The Trump administration has argued that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has failed to address China's "unfair" trade practices. While it is true that China's economic rise poses a unique challenge to the world trading system, WTO dispute settlement has more potential to address China's practices than the administration believes. If the Trump administration really does want the Chinese economy to be more market-oriented, it should consider making better use of WTO rules by filing more complaints against China. While it is often accused of flouting the rules, China does a reasonably good job of complying with WTO complaints brought against it. There are a number of policy areas where additional complaints are possible. The U.S. Trade Representative's Office (USTR) has been gathering detailed information on China's practices for years, and should file complaints on this basis, coordinating these efforts with key allies. And for those areas that are not well covered by WTO rules, such as state-owned enterprises, the United States should work with these allies to develop new rules. So far, the Trump administration has mainly relied on unilateral tariffs to open the Chinese market, but these are likely to hurt Americans, while not having much effect on Chinese trade practices. The multilateral route is a better approach to disciplining these trade practices and making China more market-oriented.
{"title":"Disciplining China's Trade Practices at the WTO: How WTO Complaints Can Help Make China More Market-Oriented","authors":"J. Bacchus, S. Lester, Huan Zhu","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3246579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3246579","url":null,"abstract":"The Trump administration has argued that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has failed to address China's \"unfair\" trade practices. While it is true that China's economic rise poses a unique challenge to the world trading system, WTO dispute settlement has more potential to address China's practices than the administration believes. If the Trump administration really does want the Chinese economy to be more market-oriented, it should consider making better use of WTO rules by filing more complaints against China. While it is often accused of flouting the rules, China does a reasonably good job of complying with WTO complaints brought against it. \u0000There are a number of policy areas where additional complaints are possible. The U.S. Trade Representative's Office (USTR) has been gathering detailed information on China's practices for years, and should file complaints on this basis, coordinating these efforts with key allies. And for those areas that are not well covered by WTO rules, such as state-owned enterprises, the United States should work with these allies to develop new rules. \u0000So far, the Trump administration has mainly relied on unilateral tariffs to open the Chinese market, but these are likely to hurt Americans, while not having much effect on Chinese trade practices. The multilateral route is a better approach to disciplining these trade practices and making China more market-oriented.","PeriodicalId":348907,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Enforcement of International Law (Topic)","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134450264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses comparatively the enforcement procedures of the Ecuadorian judgment in the famous Chevron case, related to environmental damages caused by oil drilling in Ecuador. Enforcement of the judgment was proposed in several American countries, such as the United States, Canada, Argentina and Brazil. The central issue is how private international law can assure the enforcement of a foreign decision related to human rights against a multinational business conglomerate. Central arguments used in the enforcement decisions concerned the legal separateness of subsidiaries and the public order exception. Some procedures are still pending final decision. The methodology used in this article involves a bibliographical and documental review, mainly of legislation and court decisions.
{"title":"A Comparative Analysis of International Enforcement Procedures in the Chevron Case","authors":"G. Navarro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3179426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3179426","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses comparatively the enforcement procedures of the Ecuadorian judgment in the famous Chevron case, related to environmental damages caused by oil drilling in Ecuador. Enforcement of the judgment was proposed in several American countries, such as the United States, Canada, Argentina and Brazil. The central issue is how private international law can assure the enforcement of a foreign decision related to human rights against a multinational business conglomerate. Central arguments used in the enforcement decisions concerned the legal separateness of subsidiaries and the public order exception. Some procedures are still pending final decision. The methodology used in this article involves a bibliographical and documental review, mainly of legislation and court decisions.","PeriodicalId":348907,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Enforcement of International Law (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115108926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Blockchain is coming to tax administration and will cause fundamental change. This article considers the potential for blockchain technology as it applies to the introduction of a value added tax in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Blockchain technology disrupts centralized ledgers. Blockchain improves efficiency, security and transparency. Perhaps no centralized ledger system presents more challenges than that of the modern tax administration. The central data storage system of a modern tax authority contains all return, payment, and audit activity for all taxpayers arranged tax-by-tax for three years or longer periods of time. It is likely that blockchain will come first to jurisdictions like the GCC, where there is no pre-existing tax system to be “disrupted.” This is the familiar technological “leap-frog” effect where jurisdictions without an established infrastructure in place can quickly move to new technologies without needing to pass through the entire development process. This is a common occurrence in African economies. For those who are attentive to the coming blockchain disruption there are some precursor developments already visible. In the restaurant sector, Quebec mandates encryption of transaction data, requires the monthly submission of a digital summary report, performs AI-base risk analysis on the aggregate data streams to identify fraud patterns, and completes most audits remotely. Rwanda has gone further. It implemented a DICE compliance regime for all businesses, and requires full transactional data transmission daily (not just summary reports submitted monthly). Rwanda performs the same AI-based risk analysis for fraud detection. In addition, Rwanda appears ready to adopt a cross-border DICE system with neighboring Tanzania.
