of the model—one accounting for the separation of powers and one including only the smallest group with decision-making power in government. It argues that the bigger group is characterized by two important features: it has a hierarchical power structure, and it includes ‘nested’ agency (some of its members are collective agents rather than individuals). The chapter concludes with a general discussion of whether this group has both agency and moral agency, and argues that it does.","PeriodicalId":348129,"journal":{"name":"Not In Their Name","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127701083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198833666.003.0005
H. Lawford-Smith
This chapter returns to the outstanding issue of whether citizens might have responsibility for what their states do in a weaker form than culpability. That is to say, even if they are not members of the collective agent that is the state, they might nonetheless come to have responsibilities for what it does. In the first part of the chapter, the focus is on whether weak collective agency can support collective culpability, and it is argued, through a thought experiment in three variations, that it cannot. In the second part of the chapter, the focus is on alternatives to culpability, including complicity, association, benefit, privilege, and assistance. Difficulties with some of these are noted, but it is argued that there may yet be responsibilities from several of these sources, particular when there are ‘culpability shortfalls’.
{"title":"Citizens’ Culpability and Responsibility for States’ Actions","authors":"H. Lawford-Smith","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198833666.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198833666.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter returns to the outstanding issue of whether citizens might have responsibility for what their states do in a weaker form than culpability. That is to say, even if they are not members of the collective agent that is the state, they might nonetheless come to have responsibilities for what it does. In the first part of the chapter, the focus is on whether weak collective agency can support collective culpability, and it is argued, through a thought experiment in three variations, that it cannot. In the second part of the chapter, the focus is on alternatives to culpability, including complicity, association, benefit, privilege, and assistance. Difficulties with some of these are noted, but it is argued that there may yet be responsibilities from several of these sources, particular when there are ‘culpability shortfalls’.","PeriodicalId":348129,"journal":{"name":"Not In Their Name","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114442278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198833666.003.0003
H. Lawford-Smith
Chapter 3 asks whether the citizen-inclusive model described in Chapter 2 meets the conditions for collective agency. A range of theories of collective agency are presented, grouped according to strength: strong accounts, moderate accounts, and weak accounts. After presenting each account, the chapter determines whether the state is likely to count as a collective agent on any of these theories. It also considers the distinction between agency and moral agency, and whether the state can be said to have the latter. The chapter concludes with a more general discussion of whether the citizenry is the kind of group likely to meet strong or moderate conditions, and argues that it is not because it is fundamentally unorganized. The conclusion is that an understanding of the state as the citizenry taken together should be rejected.
{"title":"Is the Citizen-Inclusive State an Agent?","authors":"H. Lawford-Smith","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198833666.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198833666.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 3 asks whether the citizen-inclusive model described in Chapter 2 meets the conditions for collective agency. A range of theories of collective agency are presented, grouped according to strength: strong accounts, moderate accounts, and weak accounts. After presenting each account, the chapter determines whether the state is likely to count as a collective agent on any of these theories. It also considers the distinction between agency and moral agency, and whether the state can be said to have the latter. The chapter concludes with a more general discussion of whether the citizenry is the kind of group likely to meet strong or moderate conditions, and argues that it is not because it is fundamentally unorganized. The conclusion is that an understanding of the state as the citizenry taken together should be rejected.","PeriodicalId":348129,"journal":{"name":"Not In Their Name","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123134327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833666.003.0006
H. Lawford-Smith
This chapter returns to the issue of what the normative implications of collective culpability are for members of the collective (e.g. those in government, public services, defence forces and the police). After setting aside some preliminary worries with the idea of collective punishment, the chapter argues for a distribution of culpability under a particular transformation: proportional to hierarchy in the collective. This entails that all members get a share in the collective’s culpability, but some get a greater share than others. This conclusion is defended against several objections, including the problem that some employees may have done all they could to prevent a collective harm taking place.
{"title":"Governmental Culpability","authors":"H. Lawford-Smith","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198833666.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833666.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter returns to the issue of what the normative implications of collective culpability are for members of the collective (e.g. those in government, public services, defence forces and the police). After setting aside some preliminary worries with the idea of collective punishment, the chapter argues for a distribution of culpability under a particular transformation: proportional to hierarchy in the collective. This entails that all members get a share in the collective’s culpability, but some get a greater share than others. This conclusion is defended against several objections, including the problem that some employees may have done all they could to prevent a collective harm taking place.","PeriodicalId":348129,"journal":{"name":"Not In Their Name","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134174633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-28DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198833666.003.0002
H. Lawford-Smith
Chapter 2 focuses on alternative conceptions of the state. It presents several different models of the state drawn from different academic disciplines: political science, international relations, political philosophy, and international law. These include states as political leaders; states as unified national governments; states as defined in the Montevideo Convention; states as the citizenry taken together (at least in democratic states); states as competing organizations; and states as competing leaders of organizations. It is argued that particular attention should be paid to two of these models: the citizenry taken together (because this accords well with ordinary intuitions about what the state is), and a version of the unified national governments model that restricts membership in the state to those involved in the wider government administration. Both of these models are taken forward into Chapters 3 and 4 (respectively), in asking whether each group counts as a collective agent, capable of intentional action.
{"title":"What is The State?","authors":"H. Lawford-Smith","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198833666.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198833666.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 2 focuses on alternative conceptions of the state. It presents several different models of the state drawn from different academic disciplines: political science, international relations, political philosophy, and international law. These include states as political leaders; states as unified national governments; states as defined in the Montevideo Convention; states as the citizenry taken together (at least in democratic states); states as competing organizations; and states as competing leaders of organizations. It is argued that particular attention should be paid to two of these models: the citizenry taken together (because this accords well with ordinary intuitions about what the state is), and a version of the unified national governments model that restricts membership in the state to those involved in the wider government administration. Both of these models are taken forward into Chapters 3 and 4 (respectively), in asking whether each group counts as a collective agent, capable of intentional action.","PeriodicalId":348129,"journal":{"name":"Not In Their Name","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129851788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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