Pub Date : 2021-10-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0008
Jeffrey S. Sutton
This chapter explains the myriad restrictions that state constitutions place on state legislatures—such as single-subject rules, clear-title, and public-purpose clauses—and the kinds of problems that prompted them. The clear-title rule requires the subject of each bill to be expressed plainly in its title. The single-subject requirement ensures that each bill enacted by the legislature contains just one subject. The original-purpose requirement requires a final bill to line up with the stated purpose of the original bill. These limitations grew naturally out of a preoccupation of the Jacksonian era, curbing special interests. The US Constitution does not place comparable restrictions on Congress.
{"title":"State Legislatures and Distrust","authors":"Jeffrey S. Sutton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explains the myriad restrictions that state constitutions place on state legislatures—such as single-subject rules, clear-title, and public-purpose clauses—and the kinds of problems that prompted them. The clear-title rule requires the subject of each bill to be expressed plainly in its title. The single-subject requirement ensures that each bill enacted by the legislature contains just one subject. The original-purpose requirement requires a final bill to line up with the stated purpose of the original bill. These limitations grew naturally out of a preoccupation of the Jacksonian era, curbing special interests. The US Constitution does not place comparable restrictions on Congress.","PeriodicalId":360105,"journal":{"name":"Who Decides?","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123662126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0006
Jeffrey S. Sutton
This chapter compares the unitary executive at the federal level with the plural executive at the state level. The fifty state constitutions and the United States Constitution share a “surface similarity” in describing the authority of their chief executives: They both vest executive power in a governor or president. But in practice, there are many differences. At the national level, the US Constitution places all executive authority in one president who controls the executive-branch officers through the singular authority to choose all cabinet members. What’s called a unitary executive largely is one, given the president’s authority to hire and fire these executive branch officers. Contrast the state side. In response to the states’ colonial experiences with a monarch, many of the first state constitutions created weak executive branches. All but one of the original state constitutions also mandated that the governor work alongside an executive council. In many states, constitutional executive offices—secretary, treasurer, auditor—are often chosen by the legislature. The rise of the state attorneys general as a source of local and national power offers one illustration of the salience of the plural executive.
{"title":"One Chief Executive or Many?","authors":"Jeffrey S. Sutton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter compares the unitary executive at the federal level with the plural executive at the state level. The fifty state constitutions and the United States Constitution share a “surface similarity” in describing the authority of their chief executives: They both vest executive power in a governor or president. But in practice, there are many differences. At the national level, the US Constitution places all executive authority in one president who controls the executive-branch officers through the singular authority to choose all cabinet members. What’s called a unitary executive largely is one, given the president’s authority to hire and fire these executive branch officers. Contrast the state side. In response to the states’ colonial experiences with a monarch, many of the first state constitutions created weak executive branches. All but one of the original state constitutions also mandated that the governor work alongside an executive council. In many states, constitutional executive offices—secretary, treasurer, auditor—are often chosen by the legislature. The rise of the state attorneys general as a source of local and national power offers one illustration of the salience of the plural executive.","PeriodicalId":360105,"journal":{"name":"Who Decides?","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126227516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0002
Jeffrey S. Sutton
In the United States, the growth of judicial power started as a way to curb over-reaching, sometimes corrupt, state legislatures and manifested itself in allowing the judicial branch, as opposed to the other branches, to resolve more disputes over contracts, property, debts, and other distinctly nineteenth-century problems. For the last seventy-five years or so, however, something else has propelled its influence: the growth of constitutional review at the federal level, the power to invalidate state and federal civil laws and executive branch actions as well as state and federal criminal prosecutions. This chapter discusses what has become an acutely American dilemma, a fear that the courts will do too little in enforcing constitutional rights and a fear they will do too much. It considers the problems posed in each direction and the risks of politicizing the federal courts if they become the exclusive source of identifying constitutional individual and structural rights.
{"title":"Umpiring and Gerrymandering","authors":"Jeffrey S. Sutton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, the growth of judicial power started as a way to curb over-reaching, sometimes corrupt, state legislatures and manifested itself in allowing the judicial branch, as opposed to the other branches, to resolve more disputes over contracts, property, debts, and other distinctly nineteenth-century problems. For the last seventy-five years or so, however, something else has propelled its influence: the growth of constitutional review at the federal level, the power to invalidate state and federal civil laws and executive branch actions as well as state and federal criminal prosecutions. This chapter discusses what has become an acutely American dilemma, a fear that the courts will do too little in enforcing constitutional rights and a fear they will do too much. It considers the problems posed in each direction and the risks of politicizing the federal courts if they become the exclusive source of identifying constitutional individual and structural rights.","PeriodicalId":360105,"journal":{"name":"Who Decides?","volume":"723 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127566994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0012
Jeffrey S. Sutton
When it comes to the who-decides questions at the local level, the states have been versatile over time, developing more and more democratic answers. At the national level, the country remains largely fixed in an eighteenth-century republican form of government, one that remains non-democratic in many ways. Are there ways in which these two different approaches to government can complement each other? The conviction of this book is that American constitutional structure cannot be understood without appreciating how the national and state governments handle it. The hope is that a greater appreciation of American federalism offers ways to improve the functioning of each side. The epilogue addresses the gap between the increasingly democratic state governments and non-democratic federal government, the role of the state and federal courts in addressing change, and the structural values of federalism and localism in creating stable and lasting change.
{"title":"Epilogue","authors":"Jeffrey S. Sutton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197582183.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"When it comes to the who-decides questions at the local level, the states have been versatile over time, developing more and more democratic answers. At the national level, the country remains largely fixed in an eighteenth-century republican form of government, one that remains non-democratic in many ways. Are there ways in which these two different approaches to government can complement each other? The conviction of this book is that American constitutional structure cannot be understood without appreciating how the national and state governments handle it. The hope is that a greater appreciation of American federalism offers ways to improve the functioning of each side. The epilogue addresses the gap between the increasingly democratic state governments and non-democratic federal government, the role of the state and federal courts in addressing change, and the structural values of federalism and localism in creating stable and lasting change.","PeriodicalId":360105,"journal":{"name":"Who Decides?","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126911832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-25DOI: 10.4324/9781315050492-36
M. Urofsky, Philip E. Urofsky
{"title":"Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass’n","authors":"M. Urofsky, Philip E. Urofsky","doi":"10.4324/9781315050492-36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315050492-36","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":360105,"journal":{"name":"Who Decides?","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126120625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Due Process of Dying","authors":"Michael Flick","doi":"10.4324/9781315050492-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315050492-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":360105,"journal":{"name":"Who Decides?","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124556256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Not Resuscitate: The Failure to Protect the Incompetent Patient’s Right of Self-Determination","authors":"E. Shaver","doi":"10.4324/9781315050492-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315050492-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":360105,"journal":{"name":"Who Decides?","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117320712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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