{"title":"Blockchain, Bitcoin, and VAT in the GCC: The Missing Trader Example","authors":"R. T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2919056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2919056","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain is coming to tax administration and will cause fundamental change. This article considers the potential for blockchain technology as it applies to the introduction of a value added tax in the Gulf Cooperation Council. \u0000Blockchain technology disrupts centralized ledgers. Blockchain improves efficiency, security and transparency. Perhaps no centralized ledger system presents more challenges than that of the modern tax administration. The central data storage system of a modern tax authority contains all return, payment, and audit activity for all taxpayers arranged tax-by-tax for three years or longer periods of time. \u0000It is likely that blockchain will come first to jurisdictions like the GCC, where there is no pre-existing tax system to be “disrupted.” This is the familiar technological “leap-frog” effect where jurisdictions without an established infrastructure in place can quickly move to new technologies without needing to pass through the entire development process. This is a common occurrence in African economies. \u0000For those who are attentive to the coming blockchain disruption there are some precursor developments already visible. In the restaurant sector, Quebec mandates encryption of transaction data, requires the monthly submission of a digital summary report, performs AI-base risk analysis on the aggregate data streams to identify fraud patterns, and completes most audits remotely. Rwanda has gone further. It implemented a DICE compliance regime for all businesses, and requires full transactional data transmission daily (not just summary reports submitted monthly). Rwanda performs the same AI-based risk analysis for fraud detection. In addition, Rwanda appears ready to adopt a cross-border DICE system with neighboring Tanzania.","PeriodicalId":348907,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Enforcement of International Law (Topic)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124636164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The 'Great recession' that has been ongoing since 2008 has had a serious impact on the realization of economic and social rights in many countries. When the balancing between limited economic resources and the discretion granted to states for the realization of economic and social rights results in an adverse impact on the lives of individuals, the attention is commonly turned to improving the state of the protection scheme. Yet, as the economic crisis has re-invoked practically all classical debates concerning economic and social rights, it has also revealed the depth of the controversies involved. Further development of the economic and social rights protection scheme in face of austerity measures may therefore be an insurmountable task.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Austerity and Human Rights Law","authors":"Viljam Engström","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2734659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2734659","url":null,"abstract":"The 'Great recession' that has been ongoing since 2008 has had a serious impact on the realization of economic and social rights in many countries. When the balancing between limited economic resources and the discretion granted to states for the realization of economic and social rights results in an adverse impact on the lives of individuals, the attention is commonly turned to improving the state of the protection scheme. Yet, as the economic crisis has re-invoked practically all classical debates concerning economic and social rights, it has also revealed the depth of the controversies involved. Further development of the economic and social rights protection scheme in face of austerity measures may therefore be an insurmountable task.","PeriodicalId":348907,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Enforcement of International Law (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127936426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Counterclaims are claims raised by respondents. Various international courts and tribunals have expressed their jurisdiction to hear counterclaims as an emanation of their inherent powers, even though their constitutive instruments are silent. Modern rules of court often contain provisions on counterclaims. So do the principal instruments and rules regulating international investment arbitration and international commercial arbitration. Counterclaims allow a tribunal to streamline and simplify the settlement of complex international disputes, where parties each present claims related to the same underlying dispute. However, respondent States may opportunistically squeeze tenuously related ‘counterclaims’ within the ambit of the jurisdiction established over the principal claim. This chapter addresses the role of counterclaims before the ICJ and international investment arbitration tribunals.
{"title":"Counterclaims in International Law","authors":"M. Waibel, J. Rylatt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2511847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2511847","url":null,"abstract":"Counterclaims are claims raised by respondents. Various international courts and tribunals have expressed their jurisdiction to hear counterclaims as an emanation of their inherent powers, even though their constitutive instruments are silent. Modern rules of court often contain provisions on counterclaims. So do the principal instruments and rules regulating international investment arbitration and international commercial arbitration. Counterclaims allow a tribunal to streamline and simplify the settlement of complex international disputes, where parties each present claims related to the same underlying dispute. However, respondent States may opportunistically squeeze tenuously related ‘counterclaims’ within the ambit of the jurisdiction established over the principal claim. This chapter addresses the role of counterclaims before the ICJ and international investment arbitration tribunals.","PeriodicalId":348907,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Enforcement of International Law (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116338793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When the European Union imposed a ban on the import of seal products, Canada and Norway challenged that ban at the World Trade Organization. This paper analyzes the issues and reasoning in the 2013 Dispute Settlement Panel decision, with some attention to the Appellate Body decision that followed. Among the important questions are the definition of a "technical regulation" as well as particular interpretations of the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The decision dealt more generally with the balance between a nation’s right to regulate in support of its citizens’ moral concerns and trading partners’ rights to market access.
{"title":"EC – Seal Products (TBT Aspects of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports): Seals and Sensibilities","authors":"Philip I. Levy, D. Regan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2487490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2487490","url":null,"abstract":"When the European Union imposed a ban on the import of seal products, Canada and Norway challenged that ban at the World Trade Organization. This paper analyzes the issues and reasoning in the 2013 Dispute Settlement Panel decision, with some attention to the Appellate Body decision that followed. Among the important questions are the definition of a \"technical regulation\" as well as particular interpretations of the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The decision dealt more generally with the balance between a nation’s right to regulate in support of its citizens’ moral concerns and trading partners’ rights to market access.","PeriodicalId":348907,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Enforcement of International Law (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125484772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper aims at shedding some light on the dynamics of competition among off-shore centers that attract capitals of illicit origins. The paper takes a relational approach, focusing on the relations established between off-shore centers and criminal organizations, in order to design the optimal international financial regulation. The main problem faced by off-shore countries is one of devising a credible commitment not to behave opportunistically ex post the exchange with criminal organizations. More specifically, off-shore centers need to post a "hostage" that increases criminal organizations' trust in the exchange. This result is ensured by a solid reputation as a supplier of criminal financial services and by dependence on revenues generated by money laundering. In a world of bounded rationality, contracts are hopelessly incomplete. Ex post mechanisms of governance of the relations are pivotal. Keeping the quality of regulation constant, off-shore centers that will be able to offer gap filling devices of superior quality will be in an advantageous position. The paper focuses on one of such devices, i.e. an efficient judiciary. The paper derives some implications for devising an international response to the threat posed by such countries. On a battleground where reputation is a fundamental weapon, a per se "name and shame" approach may even prove counterproductive. It may in fact increase the transaction specific nature of investments in reputation, thus cementing the commitment of off-shore centers. Names should be named, but only if blacklisting goes hand in hand with other appropriate countermeasures. The paper also argues that, due to the perverse nature of competition among off-shore centers, countermeasures should be aimed at skimming off the most important suppliers, rather than trying to hit in a non discriminating way all countries in the market.
{"title":"It Takes Two to Tango: International Financial Regulation and Off-Shore Centres","authors":"D. Masciandaro, A. Portolano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.289541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.289541","url":null,"abstract":"The paper aims at shedding some light on the dynamics of competition among off-shore centers that attract capitals of illicit origins. The paper takes a relational approach, focusing on the relations established between off-shore centers and criminal organizations, in order to design the optimal international financial regulation. The main problem faced by off-shore countries is one of devising a credible commitment not to behave opportunistically ex post the exchange with criminal organizations. More specifically, off-shore centers need to post a \"hostage\" that increases criminal organizations' trust in the exchange. This result is ensured by a solid reputation as a supplier of criminal financial services and by dependence on revenues generated by money laundering. In a world of bounded rationality, contracts are hopelessly incomplete. Ex post mechanisms of governance of the relations are pivotal. Keeping the quality of regulation constant, off-shore centers that will be able to offer gap filling devices of superior quality will be in an advantageous position. The paper focuses on one of such devices, i.e. an efficient judiciary. The paper derives some implications for devising an international response to the threat posed by such countries. On a battleground where reputation is a fundamental weapon, a per se \"name and shame\" approach may even prove counterproductive. It may in fact increase the transaction specific nature of investments in reputation, thus cementing the commitment of off-shore centers. Names should be named, but only if blacklisting goes hand in hand with other appropriate countermeasures. The paper also argues that, due to the perverse nature of competition among off-shore centers, countermeasures should be aimed at skimming off the most important suppliers, rather than trying to hit in a non discriminating way all countries in the market.","PeriodicalId":348907,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Enforcement of International Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125828690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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